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Disasters have devastating impacts on societies, aecting millions of people
and businesses each year. The delivery of essential goods to beneciaries in
the aftermath of a disaster is one of the main objectives of relief logistics. In
this context, selecting suitable locations for three dierent types of essential
facilities is central: warehouses, distribution centers, and points of distribution.
The present dissertation aims to improve relief logistics by advancing the
location selection process and its core components.
Five studies published as companion articles address substantial aspects of
relief logistics. Despite the case studies’ geographical focus on Germany,
valuable insights for relief logistics are derived that could also be applied to
other countries. Study A addresses the importance of public-private collabo-
ration in disasters and highlights the signicance of considering dierences in
resources, capabilities, and strategies when using logistical models. Moreover,
power dierences, information sharing, and partner selection also play an
important role. Study B elaborates on the challenges to identify candidate
locations for warehouses, which are jointly used by public and private actors,
and suggests a methodology to approach the collaborative warehouse selec-
tion process. Study C investigates the distribution center selection process
and highlights that including decision-makers’ preferences in the objective
function of location selection models helps to raise awareness of the implica-
tions of location decisions and increases transparency for decision-makers
and the general population. Study D analyzes the urban water supply in
disasters using a combination of emergency wells and mobile water treatment
systems. Selected locations of mobile systems change signicantly if vulnera-
ble parts of the population are prioritized. Study E highlights the importance
of accurate information in disasters and introduces a framework that allows
determining the value of accurate information and the planning error due to
inaccurate information.
In addition to the detailed results of the case studies, four general recommen-
dations for authorities are derived: First, it is essential to collect information
iii
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before the start of the disaster. Second, training exercises or role-playing
simulations with companies will help to ensure that planned collaboration
processes can be implemented in practice. Third, targeted adjustments to the
German disaster management system can strengthen the country’s resilience.
Fourth, initiating public debates on strategies to prioritize parts of the popula-
tion might increase the acceptance of the related decision and the stockpiling
of goods for the people who know in advance that they will likely not receive
support.
The present dissertation provides valuable insights into disaster relief. There-
fore, it oers the potential to signicantly improve the distribution of goods
in the aftermath of future disasters and increase disaster resilience.
iv
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1 Introduction and Motivation
The rst wave of the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the vulnerability of
supply chains during disasters in an unprecedented way. All over the world,
shortages for a large variety of products were reported in the media, from
toilet-paper (The Washington Post 2020) and disinfection liquids (abcNEWS
2020) to clinical ventilators (The New York Times 2020).
As a response to these shortages, German authorities stepped up, collabo-
rated closely with organizations and companies from the private sector, and
implemented measures to ensure the population’s supply. For example, au-
thorities supported farmers ying in desperately needed seasonal workers
(DW 2020b), purchased medical goods such as masks (The Local 2020) or
ventilators (Reuters 2020), or distributed goods to vulnerable parts of the popu-
lation with the help of the Bundeswehr (DW 2020f). Moreover, the installation
of dierent types of facilities was a critical component of their relief inter-
vention. At the beginning of the pandemic, these facilities were, for instance,
mobile test facilities to conduct tests for Sars-Cov-2 (DW 2020e), warehouses
to store a large number of masks (Merkur 2020), or temporary hospitals to
oer additional space for critical care patients (DW 2020a). Later, issues such
as the location of vaccination centers became relevant (DW 2020d).
The selected facility locations strongly aect the outcome of the intervention.
For instance, a remotely located temporary hospital will most likely not
ll with patients. Moreover, it will be dicult to supply it with essential
goods. Similarly, a warehouse without access to the road network would
not be an ecient selection. Therefore, scientic studies optimizing location
decisions in disasters provide the opportunity to improve relief logistics. For
example, Moline, Goentzel, and Gralla (2019) show that applying a dedicated
decision support tool for opening and operating temporary disaster recovery
centers can reduce average costs by 75%. However, integrating knowledge
from scientic studies supporting such location decisions is exceptionally
challenging. According to Kovács and Moshtari (2019), this may be due to a
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vast majority of available studies being too abstract and assumption-based.
Moreover, the combination of the unique disaster situation, high time pressure,
and the time it takes to adjust existing models further increase complexity
(Kovács and Moshtari 2019). Consequently, optimization models that support
location decisions are more likely to prevail in the practical world if they are
developed specically for an anticipated decision. Additionally, they need to
include the local specicities, dynamics, and available resources (Kovács and
Moshtari 2019).
In this context, the project "NOLAN"1 was initiated, aiming to improve the
German population’s supply with critical goods during disasters. It is funded
by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and coor-
dinated by the Institute for Industrial Production at the Karlsruhe Institute of
Technology (IIP 2020). One key component of the project is to support Ger-
man authorities in their logistical decision making. The present dissertation,
together with the companion articles, has been developed in the context of
this project and was inspired by numerous discussions and workshops with
experts from German authorities and the private sector.
The dissertation aspires to support decision-makers before and during disas-
ters. Moreover, disaster resilience is increased with the help of ve studies ad-
dressing German disaster management authorities’ location decisions. These
ve studies assess the selection of dierent facilities along the relief chain2 –
from warehouses via distribution centers to distribution points. The studies
provide several approaches for decision-makers faced with these concrete
decisions. Furthermore, indirect implications can be generalized into four
cross-study topics, which lead to managerial recommendations for disaster
management authorities. Consequently, the dissertation provides essential
insights for researchers and practitioners and can, thereby, improve resilience
against future disasters.
The dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 includes an overview
of related terms and literature. Chapter 3 outlines the research objectives
of the dissertation. The results of the individual studies are highlighted in
chapter 4, before the managerial implications of the studies are discussed
1 "Scalable Emergency Logistics for Urban Areas as Public-Private Emergency Collaboration,"
in German: "Skalierbare Notfall-Logistik für urbane Räume als Public-Private Emergency
Collaboration."
2 An overview of the theoretical background of relief chains follows in chapter 2.4.
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in chapter 5. Finally, the dissertation is summarized and critically examined in




2.1 Classification of Disasters
The term "disaster" can be derived from Latin, being translated as "away
from the stars" (Coppola 2007, p. 25). From a superstitious perspective, an
unlucky constellation of the stars leads to drastic consequences (Eshghi and
Larson 2008). According to the International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent, "a disaster is a sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts
the functioning of a community or society and causes human, material, and
economic or environmental losses that exceed the community’s or society’s
ability to cope using its own resources. Though often caused by nature,
disasters can have human origins" (IFRC 2020).
The classication characteristics of disasters include the root of the disas-
ter and the time it takes for the disaster to unfold (Coppola 2007). In this
context, disasters can either be triggered by technological malfunctions or
occur naturally (EM-Dat 2020). Examples of technological disasters are ex-
plosions in chemical plants or nuclear reactors. Natural disasters include,
inter alia, landslides or hurricanes. Considering the time it takes for a disaster
to unfold, sudden- and slow-onset disasters are distinguished (Gupta et al.
2016). Sudden-onset disasters include earthquakes and ash-oods, while
slow-onset disasters include droughts and famine. Depending on the disaster
context, a variety of actors can become active and play an essential role.
2.2 Active Organizations in Disasters
The activity of dierent actors strongly depends on the local characteristics of
the disaster area. While a less developed country like Mozambique required
much international support in the aftermath of Cyclone Idai (UNOCHA 2020),
the economically more mature United States coped with recent hurricanes
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primarily on their own – especially due to a strong public and private sector
(NASEM 2020). Consequently, disaster research always has to consider the
local context and available resources, making the transfer of knowledge
challenging.
Considering Germany, which is rarely aected by large-scale natural disasters,
public disaster management is based on the principle of subsidiarity and lies
in the remit of the federal states (BMI 2015). For example, in the federal state
of Baden-Württemberg, either the direct local administration (e.g., mayors’
oces or the oces of the district administration), the "Regierungspräsidium"
(the regional council), or the Ministry of the Interior Baden-Württemberg
(MIDMBW 2020) are responsible. The responsible organization is mainly de-
termined by the disaster’s geographic concentration (MIDMBW 2020). If more
than one district is aected, responsibility shifts towards the Regierungsprä-
sidium. If more than one Regierungspräsidium is aected, the Ministry of
the Interior is in charge. Moreover, the escalation stage of the local adminis-
tration is bypassed in case of an incident in the vicinity of nuclear facilities
(MIDMBW 2020).
Due to the dierent resources and shifts of responsibilities during an es-
calating disaster, the collaboration between dierent agencies and bureaus
is necessary to account for departments’ dierent resources and expertise.
This process of mutual support for each other is organized with "Amtshilfe"
applications, formalizing responsibilities and costs of the collaboration (see,
for instance, BMI (2015) for an overview of the process for inter-state dis-
aster assistance). Moreover, the German government installed the Federal
Oce of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) as a federal agency
subordinate to the Federal Ministry of the Interior. The BBK is in charge
of "matters related to civil protection and disaster assistance" (BMI 2020).
For example, they support preparedness measures (BBK 2020) or provide
information and coordination during disasters with their Joint Information
and Situation Centre (GMLZ; BMI (2020)).
The scientic literature underlies the BBK’s signicant role by stressing the
importance of coordination and collaboration of all involved actors, even
though each actor of an emergency may play a crucial role for a successful
intervention (Balcik, Beamon, et al. 2010). For example, Holguín-Veras, Jaller,
et al. (2012) argue that even though donors have good intentions, their do-
nations often do not address the population’s actual needs. Delivering these
goods to disaster areas leads to congestion of transportation infrastructure
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and, consequently, inhibits the supply of essential goods. At the same time,
humanitarian organizations cannot oend donors by turning down oered
goods (Holguín-Veras, Jaller, et al. 2012). Another example is the dierent
legal power. While authorities can respond to a disaster by adjusting rules
and regulations, logistics service providers need to follow these specications.
Even though they can try to achieve legal adjustments through lobbying,
coordination is essential to avoid disruptions in supply chains.
The collaboration of authorities and private actors during emergencies is
essential since both actors play a central role in supplying the population
(Nurmala, Leeuw, and Dullaert 2017; Nurmala, Vries, and Leeuw 2018). In
ordinary times, private actors supply goods to the population. Following
Diehlmann, Lüttenberg, et al. (2020, p. 8), private actors include all "rms
involved in the supply of essentials like food or medicine (e.g., producers,
retailers, or logistics service providers)." On the other hand, authorities become
responsible during disasters. Thereby, the term "authorities" refers to all public
actors, dened as "institutions and organizations under the control of public
authorities on a federal and/or provincial level" (Diehlmann, Lüttenberg, et al.
2020, p. 7).
Collaboration between public and private actors falls under the umbrella-term
of Public-private Emergency Collaboration (PPEC; Wiens et al. (2018)). PPECs
are necessary since, in many cases, public or private actors cannot cope with
a disaster by themselves. This is, inter alia, caused by the dierent periods
each actor becomes active. For example, the locations of supermarkets are
selected to provide goods to the population in ordinary times. On the other
hand, a disaster might come with limited mobility of the population, demand-
ing shorter distances between people and points of distribution. Therefore,
dierent suggestions for maximum walking distances in disasters exist in
the literature (EPA 2011; Fischer and Wienand 2013). For example, the Ger-
man Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear
Safety denes the maximum walking distance as 1 km (BMUB 2014). However,
the average distance between a person and a supermarket in Germany is
above 3 km (Neumeier 2014), indicating that the private sector’s distribution
infrastructure will not be sucient and collaboration necessary.
Due to the signicant impact of disasters on society, combined with the
variety of disaster types, practitioners and researchers need to prepare for
potential disasters, manage the response towards disasters eciently, and
learn from past disasters. These processes are classied in the so-called
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Disaster Management Cycle (DMC), which is a core component of disaster
management literature (H. Khan, Vasilescu, and A. Khan 2008).
2.3 The Disaster Management Cycle
The following four repeating phases dene the DMC (Coppola 2007):1 Re-
sponse, Recovery, Mitigation, and Preparedness (see Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Overview of the Disaster Management Cycle.
The Response-Phase starts right after the impact of a disaster, focusing on
providing relief to the aected area. After the immediate consequences of
the disaster are survived, the Recovery-Phase becomes paramount, aiming to
"returning victims’ lives back to a normal state" (Coppola 2007, p. 8), or even
to "build back better" (Mannakkara, Wilkinson, and Francis 2014, p. 1). While
it might take months or years to go through the Recovery-Phase (Coppola
2007), the following Mitigation-Phase addresses the impact of potentially
upcoming disasters, mitigating the eect of future incidents. Finally, the
Preparedness-Phase’s objective is to reduce the impact of a specic upcoming
disaster (Coppola 2007).
1 Note that the phases uently go into each other and may overlap. Furthermore, a variety of
disciplines (for example, sociology or psychology) aected the DMC, leading to unclear origins
of the concept (Coetzee and van Niekerk 2012), as well as some variations within the naming of
the DMC’s components (for example, some scholars prefer the name Prevention-Phase instead
of the more frequently used term Mitigation-Phase (Baldini et al. 2011; BMIAT 2020)).
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Around 80% of the costs of the immediate disaster response is caused by lo-
gistics (van Wassenhove 2006), indicating the importance of ecient logistics
management. According to Christopher (2016, p. 2), logistics can be dened
as "the process of strategically managing the procurement, movement and
storage of materials, parts and nished inventory (and the related information
ows) through the organisation and its marketing channels in such a way
that current and future protability are maximised through the cost-eective
fullment of orders."
The stream of research focusing on logistics in the context of disasters falls
under the umbrella term of Humanitarian Logistics. Like traditional business
logistics, the management of the ow of goods, information, and nances is
central in this stream (Kovács and Spens 2007). However, humanitarian logis-
tical models need to address the particular characteristics of disasters. These
characteristics are, for instance, the pursuit of (partially) non-nancial objec-
tives, the lack of information, or the often "once-in-a-lifetime"-periodicity of
decisions (in contrast to repetitive decisions in business logistics; Holguín-
Veras, Jaller, et al. (2012, p. 499)).
Humanitarian Logistics is central to two dierent types of disaster operations:
continuous aid and disaster relief (Kovács and Spens 2007). Continuous aid
refers to continuous support during long-lasting crises like providing supplies
to a refugee camp. In contrast, disaster relief refers to the response in the
aftermath of a disaster. Thus, relief logistics includes all logistical aspects of
providing goods during disaster relief. The present dissertation aspires to
support decision-makers during their relief logistics decisions. Consequently,
the next subsection’s focus is on the related key components.
2.4 Relief Logistics
According to Suzuki (2012), relief logistics consists of three major streams:
network ow problems, inventory management, and facility location problems.
While "network ow problems consist of supply and demand points, together
with several routes that connect these points and are used to transfer the
supply to the demand" (Bertsekas 1998, p. 2), inventory management refers
to "planning and controlling inventory from the raw material stage to the
customer" (Arnold, Chapman, and Clive 2008, p. 254). Moreover, facility
location problems focus on "determining the ’best’ location for one or several
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facilities or equipments in order to serve a set of demand points” (Laporte,
Nickel, and Saldanha da Gama 2019, p. 1).
Depending on the relief network’s considered layout, a plethora of facility
types and decisions can be analyzed. In general, a relief network consists
of Central Warehouses, which represent the origin of the goods in the net-
work, and the Points of Distribution (PoDs), where beneciaries receive goods.
Moreover, Distribution Centers can serve as auxiliary infrastructure, e.g. as
pre-positioning locations in anticipation of a disaster (Cotes and Cantillo 2019)
or as cross-docks for transportation (see also Figure 2.2). Multiple variations
of this basic setting exist in the literature – for instance, including a relief
chain without additional distribution centers (Balcik and Beamon 2008), or
taking warehouses out of the scope when addressing last-mile optimizations
(Noyan, Balcik, and Atakan (2016); see also Anaya-Arenas, Renaud, and Ruiz
(2014) for a systematic review).
Figure 2.2: Overview of a generic relief chain.
The selection of appropriate facility locations along the relief chain is chal-
lenging. However, there is already a variety of studies addressing dierent
decisions. For example, Charles et al. (2016) analyze optimal locations for
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global warehouses of an international organization, while Khayal et al. (2015)
present a tool to select locations for temporary distribution centers. Moreover,
Moreno et al. (2018) introduce an approach to select PoDs under consideration
of uncertainties.
Nevertheless, multiple research areas have not been studied thoroughly yet.
Therefore, additional studies can improve relief logistics further. An overview
of the research objectives that are pursued within the present dissertation,
together with related relief decisions, follows in the next chapter. A detailed




The present dissertation aims to contribute to the body of literature and
improve the outcome of future relief interventions with the help of ve
scientic studies. The following section provides a brief overview of the
addressed research objectives. Afterward, section 3.2 locates the studies
within the relief chain.
3.1 Opportunities to Improve Relief Logistics
3.1.1 Increase Knowledge About Public-Private
Collaborations
As described in section 2.2, various actors become active during disaster
relief. These actors contribute to the disaster response depending on their
individual motivation, objectives, and resources. In this context, the role and
importance of the dierent groups of actors have been studied intensively
(see, e.g., Kovács and Spens (2007) and Balcik, Beamon, et al. (2010)). The
ecient collaboration of all actors involved is key to relief logistics (Balcik,
Beamon, et al. 2010). This becomes especially important considering PPECs
(Nurmala, Leeuw, and Dullaert (2017), Nurmala, Vries, and Leeuw (2018), and
Wiens et al. (2018); see also section 2.2). However, there are no frameworks
or general studies that address possible logistical components that should
be included in quantitative PPEC models. Moreover, the identication of
these components can be a catalyst for future PPEC research. This research
objective is pursued in Study A.
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3.1.2 Support Decision-Makers Selecting Locations for
Warehouses
The locations of warehouses strongly aect the impact of relief logistics. In
this context, location factors play a central role. Location factors represent
the factors that aect the decision for a new facility (Schmenner, Huber,
and Cook 1987). Many studies already elaborated on dierent factors in the
commercial context, e.g., focusing on dierent industry sectors (Saracoglu
2020) or countries (Ramírez-Alesón and Fleta-Asín 2016). Moreover, several
studies analyzed location factors in the humanitarian context (see, for example,
Dekle et al. (2005) and Roh, Jang, and Han (2013)). However, there is no study
contrasting location factors from both perspectives, comparing dierent
regions’ attractiveness. This is remarkable since these results are of high
value for disaster authorities and private actors that want to collaborate.
Moreover, there is no methodology available to identify potential locations
for jointly used (warehouse) facilities. Study B approaches this research
objective.
3.1.3 Include Preferences in Objective Functions
Appropriate objective functions are highly debated in the eld of humanitarian
logistics. While the rst humanitarian logistics studies applied commercial
objectives towards humanitarian contexts, novel approaches allow researchers
to account for the special characteristics of a disaster response (Holguín-
Veras, Jaller, et al. 2012; Holguín-Veras, Pérez, et al. 2013). One of these novel
approaches is considering the concept of social costs, which was introduced
to the humanitarian sector by Holguín-Veras, Jaller, et al. (2012). The main
dierence to the commercially used approaches is the combination of a proxy
for human suering, so-called deprivation costs, with logistics costs. However,
several limitations inhibit applying the model in studies (see, for example,
Shao et al. (2020) for a recent discussion of the advantages and disadvantages
of deprivation costs). Consequently, extending the concept of social costs can
facilitate the application of the approach and, therefore, allow researchers
and decision-makers to better account for humanitarian specicities in their
models. While there are multiple opportunities to extend the concept, an
option with high relevance for practitioners is to include decision-makers’
preferences with the help of a weighted-sum approach. This research gap is
approached in Study C.
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3.1.4 Take Advantage of Synergies Utilizing All Available
Resources
Researchers developed various approaches to dene humanitarian supply
chains (see, for example, Charles et al. (2016) and Balcik and Beamon (2008)).
In particular, humanitarian water supply chains received much attention. For
example, Clasen and Boisson (2006) investigate the application of household-
based ceramic water lters, Dorea, Bertrand, and Clarke (2006) the application
of clariers on the community level, or Garsadi et al. (2009) the application of
mobile water treatment systems. However, there is no study that focused on
the combination of mobile treatment systems and the already installed local
emergency infrastructure. An example of local infrastructure is the German
emergency well system, consisting of grid-independent wells distributed all
over Germany. In Berlin, more than 900 wells can provide water during
emergencies (Fischer and Wienand 2013).
Combining the available resources is challenging since it emphasizes the
problem of prioritization. A supply chain based on non-mobile wells oers
little exibility. Even though the well network has been extended in the
last decades, the well system was initially designed during the cold war.
Consequently, the t with the local demographics is highly questionable. On
the other hand, a large amount of water can be distributed via wells.
In contrast, mobile systems oer high exibility, while the total amount of
water that can be distributed through them is comparably low. The combina-
tion of both technologies oers the chance to supply a large amount of water
to the general population while prioritizing vulnerable groups. However, the
consequences for the general population that arise from the prioritization
of vulnerable people need to be well-understood to make such an important
decision. Study D contributes to this stream of research.
3.1.5 Collect More Accurate Information
Accurate information is crucial for successful disaster interventions (Altay
and Labonte 2014; Celik and Corbacioglu 2010; Day, Junglas, and Silva 2009).
When it comes to the demand for critical goods, much knowledge lies within
the hands of private actors, who interact with their customers regularly. On
the other hand, authorities need to obtain access to accurate information – for
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example, by conscating or purchasing information (as done by the US FEMA
(Federaltimes 2019)). Even though research agrees that uncertainty plays an
important role in relief logistics (Ahmadi, Sei, and Tootooni 2015; Charles
et al. 2016; Vahdani et al. 2018), the eects of dierent information accuracy
levels remain unclear. Simultaneously, there is no approach for quantifying
the eects of dierent intervention strategies on the private sector if the
decision is based on accurate or inaccurate information. Understanding these
eects is the objective of Study E.
3.2 Addressed Decisions Within the Relief Chain
The studies address dierent decisions along the relief chain (see also Figure
2.2). Study A provides a general framework and insights relevant to decisions
on each relief chain stage. Moreover, Study B supports the warehouse loca-
tion decision, and Study C aims to identify locations of distribution centers.
Furthermore, Studies D and E suggest locations where critical goods can be
distributed during disaster relief.
Moreover, ecient facility location decisions in relief logistics are always
accompanied by a multitude of preconditions and consequential implica-
tions. Even though these aspects are often not directly considered in logistics
problems, they strongly aect the success of facility location decisions. The
study-based design allows deriving managerial recommendations regarding
four of such general cross-study topics: Information Management, Company
Involvement, German Specities, and Trade-os.
Information Management refers to the importance of information in disas-
ters, while Company Involvement aims to increase the understanding, how
authorities can better involve companies in their relief interventions. More-
over, German Specicities include implications targeted towards the German
infrastructure that follow from the case studies’ geographical focus. Finally,
all insights that aim to improve the understanding of conicting objectives
are collected in the domain of Trade-os.
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Study A Study B Study C Study D Study E
Information Management X X X X
Company Involvement X X X X
German Specicities X X X
Trade-os X X X X
Table 3.1: Overview on the contributions of each study to the cross-study topics.
Table 3.1 links the studies to the cross-study topics. A description of the studies
and their results follows in the next chapter. The managerial implications
derived from the cross-study topics are discussed in chapter 5.
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4 Summary of Studies and Results
4.1 Study A: A Framework for Public-Private
Emergency Collaborations
The following section refers to the content of the article "Public-Private
Collaborations in Emergency Logistics: A Framework based on Logistical and
Game-Theoretical Concepts." This article was written in collaboration with
Markus Lüttenberg, Lotte Verdonck, Marcus Wiens, Alexander Zienau, and
Frank Schultmann, and was published in the KIT-IIP Working Paper Series in
Production and Energy as Diehlmann, Lüttenberg, et al. (2020).
Study context and contributions
The study’s objective is to provide an overview of PPECs in theory and prac-
tice, introduce a framework for the logistical and game-theoretical modeling
of PPEC components, and discuss a basic game-theoretical model depicting a
simplied PPEC.
As crises of the past have shown, authorities cannot cope with large-scale
disasters by themselves (see, for example, the response to Hurricane Katrina in
the United States (Department for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
2006)). While researchers have identied various organizations involved in
disaster relief (see section 2.2), Nurmala, Leeuw, and Dullaert (2017) and
Nurmala, Vries, and Leeuw (2018) highlight the central role of private actors
in disasters. Moreover, Wiens et al. (2018) stress the potential of PPECs.
However, no study provides an overview of the state-of-the-art of PPECs,
their key components, and essential aspects to consider in quantitative PPEC
studies. This gap is addressed in Study A. A presentation of the main results
and points of discussion of the study follows.
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Results and Discussion
Even though the literature clearly indicates that PPECs are promising compo-
nents of eective disaster responses, only a minimal number of PPECs are
formally dened in reality. While there is no apparent reason for their scarcity,
examples from the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted that, nevertheless, PPECs
can be introduced spontaneously. An example is the support of private actors
during the purchasing process of face masks. After authorities struggled to
nd enough suppliers of face masks, they asked private actors to take over
negotiations and use their contacts to acquire masks for them (Tagesschau.de
2020). Moreover, private actors got actively involved and started producing
critical goods themselves (Focus 2020).
The already established PPECs, on the other hand, tend to target broader
preparedness-topics. For example, the German UP-KRITIS, a working group
consisting of experts from the public and private sector, aims to increase
critical infrastructure resilience and general knowledge exchange (UPKRITIS
2019). A reason for this could be that private companies want to keep their
independence and exibility, as indicated by Walmart after they rejected the
role of "emergency merchandise supplier" (Chen et al. 2013, p. 136). There-
fore, authorities should aim for a collaboration on a voluntary basis without
legal commitment if they wanted to set-up a formalized PPEC with an opera-
tional focus. In this context, the (intermediate) results of the research project
"NOLAN," in which researchers from the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology,
the TU Dresden, and the 4ow AG systematically investigate PPECs (IIP
2020), seem to be very promising. The research partners plan to establish the
so-called "AK NOLOG," a permanent working group where public and private
actors can collaboratively increase the understanding of the operational relief
distribution processes, share best practices, get to know each other better,
and organize disaster exercises.
In addition to the insights and implications from the discussion of the state-
of-the-art of PPECs, the logistical modeling framework provides valuable
guidance for researchers and practitioners who want to analyze PPECs quan-
titatively (Figure 4.1).
From a logistical perspective, dierences in resources, capabilities, and strate-
gies are essential. For example, tensions may arise from competing long-term
strategies: While private actors usually follow nancial objectives to satisfy
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Figure 4.1: Interdependencies in Public-Private Emergency Logistics (see also Figure A.3).
shareholders or ensure their long-term liquidity, public actors can focus on re-
ducing the population’s suering. Moreover, power dierences, information
sharing, and partner selection are important aspects to consider. Legal aspects
can be examples of power dierences since public actors have the power to
adjust the legal context of the intervention (as, for instance, happened all over
the world during various partial or full lockdowns as part of the COVID-19
pandemic response). Additionally, the game-theoretical model and example
developed in Study A indicate the powerful implications drawn from such
quantitative PPEC analyses.
4.2 Study B: Selecting Locations for Warehouses in
PPECs
The following section refers to the content of the article "Identifying Joint
Warehouse Locations in Public-Private Emergency Collaborations." This arti-
cle was written in collaboration with Maximilian Löel, Alexander Zienau,
Markus Lüttenberg, Marcus Wiens, Stephan Wagner, and Frank Schultmann,
and has been submitted to a scientic journal.
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Study context and contributions
The study’s objective is to compare the suitability of dierent regions as a
warehouse location from authorities’ and companies’ perspectives and to
develop a methodology to select locations for shared warehouses. These
warehouses can be used to supply goods to the general population during
ordinary times and to beneciaries during disasters.
Private actors supply goods to the population with the help of supply chains
that continuously aim to increase their eciency. While authorities observe
the market in ordinary times, they need to intervene when the supply drops
in times of a disaster. For example, German authorities stepped up during the
COVID-19 pandemic and, among other things, loosened driving restrictions
for logistics providers (BMVI 2020) or supported farmers during the harvest
workers’ immigration process (BReg 2020). Furthermore, in case of more
severe disturbances, authorities can activate goods from the so-called "Zivile
Notfallreserve" (eng: "Civil emergency reserve"), in which large amounts
of rice or legumes are stored (BLE 2020). Furthermore, the "Bundesreserve
Getreide" (eng: "Federal grain reserve") oers large amounts of wheat and
other grains (BLE 2020). Even though these goods could provide helpful relief
to beneciaries, various operational and legal factors inhibited the activation
of these resources (Rexroth 2010). Consequently, authorities spend much
money maintaining goods they barely need (Rexroth 2010).
One approach for increasing the relief chain’s exibility and eciency in-
cludes involving private actors more directly in disaster preparedness. For
instance, this incorporates using their infrastructure and goods in disasters
instead of setting up new supply chains. While this requires many operational
agreements (for example, an increase of safety stock or the prioritization of
deliveries on behalf of authorities), authorities can save money compared to
the current, non-cooperative setup by defunding the barely used infrastruc-
ture. Hence, part of this money could be spent setting incentives for private
actors and, thus, lead to solutions from which both actors prot.
The selection of a location both actors benet from is a challenging task. In
the context of this study, it is approached in two ways. With the help of
a structured approach, it is possible to determine a region’s general attrac-
tiveness as a quantitative score using expert interviews, AHP, and selected
metrics. Furthermore, this score can be utilized as one of the objectives of
a series of mixed-integer linear models with goal-programming objectives.
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These models suggest the structures of dierent logistics networks using
actor-specic combinations of objectives. Following, mapping the dierent
networks leads to solutions that are of interest to both actors. These loca-
tions can, therefore, be the starting point for discussions on candidate PPEC
locations.
Overall, the study contributes to the body of literature in two dierent ways.
First, the attractiveness score represents a very exible approach to evaluating
and comparing dierent regions’ suitability. It can support PPEC-practitioners
to understand the required characteristics of the partner better. Second, the
introduced models eectively combine multiple objectives and oer a unique
perspective of collaborative location selection for disaster preparedness. A
presentation of the main results and points of discussion of the study fol-
lows.
Results and Discussion
The results of the case study underline the possibilities and exibility of the
approach. While the attractiveness score was determined for Germany, the op-
timization models were restricted to the federal state of Baden-Württemberg
to reduce the computational complexity.
Figure 4.2 highlights the scores that result from a total of thirteen interviews
with experts from the private sector, authorities, NGOs, and consulting rms.1
These experts assessed nine criteria for their importance. Combined with
more than thirty metrics, the nal scores for the attractiveness of a region as
a location for a warehouse from the perspectives of the private sector (Figure
4.2a) and relief authorities (Figure 4.2b) result.
While the criteria "Market in Proximity" and "Availability and Skills of Labor
Force" have the highest inuence on the commercial attractiveness score,
"Availability of Transport Equipment" and "Transport Infrastructure Reliability
and Resilience" inuence the emergency score most. Even though regions’
attractiveness diers signicantly, it is possible to identify some areas of high
attractiveness for both actors. For example, large parts of the federal states of
1 Accounting for inconsistencies in the data, the results of six commercial and six emergency
experts were considered in the study.
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4.2 Study B: Selecting Locations for Warehouses in PPECs
Nordrhein-Westfalen or Baden-Württemberg seem to be promising options
for both actors.
Moreover, the scores are an input of various optimization models. These
models determine optimal warehouse network set-ups, considering logistics
costs and attractiveness (commercial scenario), or logistics costs, deprivation
costs, and attractiveness (emergency scenario). Figure 4.3a highlights the
dierent networks. In the commercial scenario, two dierent subscenarios
are considered to reect the potential target markets. A market share of
10% represents a situation in which one large food retail chain tries to set-
up a network. On the other hand, a market share of 100% represents a
hypothetical monopolist representing the entire market supply. It follows
that a municipality close to Stuttgart is included in each scenario’s network,
while various locations are a component of two dierent networks. These
locations could be candidate locations if both actors wanted to open a new
jointly used warehouse.
Furthermore, the exibility of the approach is highlighted with the help of
two dierent extensions. In Extension I, the twenty-one warehouses of the
largest six German retailers are considered as candidate locations. Figure 4.3b
presents the selected locations. Moreover, Extension II regards the hypothet-
ical case that one retailer wanted to extend its network by one warehouse
that can be used as an emergency warehouse.
Comparing the results of the extensions, it becomes evident that the number
of candidate locations signicantly aects the network’s operational per-
formance (measured in costs and deprivation). The network that is based
on all retail chains’ locations (Extension I) leads to better results than an
extension of the warehouses of one chain (Extension II). It can be followed
that authorities should aim to increase their exibility by collaborating with
multiple chains. Furthermore, this also minimizes market interference by
avoiding to "pick winners."
The study comes along with multiple limitations. For example, establishing
an entirely new distribution network is a thought experiment that is not likely
to happen in reality. Structures develop over a long period and organically,
making the extensions considering existing infrastructure more relevant for
a practical application of the model. Moreover, individual companies might
have dierent strategies and objectives, leading to more complex optimiza-
tion problems, if applied in practice. Furthermore, disaster dynamics are not
included. If, for example, critical infrastructure damage comes with a disaster,
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4.3 Study C: Selecting Locations for Temporary Distribution Centers
highways might become blocked and negatively aect a location’s suitability.
Finally, dierent legal conditions, including dierent public administrations
and interpretation of responsibilities, are present. Disaster management in
Germany is highly localized, while a federal agency runs the emergency
warehouses. Therefore, adaptations and adjustments on the country-wide
level are only possible if the local disaster plans are adjusted, which will be
challenging to coordinate. Nevertheless, the study oers a exible methodol-
ogy to identify potential locations of collaborative warehouse locations and,
therefore, constitutes an essential contribution to increased resilience.
4.3 Study C: Selecting Locations for Temporary
Distribution Centers
The following section refers to the content of the article "A Novel Approach
to Include Social Costs in Humanitarian Objective Functions." This article
was written in collaboration with Patrick S. Hiemsch, Marcus Wiens, Markus
Lüttenberg, and Frank Schultmann, and was published in the KIT-IIP Working
Paper Series in Production and Energy as Diehlmann, Hiemsch, et al. (2020).
Study context and contributions
The study’s objective is to advance the original approach to use social costs
(SC) in humanitarian objective functions.
This approach was introduced by Holguín-Veras, Jaller, et al. (2012) and
Holguín-Veras, Pérez, et al. (2013), who dene SC as the sum of logistics
costs and deprivation costs (DeC). In this context, DeC represent a monetary
approximation of human suering (Holguín-Veras, Pérez, et al. 2013), which
is often measured via the willingness to pay for a critical good, assuming
there is a lack of this good after a disaster (Shao et al. 2020). For example, a
person with a water demand of 2 liters per day may survive without water
for a limited time. However, it would not be sucient to supply this person
with 20 liters of water after 10 days since this person will most likely be
dead by then. Moreover, the longer the person is undersupplied, the more
severe the physiological implications and the higher the willingness to pay
for water. Deprivation cost functions (DCFs) reect these eects and are,
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therefore, "monotonic, non-linear, and convex with respect to the deprivation
time" (Holguín-Veras, Pérez, et al. 2013, p. 267). Consequently, this concept
represents a powerful approach to include the escalating suering of the
aected population in considerations. Due to the expression of DeCs in
monetary units, they can be combined with logistics costs and allow decision-
makers to optimize decisions in terms of both components.
Some disadvantages come along with the application of DCFs in relief op-
timization models. For example, the functions are susceptible to the local
economic context and complex to assess (Shao et al. 2020). Wang et al. (2017)
introduce the concept of Deprivation Levels (DL) to solve some of these issues.
In contrast to DCFs, Deprivation level functions (DLFs) capture the suering
of the population on a dimensionless interval of [0; 10]. While this approach
is universal and does not depend on the local economic situation, it is very
complex to determine (Shao et al. 2020). Moreover, DLFs cannot be compared
to or combined with logistics costs.
Considering this background, a novel method is suggested in Study C. It is
based on a normalized weighted sum approach, in which deprivation and
logistics cost are normalized with nadir and ideal points (see also Figure
C.2). The objective of the resulting optimization problem is to minimize the
normalized weighted sum. Therefore, this approach allows decision-makers
to include DCFs (or DLFs) and logistics costs into their decisions fast and
eciently. Furthermore, the approach allows prioritization of one of the
two cost components, dependent on the decision-maker’s preferences. An
example of such a preference could be an international NGO that can spend
every euro saved in one country in another disaster context. Therefore, they
might regard reducing human suering as essential but strategically prefer a
stronger focus on monetary components in the context of a specic disaster.
Consequently, the approach increases transparency regarding decisions and
consequences eectively and oers much exibility to decision-makers.
The approach is applied to a case study for hypothetical water contamination
in the city of Berlin. Water stored in large warehouses outside the city is dis-
tributed at schools all over Berlin. Following Cotes and Cantillo (2019), small
temporary distribution centers (DiCs) are opened to distribute the goods (for
instance, as cross-docks, as an additional buer, or to merge deliveries from
dierent sources). Decision-makers need to select the number and location of
these DiCs from a set of twelve candidate locations (large commercial stores
or warehouses). This decision is approached with a mixed-integer linear
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program that suggests dierent combinations of opened DiCs dependent on
decision-makers’ preferences. A presentation of the main results and points
of discussion of the study follows.
Results and Discussion
The discussion of the results shows the benets of the approach. Figure 4.4
highlights the selected DiCs, dependent on the decision-maker’s preference
for logistics costs (U → 1) or deprivation (U → 0).
Figure 4.4: Opened DiCs for dierent values of U (see also Figure C.5).
The gure indicates the importance of dierent DiCs. For example, DiCs 1, 5,
and 6 are robust solutions and should be opened in any case. Moreover, DiC
11 is featured in a large number of solutions. On the other hand, DiCs 3 and 8
only become relevant in case of a strong preference for deprivation (U ≤ 0.1).
Furthermore, Figure 4.4 shows the variety of the selected location combina-
tions. Therefore, decision-makers need to understand the consequences of
dierent levels of U more thoroughly to make a decision.
Figure 4.5 can support this process. Figure 4.5a presents the course of the
normalized costs and Figure 4.5b the Pareto-Front. As indicated in Figure 4.5a,
deprivation does not signicantly change for U ≤ 0.5, while logistics costs
almost double in this interval. Simultaneously, logistics costs are comparably
stable for U ≥ 0.6, while the contribution of the deprivation component
does not signicantly change. Figure 4.5b further highlights the total costs,
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(a) Normalized values.
(b) Pareto-Front.
Figure 4.5: Normalized values and Pareto-Front of the cost components for dierent values of
U (see also Figures C.6 and C.7).
indicating that DeC are much higher than logistics costs. Consequently, a
reduction of DeC in the range of 1% already reduces the shadow price of the
population’s suering on a level above the total logistics costs, which could
lead decision-makers towards prioritizing deprivation. At the same time, the
highest possible deprivation value is only about 4% above the lowest value,
indicating that the decision does not strongly inuence deprivation in absolute
terms. On the other hand, the highest logistics costs are almost three times
higher than the lowest, indicating that the decision strongly aects logistics
costs. Moreover, logistics costs would have negligible eects in the location
selection process without the normalization. Since the decision mostly aects
logistics costs, normalization could lead decision-makers towards prioritizing
logistics costs.
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The results highlight the extremely challenging task decision-makers face in
disasters and the necessity to support them in making their decision. While
the developed approach can increase transparency and suggest locations, the
decision and consequences need to be accepted by as many people as possible.
Therefore, a broad public debate should be striven for.
Furthermore, the approach still provides opportunities for further improve-
ments and adaptations. While it allows making decisions without dening a
new DCF that ts the local economic context, it still requires a DCF or DLF
as an input parameter. Even though the concept of deprivation is widely
accepted, there is still only a limited number of functions available (Shao
et al. 2020), inhibiting the application in case of a demand for extraordinary
goods. Moreover, the dependency on the preferences of the decision-maker
increases the risk of power abuse. Therefore, it is essential to assess the whole
set of options and discuss the implications of selections with multiple stake-
holders. Despite these limitations, the case study highlighted possibilities to
deepen the understanding of the consequences of disaster relief decisions.
Consequently, the new approach can contribute to better decisions in future
disasters and support decision-makers eectively.
4.4 Study D: Selecting Locations for Mobile Water
Distribution Systems
The following section refers to the content of the article "On the combination
of water emergency wells and mobile treatment systems: a case study of
the city of Berlin." This article was written in collaboration with Christoph
Stallkamp, Markus Lüttenberg, Marcus Wiens, Rebekka Volk, and Frank
Schultmann, and was published in the journal Annals of Operations Research
as Stallkamp et al. (2020).
Study context and contributions
The study’s objective is to develop a tool to support decision-makers in
selecting locations for mobile water purication systems.
The German disaster management authorities have around 4.800 grid-
independent emergency wells at their disposal (BBK 2008). These wells can
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be activated in case of contamination in the water supply system, e.g., caused
by a terrorist attack. Beneciaries visit the wells, pick up water for their im-
mediate demand, and carry the water back home. Consequently, the distance
between the beneciaries and wells should be as short as possible. Since the
wells’ locations were selected and built before Germany got reunited, they
do not reect the demographic properly. This applies especially in areas of
the former GDR (BBK 2008), leading to large distances between beneciaries
and wells. Therefore, an intervention based on wells alone seems to be not
sophisticated enough to account for the population’s suering.
While dierent technologies could be facilitated to increase the supply of
water further (e.g., household-based ceramic water lters (Clasen and Boisson
2006)), mobile water treatment systems (WTS) oer the chance to start a large
scale intervention fast and with a limited number of required components.
Figure 4.6 provides an overview on the study’s components. While module
A aims to determine the water demand, the focus of module B is to provide
an overview of the collection and pre-processing steps for wells and WTS.
Moreover, module C contains the development of a mixed-integer linear
optimization problem to select locations, together with various possibilities
to better understand the trade-os of decisions and, therefore, oer decision
support to authorities.
Figure 4.6: Overview of Study D’s model requirements and modules with the chosen modeling
approaches (modules A, B, C; see also Figure D.1).
34
4.4 Study D: Selecting Locations for Mobile Water Distribution Systems
From an academic perspective, the study oers three main contributions to
the body of literature. First, the introduced structure can be followed when
determining the capacities of an existing well system. Second, a maximum
covering model to support the process of location selection for WTS is intro-
duced. Third, the comparison of dierent trade-os allows decision-makers to
deepen their understanding of relief interventions more thoroughly and, thus,
can improve both preparedness for disasters and the response after future
disasters.
The application of the model to a case study highlights the power of the
approach. Within the case study, the response to hypothetical water con-
tamination in the city of Berlin is analyzed. The German Federal Agency
for Technical Relief (THW) owns 14 large-scale UF-15 WTS that are con-
sidered potential water sources complementing Berlin’s wells. These UF-15
systems can purify up to 300,000 liters of water per day to drinking water
quality. A presentation of the main results and points of discussion of the
study follows.
Results and Discussion
The case study highlights the importance of extending emergency water
supply beyond the limits of emergency wells. Under the selected assumptions,
emergency wells can only oer water to up to 77% of the population’s demand.
On the other hand, this number can increase to up to 84% if WTS complement
the wells. However, the selected locations dier strongly if decision-makers
prioritize parts of the population – e.g., vulnerable groups such as people
in hospitals or nursing homes. The maximization of total supply leads to
WTS-locations that are mostly located on the outskirts of Berlin. On the other
hand, a lexicographic maximization approach, in which vulnerable groups
are prioritized over the general population’s demand, suggests installing
WTS at more central locations. Figure 4.7 highlights the selected locations.
Furthermore, trade-os regarding the maximum length of the supply route,
the required number of WTS to fulll a certain coverage level, and between
cost and coverage are discussed in the published article.
The study eciently highlights the importance of improving the emergency
water distribution system and extending the available resources. Even though
the currently available WTS increase the attainable degree of coverage, it is
not possible to supply water to 16% of the population.
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4.5 Study E: The Value of Accurate Demand Information in PPECs
Moreover, the study sheds light on the trade-os decision-makers have to con-
sider when facing disaster relief decisions. Even though these decision-makers
are usually experienced logisticians, elected politicians, or both, having expert
knowledge in their eld, decisions like prioritizing parts of the population or
investing in specic technologies come with drastic consequences for society.
Therefore, it is necessary to provide people in charge with as much support
as possible. This could be done both with studies like the present one, com-
plemented with public debates. For example, one component of the study
was to understand the eects of an increased number of WTS and to analyze
the eects of a more cost-ecient deployment of expenditures (in favor of
other strategies to use available money). Therefore, considering debates, the
general society needs to start forming a consent about the degree to which
vulnerable people should be prioritized or if it is possible to determine a limit
of tolerable consequences for the general population. Similar debates also
inuenced decisions during the COVID-19 pandemic response, e.g., regarding
tolerable contact restrictions during the Christmas holidays or the tolerable
economic burden due to the large nancial aid volume.
Consequently, the developed approach increases transparency signicantly
and provides decision-makers with valuable information.
4.5 Study E: The Value of Accurate Demand
Information in PPECs
The following section refers to the content of the article "On the Value of
Accurate Demand Information in Public-Private Emergency Collaborations."
This article was written in collaboration with Miriam Klein, Marcus Wiens,
Markus Lüttenberg, and Frank Schultmann, and was published in the KIT-IIP
Working Paper Series in Production and Energy as Diehlmann, Klein, et al.
(2020).
Study context and contributions
The study’s objective is to introduce a framework to quantify the value of
accurate information and the planning error due to incorrect information in
disaster relief.
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Private actors supply goods to the population during ordinary times and in-
teract with their customers regularly. Therefore, they understand the market
better than authorities do, which are mainly during disaster relief. Conse-
quently, authorities are motivated to collect more accurate information. For
example, this can be done by purchasing market data (similar to the US FEMA,
which recently spent 3.6 million USD on market information (Federaltimes
2019)) or, more drastically, by a state-ordered release of demand information
during a disaster. However, these measures represent intense market inter-
ference and should, therefore, be assessed carefully in advance. To support
this assessment, a framework to quantify the value of this information was
developed and introduced in the study.
Figure 4.8 highlights the framework. Assuming a demand spike in the af-
termath of a disaster, supermarket capacities are exceeded, leaving parts of
the population without supplies. Consequently, authorities try to distribute
essential goods to the people who cannot be supplied by the companies any-
more. This is achieved by opening or remodeling facilities for the distribution,
e.g., schools.
While authorities only have access to general demographic information, they
cannot distinguish between dierent characteristics of demand points (DPs)
representing beneciaries. Therefore, they need to treat every DP equally
(grey boxes). On the other hand, private actors understand dierent demand
patterns better. If, for example, people living on a block did not increase their
water purchases during a minor water contamination a couple of months
ago, they most likely will have water stored at home. Therefore, their water
purchases will most likely not increase again, leading to a more specic
assessment of the same people’s demand (green boxes).
Including such information into authorities’ school selection decisions leads
to dierent outcomes (ED-Scenario (Equal Demand) and I-Scenario (Informa-
tion)). Moreover, the combination of the locations selected with inaccurate
information and the real demand points leads to the so-called CO-Scenario
(Combined Outcome), which can be interpreted as the realization of a plan
based on inaccurate information. Consequently, the dierence between CO-
Scenario and ED-Scenario (in terms of a selected key performance indicator)
represents the planning error. Furthermore, the dierence between I-Scenario
and CO-Scenario represents the value of accurate information. Moreover, the
frameworks’ exible set-up allows decision-makers to analyze multiple addi-
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4 Summary of Studies and Results
tional situations and, therefore, oers a valuable contribution for planners,
decision-makers, and researchers.
The framework is applied to a case study of hypothetical water contamination
in the city of Berlin. Assuming a short time spike of water demand, authorities
need to select schools as temporary water distribution points. In the present
case study, these schools’ selection is conducted with a mixed-integer linear
program maximizing the delivered water. Following the framework described
above, authorities can only plan with publicly available census data. Simulta-
neously, supermarkets have more detailed data available.2 A presentation of
the main results and points of discussion of the study follows.
Results and Discussion
Figure 4.9 highlights the selected schools to open within the three scenarios
(ED, CO, and I) in case authorities have the capabilities to open 33 schools.3
In the ED-Scenario, the mixed-integer linear program selected schools mostly
located in Berlin’s center. However, merging the actual demand distribution
with these locations indicates that the locations are not selected adequately
(CO-Scenario). Consequently, 23% fewer goods than planned can be dis-
tributed, representing the planning error. On the other hand, total supply
increases by 19% in case authorities base their plan on accurate demand,
representing the value of information (I-Scenario).
Furthermore, the framework allows for analyzing two extensions. The rst
extension aims towards a better understanding of the intervention’s starting
time. While authorities started operating their school-based distribution after
supermarkets had run out of goods in the basic version of the framework,
extension I regards simultaneously operated schools and supermarkets. Fur-
thermore, the second extension aims to better understand the competition
between supermarkets and school-based distribution centers. In the basic ver-
sion of the framework, school locations were selected considering the demand
that cannot be covered by the supermarkets. In extension II, authorities re-
gard the whole population’s demand and operate the schools simultaneously
2 The study’s market data was simulated due to condentiality reasons.
3 The sum of the capacity of 33 schools and Berlin’s supermarkets roughly equals the total
demand.
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to the supermarkets. Consequently, crowding-out eects are more likely to
occur.
Figure 4.10 presents the amount of water distributed via the dierent dis-
tribution channels for the basic version of the framework and the two ex-
tensions. In contrast to the intuitively expected result, crowding-out eects
are weaker in the case of a more intense market intervention. By selecting
schools that maximize the total supply through supermarkets and schools,
authorities implicitly consider the maximization of supermarkets’ supply into
their optimization models. Consequently, supermarkets benet from stronger
interventions and are recommended to collaborate with authorities if they
expect an intervention. If, for example, authorities reached out and asked for
information on areas that are expected to become undersupplied by the pri-
vate sector, they could consider sharing additional information on the whole
supply. However, it has to be noted that crowding-out cannot be avoided.









ED CO I ED CO I ED CO I
Supermarket School Total
Delivered Water via Distribution Channel 
(L=33 schools)
Framework Extension I Extension II
Figure 4.10: Overview of the amount of water distributed via schools, supermarkets, and total
within the dierent model extensions.
The study oers multiple directions for future research. First, the assumption
of a static disaster context might not hold in reality. Examples of potentially
dynamic parameters are demand and supply, which might increase fast or
unfold slowly. Consequently, multi-period approaches might shed light on
ways to optimize the order to open schools or the importance of anticipating
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demand information in disasters. Second, the study assumes equal treatment
for every beneciary. As shown in Stallkamp et al. (2020), the prioritization
of vulnerable parts of the population might be necessary, though it can sig-
nicantly reduce total supply. Considering dierent demand types might
oer the chance to distinguish the value of information for dierent types of
demand information, leading to a deeper understanding of prioritization con-
sequences. Third, the operationalization of the collaboration requires further
preparation. If, for example, supermarket chains were to share information
with authorities, questions on the data format, requirements for IT-interfaces,
data protection issues, and many more would arise and take much time to
agree on. Consequently, disaster response exercises could help identify such
problems and handle them prior to the disaster, leading to better-dened




After summarizing the studies’ results, the managerial implementations for
the four cross-study topics introduced in chapter 2.4 – Information Manage-
ment, Company Involvement, German Specities, and Trade-os – follow.
5.1 Collect Information Before the Start of the
Disaster
Studies A, B, D, and E provided valuable insights into the importance of
information in disasters. Study A identied asymmetric information as a
challenge for collaboration in disaster relief. Study B stressed how informa-
tion is interpreted dierently by the respective relief actors. Furthermore,
Study D underlined that decisions might change by including precise infor-
mation regarding, e.g., a person’s vulnerability. Finally, Study E shed light on
the importance of accurate information and highlighted the complexity of
approximating demand information from publicly available resources.
The diversity of potentially helpful information indicates that a variety of
actors could contribute important information. However, the majority of
relevant datasets are critical from a business condentiality or data protec-
tion perspective. Consequently, these actors either need compensation for
sharing data or guarantees that sharing data will not negatively aect their
organization. In case they agree to share data, issues such as data format,
granularity, or the selection of an exchange platform may arise.
Creative solutions can facilitate collaboration and information exchange. In
this context, blockchain technology might be a promising option since it
"provides an integrity protected data storage and allows to provide process
transparency" (Wust and Gervais 2018, p. 45). Therefore, blockchains could
work as a single platform of communication in disasters, connecting donors
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and transportation companies or ensuring the verication of the authen-
ticity of relief goods (SCB 2019). Other application concepts include using
blockchains for victim identication via sensitive dental data (AlQahtani et al.
2019) or coordinating the information exchange between ground vehicles and
unmanned aerial vehicles scanning disaster areas (Su et al. 2020).
Nevertheless, it becomes evident that the information required for an ecient
relief decision is too complex to be collected without preparation in the
aftermath of a disaster. Decision-makers must address ways to obtain a
comprehensive set of information before the disaster started. In addition to
complex state-of-the-art technologies, traditional (open-source) databases
might already provide sucient information for dedicated decision support
models. For example, the city of Berlin publicly shares georeferenced data
(Berlin 2019). This data can be further used in studies addressing dierent
disaster components, increasing the understanding of local characteristics
for disaster response. The fact that most of the companion articles for the
present dissertation were conducted using Berlin’s publicly available data
underlines this further.
5.2 Organize Training Exercises With Companies
Studies A, B, C, and E addressed the involvement of companies in disaster
relief. Study A oered multiple examples of PPECs, as well as guidelines
for modeling these collaborations. Study B underlined the challenges of
identifying options that both actors benet from, while Study C shed light on
selecting commercial buildings as temporary distribution centers. Moreover,
Study E emphasized the potential eects of authorities’ interventions on the
private sector.
Together with the current developments in the COVID-19 pandemic, the
results of the studies highlight that companies are already heavily involved
in relief logistics. Despite authorities’ formal responsibility during disasters,
companies signicantly reduce the aected population’s suering by keeping
their distribution channels open (for commercial and altruistic reasons). Thus,
increasing the private sector’s resilience reduces the burden on authorities.
Moreover, authorities implicitly rely on companies’ resources – for example,
transportation capacities, buildings, or goods. Therefore, joint exercises are
highly recommended to improve interoperability by ensuring that access to
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and operation of the potentially required resources, as well as the related com-
munication processes, work properly. For instance, this could be addressed
in one of the upcoming LÜKEX1 campaigns, in which authorities practice
collaboration between dierent ministries and bureaus during a large scale
disaster intervention. Standardization and practicing of processes can speed
up the disaster intervention and provide necessary relief.
5.3 Adjust the German Disaster Management
System
Dierent aspects of the German disaster management system were analyzed in
Studies B, D, and E. Study B highlighted the potential of closer collaboration of
public and private actors during the storage of goods that might be demanded
in a disaster. Study D addressed available infrastructure for water supply and
Study E Berlin’s local school network as potential PoDs.
The studies hint towards slightly outdated structures that require moderniza-
tion. For example, Study B highlighted that it is not possible to supply Berlin’s
population in a disaster with wells alone. Even though the emergency wells
are maintained and new wells built from time to time, it is highly unlikely that
the well system is sucient during disaster relief, considering that almost 20%
of Germany’s emergency wells are located in Berlin (Fischer and Wienand
2013). Moreover, maintaining and extending the well system requires high
nancial and organizational eort. On the other hand, during one of the
NOLAN-workshops, experts stressed that emergency wells only serve as the
"last resort," and other means of supply might be helpful during small-scale
disruptions. Consequently, further investments in mobile treatment systems
or other exible solutions might be reasonable options for decision-makers
that want to increase water supply resilience in disasters.
Another essential aspect to consider, which is closely connected to the issue
of Information Management, is the high degree of coordination eort. Au-
thorities need to activate and communicate with diverse public ministries,
bureaus, and organizations, which will slow down response speed (especially




if legal factors and procedures have to be followed in the context of Amtshilfe).
Furthermore, informing beneciaries about the relevant details of authorities’
operational plans is challenging – for example, the location of the allocated
PoD. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic and the development of the German
Corona-Warn-App stressed the high priority of data protection in Germany
(DW 2020c). Consequently, creative solutions are required to prevent bu-
reaucracy and data protection from slowing down the response speed. These
creative solutions could include blockchain technologies and the transfer
of the recently developed Corona-Warn-App to other application options.
An example could be anonymously tracking the frequency a PoD is visited
via the application’s interfaces, as well as using the application to distribute
food stamps, or collect voluntarily shared information in a crowdsourcing
initiative.
5.4 Initiate Public Debates About Prioritization
During Disaster Relief
Studies A, B, C, and D highlighted the importance of understanding trade-
os in disaster relief. Study A discussed the dierent objectives in disaster
collaborations, while an approach to identify potential compromises in lo-
cation selection was introduced in Study B. Moreover, Study C focused on
the trade-o between human suering and nancial aspects during a relief
intervention, while Study D addressed the trade-os that come along with
prioritizing vulnerable parts of the population.
It is almost impossible to make relief decisions without (explicitly or implicitly)
considering trade-os. Financial trade-os have been highly debated in
commercial literature and attracted some attention in relief logistics in the
context of deprivation costs. However, the implications of non-monetary
trade-os should be further investigated. For example, sustainability topics,
such as minimizing waste or emissions while maximizing supply, could also
become important for decision-makers. Moreover, trade-os that arise by
prioritizing one part of the population over another need to be investigated
further. It might be reasonable to prioritize vulnerable groups (for example,
people in special care facilities) from a philosophical or moral perspective.
On the other hand, Study D highlighted the drastic consequences for the non-
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prioritized groups. Consequently, there should be a public debate about if,
how, and at which cost authorities should prioritize parts of the population.
An example of such a discussion is the COVID-19 vaccine distribution debate.
A group of experts from various German organizations2 opened the debate
by suggesting a general vaccination-prioritization strategy for the German
population (Ethikrat 2020). Afterward, this strategy was open for debate
long before the vaccine distribution was expected to start. Similar debates
on critical issues, such as: "who should receive water in case there is not
enough water?" or "who should get access to critical goods rst if there is
hypothetically enough for everyone, but everyone needs them at the same
time?" could therefore be initiated by authorities. However, starting these
kinds of debates will be challenging and needs to be prepared thoroughly
to avoid the risk of a debate based on panic and fears. Nevertheless, besides
probably increasing the acceptance of these measures during an upcoming
disaster, transparently communicating a strategy agreed upon by the majority
of the population might lead to better disaster preparation of non-prioritized
groups and, thus, less suering of the whole population.
2 The German Permanent Vaccination Commission, German Ethics Council, and the German




Relief logistics aims to deliver goods to beneciaries in the aftermath of a
disaster. During this process, three dierent types of facilities are essen-
tial: warehouses, distribution centers, and distribution points. The selected
locations of facilities signicantly aect the outcome of disaster response.
Therefore, decision-support models improving the process of location selec-
tion increase resilience towards disasters.
The dissertation contributes to the literature with ve studies, increasing
the understanding of disaster relief logistics and supporting decision-makers
during dierent facility location decisions. Thus, it provides valuable in-
sights into making relief interventions more ecient. Study A stresses the
importance of addressing dierences in resources, capabilities, and strategies
in PPECs. Moreover, power dierences, information sharing, and partner
selection are essential to consider. Study B indicates that, even though both
types of actors follow dierent strategies and goals, it is possible to identify
candidate locations with the help of a new approach based on multi-objective
mixed-integer optimization models. Study C highlights that decision-makers
could better understand the implications of their decisions with the help of a
normalized weighted sum approach. Study D indicates that a combination of
wells and mobile systems could improve humanitarian water supply chains
in disasters. Selected locations change signicantly if vulnerable parts of
the population are prioritized. Study E introduces a framework that allows
determining the value of information and the planning error due to inaccu-
rate information. Consequently, the studies contribute to an increase in the
eciency of the relief system.
Furthermore, implications for four cross-study topics – Information Man-
agement, Company Involvement, German Specities, and Trade-os – were
derived. Information should be collected before a disaster stroke since the
complexity of collecting and exchanging information will signicantly slow
down relief eorts otherwise. Furthermore, the need to exercise with com-
panies became obvious since authorities already strongly rely on company
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resources. Moreover, adjustments to the German disaster management sys-
tem are recommended. This includes, inter alia, investments into mobile
water treatment systems or creative solutions for more ecient coordination
during disasters. Finally, a public debate on the consequences of implicitly
or explicitly prioritizing parts of the population has the potential to increase
the public acceptance of a prioritization strategy and, thereby, reduce the
burden on authorities signicantly. Initiating research projects preparing
these debates could be a rst step to approach this issue.
Future studies aiming to improve location planning further may, in addition
to the opportunities mentioned in chapter 4, address these cross-study topics.
For example, developing a data exchange interface can increase the available
input data for location optimization models. Guidelines to standardize PPECs
and a toolbox for exercises can ensure ecient implementation of plans in
case of a disaster. A holistic analysis of the German disaster warehouses’
location under consideration of the private sector might reduce authorities’
warehousing costs. Similarly, a shift from stockpiling grains towards storing
ready-to-eat meals can reduce the complexity of the distribution, bypass-
ing the preprocessing steps currently required before distributing food to
the population. However, the accompanying adaptations to the warehouse
system need to be studied thoroughly rst. Moreover, future studies could
aim to improve the communication of location decisions. For example, a
disaster dashboard highlighting selected PoDs could ensure that prioritized
beneciaries receive their goods. The implementation into an already existing
mobile application might facilitate this process.
Despite the opportunities to improve disaster relief further, statistics indi-
cate that, from a global perspective, disaster management is developing in
a promising direction. An example of such a promising development is the
ongoing century-wide decline of average deaths per year caused by disasters
while the total number of disasters increases (Forbes 2020). The COVID-19
pandemic is likely to stop this trend and revealed that there is still much
room for improvements. Moreover, the increasing probability of disasters
like zoonoses caused by the eects of Globalization (Gibb et al. 2020) or an
increasing number of hurricanes caused by Global Warming (Webster et al.
2005) indicates that the number of disasters is likely to keep increasing in the
future. Nevertheless, the promising long-term trend highlights that disaster
management continuously improved over the last century, allowing disaster
managers to face the upcoming challenges with optimism. The present dis-
sertation can contribute to this positive long-term development, improve the
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response towards upcoming disasters and, therefore, reduce the suering of
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A Public-Private Collaborations in
Emergency Logistics: A
Framework Based on Logistical
and Game-Theoretical Concepts
Abstract1
Collaboration in emergency logistics can be benecial for governmental ac-
tors when supply chains need to be set up immediately. In comparison to
research on humanitarian-business partnerships, the body of literature on
so-called Public-Private Emergency Collaborations (PPEC) remains scarce.
Private companies are only rarely considered within research on emergency
collaborations, although they could contribute to a more ecient supply of
goods given their resources and existing communication networks. Based
on this research gap, this paper develops a logistical and game-theoretical
modeling framework for public-private emergency collaborations. We char-
acterize both public and private actors’ possible roles in emergency logistics
based on literature research and real cases. Furthermore, we provide an
overview on existing PPECs and the challenges they are confronted with.
The concluding framework contains aspects from humanitarian logistics on
the governmental side and from business continuity management (BCM) or
corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the commercial side. To address
the challenge of evaluating dierent objectives in a collaboration, we add a
game-theoretical approach to highlight the incentive structure of both parties
1 This chapter includes the preprint of the article "Public-Private Collaborations in Emergency
Logistics: A Framework based on Logistical and Game-Theoretical Concepts" by Markus
Lüttenberg, Lotte Verdonck, Marcus Wiens, Alexander Zienau, Frank Schultmann, and myself
(Diehlmann, Lüttenberg, et al. 2020).
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in such a collaboration. In this way, we contribute to the research eld by
quantitatively evaluating public-private collaboration in emergency logistics
while considering the problem-specic challenge of the parties’ dierent
objectives.
A.1 Introduction and motivation
In 2018, earthquakes and tsunamis resulted in the loss of 10,733 lives, while
extreme weather led to 61.7 million people aected by natural hazards (UN-
DRR 2019). According to Worldbank (2019), global losses caused by natural
hazards have quadrupled from $50 billion a year in the 1980s to $200 billion
in the last decade. Moreover, population growth and increased urbanization
lead to rising disaster impacts (Worldbank 2019).
van Wassenhove (2006) highlights that around 80% of all relief eorts after
disasters are related to logistics. Consequently, all involved actors need
to establish well dened relief logistics procedures to protect the aected
population. While emergency management focuses on the management of
all actions directly after the impact of a disaster (see for instance Tatham and
Spens (2011)), the term "emergency logistics" can be dened as "a process of
planning, managing and controlling the ecient ows of relief, information,
and services from the points of origin to the points of destination to meet
the urgent needs of the aected people under emergency conditions" (Sheu
2007).
Within the limits of the concrete disaster scenario, companies can still dispose
over most of their capabilities to respond to the disaster, while established
supply chain structures are severely interrupted during catastrophes (Holguín-
Veras, Jaller, et al. 2012). Higher resilience provided by public and private
actors, cooperatively involved in disaster relief, can therefore help to prevent
the shift from a critical or disastrous situation to a catastrophic disaster,
resulting in a reduction of the burden on the population and companies.
The focus of this paper is to describe and model the scope and potential of
emergency collaboration between private rms on the one hand and the
government on the other, hence a Public-Private Emergency Collaboration
(PPEC). Although researchers agree that multiple actors play an important
role in relief logistics (Balcik et al. 2010; Kapucu, Arslan, and Demiroz 2010;
70
A.1 Introduction and Motivation
Kovács and Spens 2007), real world cases that develop quantitative disaster
relief models for civil protection agencies and other governmental authorities
are rarely considered in the literature. One reason for this phenomenon could
be that - compared to governmental agencies - humanitarian organizations
are more willing to provide researchers with data that they are allowed to
publish (and/or funding) in exchange for scientic knowledge and experience
(Arnette and Zobel 2019; Duran, Gutierrez, and Keskinocak 2011; Gatignon,
van Wassenhove, and Charles 2010; Pedraza-Martinez and Van Wassenhove
2013; Saputra et al. 2015; Laan et al. 2016). In contrast, data received in
cooperation with public authorities and governments often contains critical
knowledge that researchers might not be allowed to share publicly (Goolsby
2005). However, an exclusive research focus on non-prot humanitarian
organizations in the quantitative relief management context might lead to
a trend to analyze ways to ght the symptoms instead of tackling the roots
of the problem. It can be argued that the role of non-prot humanitarian
organizations in humanitarian logistics primarily exists due to a lack of
resilience in the market or in the public disaster management system.
Figure A.1: Classication of phases or activities for dierent types of actors during a crisis.
From a conceptional point of view, activities of actors after a disaster can
be classied as in Figure A.1 (note that real cases may vary from this - for
instance due to very strong and active NGOs or comparably ineective public
or private actors). Firms deal with uctuations in demand or supply as well
as with disruptions in their supply chain in the context of their Business
Continuity Management (BCM) on a regular basis (see for instance Schätter
et al. (2019)). Their reactions focus on getting back to "business as usual" as
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soon as possible (Palin 2017; Macdonald and Corsi 2013). Once a disruption
in supply impacts the population or critical infrastructures signicantly, the
state needs to become active to ensure the population’s well being (Wiens
et al. (2018), "I" in Figure A.1). These operations can be signicantly improved
by a collaboration with private rms (PPEC). The importance of the private
sector is underlined by Izumi and Shaw (2015), who point out that 70-85% of
investments in emergency logistics are expected to come from the private
sector.
While humanitarian organizations (HOs) can operate humanitarian supply
chains without the occurrence of a disaster, they sometimes play an important
role in emergency logistics as well. Their activity usually starts once the
impact of the disaster reaches another critical threshold - for instance, because
they get signicantly more donations if the crisis receives more attention
by the media due to increased severity, or due to the time it takes to collect
donations (II). In this phase, all actors ght the situation at the same time
and need to directly or indirectly work together to ensure ecient relief
management (Catastrophe Collaboration). Once the disaster becomes less
severe or the HOs run out of funding, HOs leave the area again (III). Finally,
the private sector takes over and processes normalize again once the state
stops its intervention (IV). Moreover, it has to be noted that in extremely
severe situations, NGOs might become active right away (V) or stay active
until the market takes over again (VI).
Accounting for these phases, improved emergency management procedures
within the private and the public sector can reduce the burden on the pop-
ulation signicantly (Papadopoulos et al. 2017). Therefore, it prevents the
worsening of the situation and that the disaster turns into a catastrophe. One
way to achieve improvement is to establish sustainable collaboration mecha-
nisms, since collaboration signicantly improves eciency and eectiveness
of emergency response activities (Balcik et al. 2010; Kapucu, Arslan, and
Demiroz 2010). However, in spite of the prominent opinion stressing the
importance of multiple actors in crisis management, most of the studies in the
eld of humanitarian supply chain management focus on a single actor (Behl
and Dutta 2019). In our view, sustainable and – from a welfare perspective –
ecient crisis management research primarily requires in-depth research on
the way private rms and public organizations deal with emergencies together.
While collaboration increases the eciency of the logistical operations, incen-
tives and a surplus for all involved partners are critical as well. Consequently,
a comprehensive account on collaboration in emergency logistics operations
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requires a profound understanding of both, the operational logistics perspec-
tive on the one hand and the incentive-oriented game-theoretic perspective
on the other.
However, in comparison to research on humanitarian-business partnerships
(Fikar, Gronalt, and Hirsch 2016; Nurmala, Vries, and Leeuw 2018; Tomasini
and Van Wassenhove 2009), the body of literature on PPECs remains scarce
(Chen et al. 2013; Gabler, Richey, and Stewart 2017; Stewart, Kolluru, and
M. Smith 2009; Swanson and R. J. Smith 2013; Wang, Wu, et al. 2016; Wiens
et al. 2018). Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, only two publications
exist that explicitly consider logistical and game-theoretical approaches in the
disaster context simultaneously (Nagurney, Flores, and Soylu 2016; Nagurney,
Salarpour, and Daniele 2019). Even though the authors analyzed competition
and collaboration of humanitarian organizations, they did not regard the
collaboration of public and private actors in disaster management. This paper
aims to ll this research gap.
The main contribution of this paper can be summarized as follows. A frame-
work for public-private emergency collaborations is developed based on
logistical and game-theoretical concepts. On the one hand, the operations
research perspective on PPECs is highlighted by describing the requirements,
characteristics, and challenges for logistical PPEC-models. On the other hand,
game-theoretical questions are considered regarding contract design and
the requirements for collaboration that are mandatory to ensure stable and
ecient relationships. In this way, we contribute to the research eld by
quantitatively modeling public-private collaboration in emergency logistics
while considering the problem-specic challenge of the parties’ dierent
objectives.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
the concept of PPECs. Following, we analyze the role of public and private
actors involved in emergency logistics and address relevant characteristics
of a PPEC from both perspectives. An overview on logistical challenges that
need to be regarded in PPEC models follows in Section 4. We complete the
modeling framework by considering game-theoretical aspects of a PPEC and
providing an illustrative game-theoretical example in Section 5. Section 6
draws conclusions from our ndings.
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A.2 Public-private emergency collaborations
The concept of a PPEC is closely related to the well established concept of
a Public-Private Partnership (PPP). Therefore, we rst provide an overview
on PPPs in general and build the bridge to PPECs in crisis management,
which are confronted with specic challenges but also entail high potential
for improvement of crisis operations. We discuss the potentials and limits of
a PPEC from a wider economic perspective and focus on the incentives of
the collaborating partners. Following, we present dierent forms of already
established PPECs. In line with the denitions provided by Wankmüller and
Reiner (2020), the term "collaboration" is preferred in the PPEC context as
a collaboration aims to establish a close, intense and long-term relationship
between organizations to solve problems jointly. On the contrary, "coopera-
tion" is a short-term phenomenon, which primarily relates to partnerships
established in the preparedness and immediate response phases to disasters
(Schulz and Blecken 2010).
A.2.1 Public-private partnerships in general
There is no ocial denition of public-private partnerships (PPPs) available
in literature (Worldbank 2018). However, PPPs follow the general principle
that the collaboration of the public sector with the private sector leads to
(1) eciency gains and (2) an optimal distribution of the risk (Iossa and
Martimort 2015). PPPs ensure the involvement of private partners with both
the expertise and the nancial resources that may not be readily available in
the public sector (Swanson and R. J. Smith 2013). The concept of PPPs was rst
established in the infrastructure sector (Delmon 2011) and the transportation
sector (Grimsey and Lewis 2004). Nowadays, they are also applied to social
projects (Fandel, Giese, and Mohn 2012), in the healthcare sector, for schooling
projects, or in waste management (Spoann et al. 2019). Saussier and Brux
(2018) provide an overview on the current status of PPPs in theory and
practice.
Several characteristics described in the literature are typical for PPP projects.
First, PPP projects are aimed to last for a long-term period (Iossa and Saussier
2018), typically at least for 20 years. Second, PPP projects may be divided into
dierent organizational parts - the building part, the operating part and the
nancing part (Morasch and Toth 2008). Morasch and Toth (2008) argue that
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the building part is usually executed by private rms, while the nancing
part belongs to the power of the public sector. The operating part may vary
in responsibility. Furthermore, the authors emphasize that in comparison
with conventional procurement, where the public sector invites tenders for
orders and the whole project is divided into several minor parts that are
conducted from dierent rms, in PPP projects, tasks are bundled and under
the responsibility of a single rm. As such, the degree of bundling is higher
in PPP projects. Third, in comparison with a conventional project, the cost of
a PPP project can exceed or undercut (Iossa and Martimort 2015). Iossa and
Martimort (2015) further elaborate that an important cost-driver of PPPs are
transaction costs which are almost uncorrelated with the total PPP volume.
High transaction costs arise due to complexity of projects and contractual
relationships (Carbonara, Costantino, and Pellegrino 2016). Therefore, Iossa
and Martimort (2015) suggest that only high volume projects are relevant for
consideration of a possible PPP contract. Fourth, Iossa and Martimort (2015)
provide an overview on quality factors which need to be considered in PPP
projects. They emphasize that every evaluation needs to be performed on a
case by case basis, that the quality of the products and services that are part
of the PPP contract needs to be analyzed, and that the quality is adequately
specied.
To summarize this section, major factors under consideration for the evalua-
tion of a PPP are (1) the period of time the project is forecasted to last, (2) what
parts of the projects are privatized and which remain under the control of
the public counterpart, (3) the complexity of the contractual design together
with the resulting transaction costs (Osei-Kyei and Chan 2015) and, (4) the
quality factors of the project itself.
A.2.2 PPEC barriers, requirements and potential benefits
In general, PPECs should be consistent with the ten “Guiding Principles for
Public-Private Collaboration for Humanitarian Action” acknowledged by
the World Economic Forum and UN-OCHA (World Economic Forum (WEF)
and UN-OCHA 2008). The idea is that partnerships with rms facilitate the
transfer of knowledge and skills on collaborative logistics and supply chain
management, leading to eciency gains in humanitarian logistics (Nurmala,
Leeuw, and Wout Dullaert 2017). Moreover, PPECs may help to create more
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resilient infrastructure systems, thereby helping to improve the situation of
the population (Boyer 2019).
However, several real-life examples highlight that the public sector strug-
gles to collaborate with the private sector eciently. One case is Hurricane
Katrina, in which the successful emergency response of retailers, including
Walmart, diametrically opposed the insucient performance of government
agencies (Horwitz 2009; Sobel and Leeson 2006). Exemplary was the pri-
vate sector’s fast delivery of necessary goods like food and clothes to the
places where they were needed, while the trucks under control of the govern-
mental organization FEMA experienced a lot of diculties organizing and
distributing essential supplies (Horwitz 2009). Another well-discussed case
is the earthquake and tsunami hitting Japan in 2011, where the government
excluded private companies from the impact zone and attempted to create
entirely new supply networks. As a result, millions of people with a real
need for food could not reach commercial organizations, while those outside
the disaster area started hoarding (Palin 2017). This raises the question why
such collaborations between public and private actors did not succeed in the
way they were supposed to. We argue that there is a signicant potential for
collaboration but that this potential is more dicult to identify and “extract”
compared to other forms of collaboration.
The motivation for both partners to participate in disaster management diers
(Gabler, Richey, and Stewart 2017), and so do the required incentives. In the
following paragraphs, we will briey outline the basic economic prerequisites
for collaboration, especially from an incentive (or game-theoretic) perspective.
In Section 4, we will discuss the options for collaboration in the eld of
logistics and emergency logistics in more detail.
In economics, the agency theory (Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Townsend 1982),
contract theory (Salanié 1997) and the theory of relational contracts (Gintis
2000; Macaulay 1963; Macleod 2006) form the methodological framework
for the analysis of collaboration between actors with – at least partially –
conicting objectives. In addition to the theoretical foundation, behavioral
experimental economics contributed enormously to this eld of research
over the last decades. Collaborative agreements can signicantly reduce
transaction cost but have to cope with agency-specic risks based on asym-
metries of power and information, such as exploitation, hold-up problems,
or moral hazard (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). Key factors for a stable and
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ecient collaboration are (among many others) open (Jüttner 2005) and cred-
ible communication (Farrel and Rabin 1996) about the partners’ objectives
and intentions (Falk and Fischbacher 2006), transparent and fair allocation of
risks and benets (Fehr and Gächter 2000) as well as the future perspective
of an enduring relationship (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986). The possibility of
a longer-term relationship allows the partners to stabilize their relationship
on the basis of reciprocity and parallel expectations. From a game-theoretical
point of view, relational contracts are self-enforcing contracts, since no exter-
nal body (such as a court) is required to enforce the contractual interests, but
the contract is fullled by mutual agreement and in the best self-interest. The
range of application of these established concepts is broad and includes labor
markets, project management, R&D collaboration and also public-private
partnerships (Bing et al. 2005; Desrieux, Chong, and Saussier 2013).
In principle, most of these mechanisms can also be transferred to collaboration
in crisis management (Solheim-Kile, Lædre, and Lohne 2019). However, there
are a number of special features that should be emphasized because they could
make (at least in part) collaboration more dicult if they are not adequately
taken into account. First, in a PPEC the interests of the partners could be
even more divergent than in classical infrastructure PPPs because the state’s
priority is on civil protection and on the provision of services of general
interest. For companies, excessive investment in disaster prevention can
result in competitive disadvantages. Second, this type of collaboration serves
to prepare for a future event (disaster) that is only expected to occur with a
relatively low probability. Large investments for this purpose must not only
be economically justied, but also legally permissible.
However, there are private companies that directly participate in or support
humanitarian operations with varying intensity and frequency (see section
A.2.3 for a brief account on already established PPECs). Wiens et al. (2018)
summarized the four major benets of a PPEC as follows: (1) Set up an early
warning system based on real-time data, (2) allow information sharing be-
tween the partners and joint planning of evacuations, (3) avoid undesirable
crowding out eects and (4) make use of the infrastructure, expertise and
(technological) knowledge of the private sector. In addition to these collabo-
rative benets, a PPEC can help to avoid costs and provide the requirements
for a more ecient crisis management and an appropriate prioritization of
tasks (Pettit, Fiksel, and Croxton 2010).
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Additional advantages can result from an optimized division of tasks and
improved coordination of logistics operations (see also Section A.4). As such,
it can be concluded that a number of starting points for a public-private
partnership in crisis management exist and that each of these aspects justies
an in-depth model-based analysis.
A.2.3 Already established PPECs
Even though the number of real-life cases is small, there are already a few
existing examples of partnerships and networks which are (at least partly)
structured as a public-private collaboration for crisis management. One
example can be found in Sweden, where PPPs are implemented into the
Swedish emergency preparedness management (Kaneberg 2018). Additionally,
the US National Business Emergency Operations Center works as "FEMA’s
virtual clearing house for two-way information sharing between public and
private sector stakeholders in preparing for, responding to, or recovering from
disasters" (FEMA 2019). Participation works on a voluntary basis and is free of
cost. Moreover, the German UP KRITIS - a public-private partnership focusing
on critical infrastructures out of nine dierent sectors (e.g. water, nutrition,
or energy) - has the goal to increase the resilience of these infrastructures
and to fascilitate the exchange about current topics (UPKRITIS 2019).
These examples highlight the high potential of PPECs to increase eciency in
emergency response. Furthermore, they show that the adequate management
of involved actors is challenging and requires thorough preparation. While
this list is by far not complete, it indicates the status of partnerships that have
already been established and points to the diculties of taking into account
the roles, interests and capabilities of the partners.
A.3 On the role of public and private actors in
emergency management
Kovács and Spens (2007) identify six types of actors in supply networks
for humanitarian aid – donors, aid agencies, NGOs, governments, military,
and logistics providers. Since these groups of actors pursue dierent (sub-
)objectives and act under dierent conditions, uncoordinated intervention in
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a crisis can quickly lead to an aggravation of the situation rather than to an
improvement. Therefore, Balcik et al. (2010) highlight the need to collaborate
and discuss challenges in the coordination, which are highly discussed in
academic literature and which are the focus of Section A.4.
Although collaboration can happen on a voluntary, altruistic basis, the moral
responsibility of private actors should not be neglected. For instance, Hes-
selman and Lane (2017) investigate roles and responsibilities of non-state
actors during disaster relief from an international human rights perspective
(inter alia, Article 25, which addresses food and shelter (United Nations 1948),
connects PPECs with human rights issues). They conclude that non-public
actors in disasters are indirectly obligated to become active, even though it
might be dicult to hold them directly accountable. Therefore, Hesselman
and Lane (2017) suggest that it could be one of the state’s core task to include
non-public actors into the disaster management processes using regulations.
Within this context, it is necessary to understand the roles and tasks of the
respective partners.
A.3.1 The role of public actors in emergency logistics
In this paper, we dene “public actors” as all types of institutions and organi-
zations under the control of public authorities on a federal and/or provincial
level. This includes – inter alia – public disaster management institutions (for
instance the US FEMA or the German THW), the military, police forces and
reghters (as long as they are not privatized), and all types of ministries
directly or indirectly involved in the relief process (legal, environmental,
nancial etc.).
In general, the function of public actors in the domain of civil protection is to
“provide security against unexpected threats that individual citizens cannot
meet alone” (Comfort 2002). During emergency relief, they need to establish a
safe environment for beneciaries and relief organizations. Moreover, public
actors have critical resources at their disposal (Kovács and Spens 2007), which
they use to support relief action physically (e.g. THW trucks) or nancially
(e.g. through the FEMA Disaster Relief Fund). Furthermore, governments can
ask foreign governments or HOs for support.
At the same time, “no international action can take place if the local govern-
ment does not request it” (Day et al. 2012). In some cases, governments accept
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foreign humanitarian work without supporting it actively (Akhtar, Marr,
and Garnevska 2012) or even put up barriers to impede a HO’s intervention
(Kunz and Reiner 2016). Moreover, in very drastic cases, public actors can
– if the legal context of the crisis area accounts for it – enforce the right
to take possession over critical goods or resources (EIAS 2016). This can
catch private actors by surprise and interfere with their planned processes
signicantly. Due to legislative and moral responsibilities, public actors rst
and foremost need to support the population during an emergency. This
includes, for instance, to ght the reason of the crisis, to maintain public
security, or to ensure that the population has access to essential goods.
The delivery of goods for a large amount of people requires a variety of re-
sources (e.g. trucks, people). However, purchasing and maintaining resources
is extremely costly – especially if the resources are only needed in extraordi-
nary times. Consequently, public actors only have a comparably low number
of resources at their direct disposal. Without a PPEC, public actors therefore
need to hire logistics companies (for instance in the US via the Disaster Re-
sponse Registry (SBA 2020)) or buy goods directly from private companies
during a crisis. In developing countries, where the private sector is not as
well equipped as in developed countries, the lack of resources therefore leads
to, among others, the very prominent role of NGOs in crisis management.
Regarding logistical challenges of a crisis, public actors can benet from a
PPEC due to an increase in logistics capacities (Nurmala, Vries, and Leeuw
2018; Wang, Wu, et al. 2016) or access to logistical competences (Qiao, Nan,
and Kang 2010; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009).
At the same time, public actors provide special capabilities for a PPEC (see
for instance Kovács and Tatham (2009)). First, public actors have specialized
equipment and competences at their disposal. For instance, the German THW
owns multiple mobile water purication plants (THW 2020). Military forces
can provide necessary resources, communication devices, means of transport,
medical services, water supply, and strong logistical and organizational struc-
tures (Carter 1992). Second, the government is legally empowered to enforce
safety. They can do this with the help of police and/or military (Byrne 2013),
or - in the case of a very strong escalation of a crisis – by adapting the laws
(see for instance Halchin (2019)).
Furthermore, the involvement of private actors in the crisis management
process can speed up the recovery process and help to let the market take
over again faster (Palin 2017; Wiens et al. 2018). Strengthening these processes
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will help to increase the resilience of communities and supply chains (Chen
et al. 2013; Mendoza, Lau, and Castillejos 2018; Pettit, Fiksel, and Croxton
2010).
A.3.2 The role of private actors in emergency logistics
Emergency logistics becomes necessary if commercial supply chains are not
capable to supply the population with sucient essential goods. This could
be the case due to supply chain disruptions or a sudden increase in demand.
When talking about private actors in the context of emergency logistics, we
refer to those rms involved in the supply of essentials like food or medicine
(e.g. producers, retailers, or logistics service providers).
These companies can contribute to emergency logistics with monetary do-
nations, products, and services which can be provided in a commercial and
non-commercial way (Hesselman and Lane 2017; Nurmala, Vries, and Leeuw
2018).
From a rm perspective, involvement in emergency logistics is an issue in
BCM and CSR. BCM includes companies’ planning and preparation of re-
sponse and recovery to disruptions of business processes (Elliott, Swartz, and
Herbane 2010). Even in times of crises, companies’ actions are predominantly
motivated by long-term prot, which is why they put the strongest emphasis
on the protection of their assets and fast recovery of their business processes.
In doing so, some factors are directly controllable by the company while
others are not (Macdonald and Corsi 2013; Horwitz 2009; Li and Hong 2019;
Palin 2017; Rifai 2018).
CSR is a company’s involvement in social topics under the expectation that so-
cial improvement will lead to long-term prot (Horwitz 2009; van Wassenhove
2006). CSR eorts of private rms are proven means to improve corporate
reputation (Donia, Tetrault Sirsly, and Ronen 2017). Reputation implies both
the prominence of a company – the label as being known for something - and
the image in the sense of holding a generalized favorability towards other
companies (Lange, Lee, and Dai 2011). Through CSR related actions like
food donations, rm reputation might increase in or after crisis situations
(Cozzolino 2012; Dani and Deep 2010; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009).
Next to positive reputation, Binder and Witte (2007) name improvement of
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government relations, sta motivation and the "desire to do good" as mo-
tivation for the private sector to engage. However, Izumi and Shaw (2015)
emphasize that companies would also indirectly protect themselves by being
involved in crisis response and thereby mitigating crisis eects that would
aect the economy, like loss of life or economic downturn. It shows that
emergency logistics is included in both, BCM and CSR. The specic concept
of reputation is discussed later in the game-theory part in Section A.5.1.3.
In the following, we present two real-life examples, where the private sector
faced a crisis. The rst example is the contamination of tap water in the city
of Heidelberg, Germany, on February 7th, 2019 (Heidelberg24 2019). The
duration of the event was uncertain in the beginning. Hence, people started
to hoard bottled water and buy large amounts from retail stores, which in
turn had to be relled as soon as possible (Heidelberg24 2019). A sudden
increase of demand aects dierent stages in the supply chain, which can
cascade along the supply chain (Kildow 2011; Snyder et al. 2016). In Figure
A.2, we visualized a commercial bottled water supply chain facing a tap water
failure. In personal discussions with companies from food supply chains, we
found that in case of sudden demand peaks, rush orders are one measure
to quickly rell warehouses and retail stores. However, rush orders would
involve higher costs. Another measure would be to skip handling steps in the
transport chain in order to oer larger amounts faster to customers. Here,
additional coordination eorts would again cause higher costs. The case of
Heidelberg shows how commercial retail supply chains can be aected by
crisis situations without being directly hit. Moreover, companies’ stock values
might decline when announcing supply chain disruptions (Dani and Deep
2010).
A second intensively discussed example of private sector donations during a
crisis is Walmart’s response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The retailer donated
food, drinks and other goods fast and eciently in the aected area (Horwitz
2009). Not only in this case, supply speed compared to governmental response
is seen as a core strength of private actors in crisis response (Nurmala, Vries,
and Leeuw 2018). This goes along with ndings from Dani and Deep (2010),
who found that supply chain collaboration can help move goods faster and
more eciently during crisis.
The above examples highlight the important role of private companies during
crises. However, after Hurricane Katrina, Walmart rejected the government’s
oer to become an "emergency merchandise supplier" (Chen et al. 2013).
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Among others, the huge capacities in such a business and large inventories
for disaster preparedness did not t with Walmart’s corporate strategy. The
authors suggest that Walmart’s decline was further due to risks perceived
with a contractual agreement with a strong partner, which could impede its
operational freedom (Chen et al. 2013). This further hints at the importance
to take the risks and incentives of the PPEC-partners into account.
The examples show that improvisation and speed are crucial for compa-
nies’ ecient crisis management. The necessity to immediately react and
adapt to new circumstances by possibly re-engineering supply chain pro-
cesses indicates the exibility of the corresponding processes. Thus, the more
exible a company’s processes, the more resilient it is towards disruptions
(Scholten, Sharkey Scott, and Fynes 2014; Snyder et al. 2016; Tomasini and
Van Wassenhove 2009; Tukamuhabwa et al. 2015). Usually, companies would
lack preparation for disruptions of low probability and high consequences
(Pettit, Fiksel, and Croxton 2010; Izumi and Shaw 2015; van Wassenhove 2006)
and focus on rather internal disruptions they can control (Kildow 2011). Con-
sequently, companies might acquire knowledge during a crisis from which
they can benet afterwards. Furthermore, collaboration with public actors
can provide access to up-to-date information during a crisis with numerous
uncertainties (Wiens et al. 2018). Not only access to information, but also the
involvement in governmental resource control can be benecial.
A.4 Modeling PPECs: logistical challenges
While supply chain collaboration aims to decrease uncertainty and increase ef-
ciency, it is also confronted with multiple challenges hampering the achieve-
ment of these goals. In the next two sections, challenges associated with
modeling and coordinating collaborations, in a commercial and an emergency
context respectively, are reviewed and discussed.
A.4.1 Collaboration in logistics
The main goal of all commercial partnerships is to jointly generate value in
the exchange relationship that cannot be generated when the rms operate
in isolation. However, numerous surveys report that 50 to 70 percent of all
these collaborations fail for one reason or another (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg
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2011). Because every partner remains independent, the risk of opportunism
remains real.
According to Verdonck (2017), challenges related to sustainable partnerships
can be divided into six groups - partner selection and reliability, identication
and division of joint benets, balance of negotiation power, information and
communication technology (ICT), determination of operational scope and
competition legislation.
A rst challenge in the establishment of a sustainable horizontal collaboration
refers to the selection of suitable partners. The analysis of the strategic and
organizational capabilities of a potential partner requires knowledge about
its physical and intangible assets, its competencies and skills and its main
weaknesses. This type of information is often held private in the respective
organization. Moreover, the amount of attainable collaborative savings is
inuenced by the degree of t between the collaboration participants. When
partners have been selected and the partnership has been established, un-
certainty about partner reliability and their commitment to promises also
contribute signicantly to the complexity of the collaboration (Verdonck
2017).
Next, it appears that partnering companies nd it dicult to determine and
divide the benets of collaborating. It is essential, however, to ensure a
fair allocation mechanism in which the contributions of each partner are
quantied and accounted for, since this should induce partners to behave
according to the collaborative goal and may improve collaboration stability
(Wang and Kopfer 2011). Besides selecting a mechanism to share collaborative
benets and costs, deciding on the operational and practical organisation
of a collaboration might turn out to be a challenging task (Verstrepen et al.
2009). Partnering companies need to agree on the collaboration strategy, the
allocation of resources and the applicable key performance indicators (KPIs),
among others (Martin et al. 2018).
Another threat to the sustainability of a collaboration is the evolution of the
relative bargaining power of the participating companies over the lifetime of
the collaboration (Cruijssen, W. Dullaert, and Fleuren 2007).
A fth challenge in the establishment of sustainable collaborations deals with
the implementation of the necessary supporting ICT, which could hamper
those forms of collaboration that require intensive data exchange (Cruijssen,
W. Dullaert, and Fleuren 2007).
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Finally, companies engaging in a collaboration project need to consider the
applicable legislation on market competition. Legally binding rules prevent
companies from working too closely together as this may restrict competition
on the market at hand. European competition rules not only prohibit explicit
collaborations, such as price-setting agreements, production limits or entry
barriers, but also forbid any multi-company arrangements that have similar
eects (Verdonck 2017).
A.4.2 Collaboration in emergency logistics
We developed a framework that originates from several (review) papers, which
set up frameworks for humanitarian logistics or commercial supply chains
facing risks or disruptions. The rst (Kochan and Nowicki 2018; Scholten,
Sharkey Scott, and Fynes 2014; Snyder et al. 2016; Swanson and R. J. Smith
2013; Tukamuhabwa et al. 2015) and second category (Scholten, Sharkey
Scott, and Fynes 2014; Snyder et al. 2016; Tukamuhabwa et al. 2015) are
often discussed topics in literature. These two categories are expanded with
the consideration of dierent characteristics of public and private actors
in the context of emergency logistics. Assuming PPECs are coordinated
and managed indirectly through the use of game-theoretical methods like
(relational) contract design (see Section A.5), they are confronted with the
following challenges: dierences in strategies and motivations, complex and
uncertain interactions between actors, and dierent characteristics of the
actors’ resources and capabilities (see also Figure A.3).
We will address all these aspects in the following subsections, while a detailed
game-theoretical discussion of PPECs follows in Section A.5.
A.4.2.1 Strategy and motivation
Public and private actors engaged in an emergency collaboration are driven
by dierent strategies and motivations. These aspects are reected by their
dierent general objectives and opposing time horizons of decision making.
Multi-objective nature of logistic models
The long-term prot and eciency orientation of the private sector is mainly
modelled through a cost focus (Holguín-Veras, Jaller, et al. 2012). This is
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Figure A.3: Interdependencies in Public-Private Emergency Logistics.
also the case when modeling supply chain disruptions, although this implies
the challenge of quantifying the consequences (Ivanov et al. 2017; Ribeiro
and Barbosa-Povoa 2018). Usually, supply chain disruptions are analyzed by
opposing models of the normal supply chain and the disrupted supply chain
(Ivanov et al. 2017). In their review on disruption recovery in supply chains,
Ivanov et al. (2017) classify the modeling of supply chain performance during
crises into dierent types of costs: xed, variable, disruption, and recovery
costs.
Regarding public actors, as mentioned in Section A.3.1, the primary concern
is the well-being of the population. This is closely related to the objectives
of HOs, where optimization models in the literature focus on fullling the
needs of the beneciaries and the reduction of the misery of the population
(Holguín-Veras, Jaller, et al. 2012). However, HOs always work on some sort
of a limited budget or – dependent on their organizational structure – need to
be protable in some ways. One of the most prominent approaches regarding
this setup is the social cost approach by Holguín-Veras, Pérez, et al. (2013).
In this approach, the authors include logistics costs and combine them with
deprivation costs to dene "social costs". In this context, deprivation costs
account for the damages that happen after being undersupplied for a long time
(Holguín-Veras, Pérez, et al. 2013). Consequently, the minimization of social
costs allows HOs to focus on both nancial and non-nancial aspects. Various
studies include approaches that minimize some form of social or deprivation
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cost (Cotes and Cantillo 2019; Khayal et al. 2015; Loree and Aros-Vera 2018;
Moreno et al. 2018; Pradhananga et al. 2016).
Furthermore, Gutjahr and Fischer (2018) were able to show that the minimiza-
tion of deprivation costs leads to unfair solutions in case of budget limitations.
They therefore developed an approach that includes measures similar to the
Gini-coecient to increase the fairness of the resulting allocations. Conse-
quently, public actor’s high degree of nancial exibility indicates that the
focus on social cost minimization seems to be appropriate for them, while
HOs optimizing on a limited budget are recommended to use the approach of
Gutjahr and Fischer (2018) as a guideline.
Time horizon of decision making
A fundamental dierence between the public and private perspective is the
general supply chain layout and the time horizon of the actors. Private actors
design their network to be protable in normal times. However, during a
crisis, they need to adapt to the specics of the crisis quickly (Macdonald
and Corsi 2013). On the other hand, public actors do - except from long
term storage facilities - not possess established supply chain structures in
normal times. Therefore, they need to set up completely new supply struc-
tures under high time pressure and at high costs (Holguín-Veras, Jaller, et al.
2012). Consequently, there is a high degree of exibility in regards to loca-
tion, transportation, and product portfolio selection when setting up public
emergency supply chains. Moreover, mixed forms are possible, in which,
for instance, public actors use the private actors’ established structures to
distribute goods.
A.4.2.2 Interaction between actors
Another important aspect to consider is the interactions between actors. As
a substantial amount of actors is involved in emergency collaborations, the
ecient coordination of their interactions is often very challenging (Balcik
et al. 2010; Kabra, Ramesh, and Arshinder 2015). These challenges can include
the fundamental power dierence, aspects of trust and partner selection, the
information that the actors share, or the identication and division of costs.
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Power dierences
Both public and private actors’ involvement is determined by the power they
possess in times of disaster. The public sector is only entitled to intervene if
the situation provides the legal prerequisites for an intervention. If this is the
case, public authorities can have far-reaching rights which give them access
to several resources (e.g. goods, transport capacities, production facilities)
(Daniels and Trebilcock 2006; Wood 2008). Private sector involvement in
emergency logistics is voluntary if not being forced through governmental
seizure. However, motivated to implement CSR and BCM strategies, compa-
nies still possess their operational freedom in decision-making. Hence, they
can determine their level of involvement in emergency logistics (Johnson and
Abe 2015). Moreover, power dierences within commercial supply chains are
crucial. For example, rms can have strong negotiation positions with their
suppliers (Spence and M. Bourlakis 2009), which can also aect the abilities
to respond quickly in crises.
Information sharing
Research has shown that a lack of information sharing among commercial sup-
ply chain members results in increased inventory costs, longer lead times and
decreased customer service (Simatupang and Sridharan 2002). Since logistics
is responsible for 80% of relief operations (van Wassenhove 2006), coordina-
tion of information ows has a critical inuence on relief chain performance
(Balcik et al. 2010). As opposed to a commercial supply chain environment,
however, the sources of information can be limited or even unidentiable in
the aftermath of an emergency (Sheu 2007) and the information themselves
incomplete (Yagci Sokat et al. 2018). For this reason, the UN Joint Logistics
Center has been formally established in 2002 with the aim of collecting and
disseminating critical information and setting up information-sharing tools
(Kaatrud and Van Wassenhove 2003).
Trust and partner selection
Collaborative relationships could also suer from a lack of trust between
public and private partners. Governmental organizations might doubt the
good intentions of private companies, while the latter often perceive public
partners as bureaucratic (Christopher and Tatham 2011). Moreover, in com-
parison to commercial environments, the development of trust is impeded
by the ad-hoc nature of the hastily formed networks (Tatham and Kovács
2010). In line with the partner selection challenge addressed in Section A.4.1,
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dierences in geographical, cultural and organizational policies may create
additional coordination barriers (van Wassenhove 2006). Moreover, Kabra,
Ramesh, and Arshinder (2015) discuss management, technology and people
characteristics which may hamper ecient emergency collaborations.
Identication and division of costs
Xu and Beamon (2006) identify three cost categories associated with coor-
dination of supply chain collaborations: coordination cost, opportunistic
risk cost, and operational risk cost. Coordination costs are directly related
to physical ow and coordination management. Opportunistic risk costs
are associated with a lack of bargaining power, while operational risk costs
result from unsatisfactory partner performance (Balcik et al. 2010). A survey
of Bealt, Fernández Barrera, and Mansouri (2016) revealed that the cost of
logistics services is considered the most important barrier in the formation
of collaborative relationships between private companies and humanitarian
organizations. Given the uncertain environment emergency collaborations
operate in and the lack of clear visibility of required operations and resources,
the magnitude of these cost levels is hard to identify. In addition, eective
collaboration requires mechanisms to allocate the associated costs to each
partner. Due to the non-nancial aspects of emergency logistics, mecha-
nisms developed for commercial applications, such as penalty fees, cannot be
directly implemented to PPECs (Dolinskaya et al. 2011).
A.4.2.3 Capabilities and Resources
Public and private actors dispose over various capabilities and resources. In
the case of severe disasters, these capabilities and resources can be limited
heavily. Therefore, the specic circumstances of the crises need to be taken
into consideration during the development of a logistical model. In the context
of the following subsection, we assume that both public and private actors’
capabilities and resources after the disaster are still available.
Capabilities
Under this assumption, commercial supply chains can still make use of their
established routines, their communication network, and their knowledge of
market and demand during crises (Holguín-Veras, Jaller, et al. 2012). Retail
supply chains can quickly adapt to changes and uncertainties. Hence, they
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are designed to act in an environment where exibility and speed are crucial
(M. A. Bourlakis and Weightman 2004). These capabilities are also crucial for
private supply chains in their response to disasters (Kochan and Nowicki 2018;
Ribeiro and Barbosa-Povoa 2018). Following Kochan and Nowicki (2018), such
capabilities can be classied into readiness, responsiveness and recovery.
Contrary to commercial supply chains, knowledge in public supply chains
can be categorized as general disaster knowledge rather than detailed market
knowledge. This is highlighted by Kovács and Tatham (2010), who compared
skills required for commercial logistics positions to requirements for human-
itarian logisticians. They concluded that – in spite of some similarities –
signicant dierences exist. For example, humanitarians consider problem-
solving skills more important than their commercial counterparts do (Kovács
and Tatham 2010).
Furthermore, public actors need to cope with numerous uncertainties that
are typical for disaster situations (Olaogbebikan and Oloruntoba 2017). To
model these uncertainties related to supply chain disruptions, Snyder et al.
(2016) suggest supply, capacity, and lead time uncertainty. However, it needs
to be considered that uncertainties during and after a disaster signicantly
exceed the uctuations companies are normally prepared for (Holguín-Veras,
Jaller, et al. 2012). Moreover, sudden demand peaks (Snyder et al. 2016) as
well as the above-mentioned lack of preparedness for low-probability and
high-consequence events can be considered in modeling PPECs.
In addition, private actors are hit by the disaster right away. In case of a
shortage, retail stores try to satisfy the high demand immediately (see also
Holguín-Veras, Jaller, et al. (2012)). In the case of the suspected contamination
of the tap water in Heidelberg, this led to a time gap: until public actors set up
an emergency water supply chain, commercial supply chains were the only
distributor of water. However, they struggled to cope with such unexpected
extraordinary demand peaks (Heidelberg24 2019). Therefore, support from
public actors would have been necessary if the crisis lasted longer.
It can be concluded that modeling commercial logistics capabilities should
focus on the optimization of steady ows, while public supply chains are
designed to immediately cope with large transport volumes (Holguín-Veras,
Jaller, et al. 2012; Olaogbebikan and Oloruntoba 2017).
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Resources
Public actors have the opportunity to choose locations for warehouses and
distribution points out of a large number of buildings (e.g. schools, sports
arenas) and – due to the legislative option to take possession of resources
and goods – indirectly over a huge variety of additional resources. However,
the high exibility goes hand-in-hand with a high degree of uncertainty. For
instance, public actors could try to take possession of the goods in a ware-
house without knowing about quantities and the exact product specications
beforehand. On the other hand, private actors physically possess resources
and have knowledge and control over their location, while they have to work
under the permanent threat of seizure.
Furthermore, there is a large dierence regarding the up-scaling of available
sta at dierent sites. Except for temporary employees, the size of the work-
force of private organizations is rather xed. Moreover, the process to hire
additional employees is time consuming and challenging. Therefore, private
organizations need to navigate through heavy supply chain disturbances
with the sta they have at their disposal in normal times. On the other hand,
public relief organizations sta consists of volunteers at a high degree. This
is closely related to the risk of taking possession of physical resources since
the volunteers, which are activated by public actors, cannot keep working in
their usual job during the crisis and therefore the sta at companies is even
further reduced.
A.5 A basic game-theoretic PPEC-approach
In this section, we approach PPECs from a game-theoretical perspective
to carve out its potential and limits with a focus on the actors’ incentives.
Game-theory formally describes the eects and interdependencies of strategic
decision makers (Myerson 1991; Rasmusen 2007). Similar to Seaberg, Devine,
and Zhuang (2017), we argue that in the context of disaster management
partners act strategically as long as their goals are not completely congru-
ent. Although the number of articles in the area of disaster management is
limited, there are some rst contributions that analyze the strategic interac-
tion among dierent actors in this domain, though not from a public-private
perspective.
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For example, Nagurney, Flores, and Soylu (2016) and Nagurney, Salarpour, and
Daniele (2019) look at competition between HOs based on a game-theoretic
model, which jointly integrates both logistical and nancial decisions. The
model sheds light on the interesting strategic position of HOs who are com-
peting and at the same time collaborating to share resources and reduce cost
(collaboration is realized by shared constraints). Compared to public and
private players, HOs are non-prot and non-governmental and therefore
represent a third type of actor, which is not considered by our approach (see
also Section A.1). Gossler et al. (2019) apply a similar approach to determine
the optimal distribution of tasks. The authors derive the optimal distribution
decisions for a long-term business perspective of disaster relief organizations.
Nagurney, Flores, and Soylu (2016) and Nagurney, Salarpour, and Daniele
(2019) and Gossler et al. (2019) all apply the rather specic concept of a Gener-
alized Nash Equilibrium, which allows them to deal with the strategic aspects
and the complexity of the decisions (with respect to the large number of
restrictions).
Coles and Zhuang (2011) model a multi-actor collaboration game to establish
a decision support framework in the context of emergencies. The model eval-
uates and selects the most valuable relationships for the emergency manager
considering resource restraints. In addition to the assumption that every
company is a prot maximizer, the authors also look at non-nancial bene-
ts that accrue value to the business model of a private company. Taking a
similar focus on preferences and goal alignment, Carland, Goentzel, and Mon-
tibeller (2018) analyze the potential for collaboration between humanitarian
organizations and the private sector based on a decision support framework
(multi-attribute value analysis). From an HO’s perspective, the objective is to
engage private actors, to elicit their preferences, and to align the objectives
of both sides.
The following game-theoretical model primarily serves illustration purposes
and is therefore deliberately kept simple. We assume two players, the public
sector and the private sector. The objective functions of both players cor-
respond to the roles of both players in emergency logistics as discussed in
Sections A.1 and A.2.
In the model, we assume two reasons for the rm to engage in a collaboration:
reduction of disaster-related cost and reputation. These two variants of moti-
vation primarily serve to illustrate the interplay of state and rm incentives
in a basic model. Albeit not part of our analysis, it is promising to extend the
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rm’s motivation in a dynamic setting. For example, one could imagine a pri-
vate company that learns from the emergency context, where it collaborates
with the public sector and thus ultimately establishes a more sustainable and
crisis resilient business model, which improves the company’s internal BCM
processes. The aspect of reputation is also touched upon only briey to high-
light the incentive eects. A detailed analysis of reputation eects requires a
dynamic model that goes beyond the objective of this contribution.
The advantage of our approach to choose a basic model is that two central so-
lutions of the game can be derived in closed form and thus directly compared:
The Nash equilibrium (NE) as an individually rational solution of the game on
the one hand and the loss-minimizing result, which the state primarily strives
for. This raises the important question whether the outcome envisaged by the
state can also be implemented by a so-called incentive-compatible contract. A
simple mechanism-design approach describes the conditions under which this
solution is feasible. The application of contract theory and mechanism design
is important for a game-theoretic account of a PPEC because the collabo-
ration between state and company is ultimately intended to improve crisis
management, i.e. to transfer relief supplies more eciently to people in need.
As mentioned above, the main advantages of collaboration in emergency
logistics are the increased resource availability and capacities, leading to a
higher overall service level (Bealt, Fernández Barrera, and Mansouri 2016).
A.5.1 The model
We now illustrate the potential for collaboration by choosing a basic game-
theoretic framework. As outlined in the previous sections, “collaboration”
means that the rm and the state jointly prepare for the disaster by coordi-
nating their planned activities. Collaboration can avoid cost and provide the
requirements for a more ecient crisis management.
In a rst step, we describe the objective functions for the state and the rm.
Based on the objective functions and the strategies, we derive the NE of the
game. As a solution concept, the NE provides us with the individually optimal
outcome of each player given that the co-player plays its NE-strategy, too.
Thereafter, we compare the individual optimization result with the strategy
combination, which minimizes under-supply in the form of (non-material)
losses of the population such as suering and deprivation. In the context of a
disaster, this is the overriding goal of state crisis management. We therefore
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consider this loss-minimizing-outcome (LM) as the rst-best solution out of the
state’s perspective as the ruling disaster management authority. Finally, we
discuss under which conditions the loss-minimal solution can be implemented
in an incentive-compatible way and to what extent company reputation can
support a collaborative solution.
A.5.1.1 Basic structure
Assume that a disaster strikes with a probability Y and that the disaster causes
a damage of size  > 0. We assume that Y is an independently Bernoulli-
distributed random variable on the interval [0,1]. In this model, damage is
understood as "decit quantity", i.e. the quantity of essential goods that is
missing to supply the population. To be able to supply the population with
these goods, the state needs to acquire them on the market together with the
“logistical capacity”, which is needed to store, transport, and distribute the
goods. As the dierence between goods and logistical capacity is of secondary
importance for our analysis (what matters is the fact that the state has to
purchase these resources from the company), we summarize both with the
variable G which stands for "resources".
The state can acquire these resources at two points of time: It can procure
before the crisis occurs (ex ante) and thus create an emergency reserve of
G# where the index # stands for “No crisis” or “Normal times”. Procuring
in normal times implies that the state has to pay the regular market price ?
for the resources. Alternatively, the state can wait until a crisis occurs and
try to acquire the goods “ad hoc” from the rm (ex post). In most countries,
such an intervention comprises conscation and a subsequent compensation
of the company (Daniels and Trebilcock 2006; Deem 2012). We use the
variable G for the conscated items where the index  stands for “Crisis”.
The state compensates the rm at arm’s length prices @ per unit. The variable
@ (compensation payment) is determined by competition law and by the type
of contract between the rm and the state. The compensation level can be
equivalent to the market price ? but don’t need to be. Besides the uncertain
price conditions during a crisis, the complete availability of goods during
a crisis, even if the price does not rise, is uncertain. For example, in most
countries, the state compensates the companies for seized goods with the
market price which was observable 14 5 >A4 the crisis occurred.
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Furthermore, since the conscation occurs ad hoc, it causes transaction costs
to both the state and the rm, which can be substantial if the intervention
is not coordinated (Pelling and Dill 2010; Wood 2008). As explained at the
beginning of this section, pre-crisis collaboration reduces these transaction
costs because a PPEC reduces frictions at the company due to otherwise
unprepared and abrupt changes in the business procedures. For the state, a
high degree of collaboration will accelerate the availability and usability of
the rm’s resources. The transaction costs are given by)(, (\( \ ) = 2(,\(\ for
the state (() and rm ( ) respectively. The variable 2(, denotes the combined
transaction cost factor of the state (or the rm, respectively) as occurring
during a crisis.
The strategy variables \( ∈ [0, 1] and \ ∈ [0, 1] are at the center of this
analysis because they capture the investment in collaboration of the state
\( and the company \ . Both actors choose their strategy on a continuous
spectrum between full collaboration (\( = 1 and \ = 1) or no collaboration at
all (\( = 0 and \ = 0). High collaboration implies that both, the company and
the state, prepare the legal, technical and procedural conditions of a consca-
tion and hence face lower cost. For \( \ = 1 (bilateral full collaboration) the
transaction cost for an intervention are on a minimal (but nonnegative) level
2( for the state and 2 for the rm. However, with decreasing levels of collab-
oration, the transaction costs increase exponentially and would even become
innitively high if one partner preferred no collaboration at all ()(, →∞ for
\( \ = 0). We assume a multiplicative eect of collaboration, since it is not
possible to collaborate unilaterally. For both actors we assume a linear cost
function for collaborative investment of the form \( , \ , ^(, (^(, ≥ 1).The
variable ^(, denotes the transaction cost of collaboration, occurred by the
state or the rm.
The loss-function of the state is given by (1):
!(G# , G ) = Y [` | − G# − G | + ̄ ] + # , G# ≥ 0, G ≥ 0 (A.1)
The term | − G# − G | captures the loss of the state due to a decit of
goods, which can be reduced either by the emergency stock G# or by ad hoc
conscation G . The weighting parameter ` ≥ 1 takes into consideration that
the losses, which result out of uncovered need in the population (deprivation)
have a dierent unit than all other cost components, which are expressed
in monetary units. By increasing `, the state can give more weight to the
distribution of goods compared to budget concerns; for ` → ∞ it gives
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absolute priority to people’s needs and completely ignores budget restrictions.
The terms ̄ and # are budgets and hence monetary components of the loss
function. The indices # and  again refer to “normal times” and “crisis”, i.e.
there is a budget # available in normal times and a budget for exceptional
crisis situations ̄ . Whereas the former corresponds to the regular annual
budget, which can be spent by the crisis management authorities the latter
represents a highly up-scaled budget released by the government only in
an emergency situation. Although ̄ will certainly be a larger budget than
# (̄ > # ), the exact volume is unknown before the onset of a crisis,
which is indicated by the expectation-bar. Before a crisis occurs, the state
plans to spend the budgets as follows:





The normal-times budget is spent for the procurement of emergency stock
under regular (market) conditions and for investment in collaboration (bud-
get equation (2)). The crisis-budget (budget equation (3)) has to cover the
(expected) compensation payments for conscated goods and the (expected)
transaction cost for having emergency supply available. This way, the state’s
objective function represents a social cost function as outlined in Section
A.4: the undersupply corresponds to the deprivation cost and the budgets
reect the nancial constraints. If we solve both budget equations for the
quantities of goods G# and G and insert these quantities into (1) we get (4) as
a modied version of the state’s loss function, which now depends explicitly
on the strategy variables \( and \ .
!(\( , \ ) = Y [` | − G# (\( ) − G (\( , \ ) | + ̄ ] + # (A.4)
The rm’s prot function is given by (5):




The expression c represents the “prot in normal times” and the second
term is the prot for the provision of resources for the state in normal times.
The content of the square brackets Y [·] reects the changes in prot due to
conscation and compensation in the case of a crisis. If there is no crisis
(which is expected with a probability of 1 − Y), these prot changes are zero.
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The cost term ^ \ represents the eort in time and money for engaging
in collaboration (“collaborative investment”). Note that these costs have to
be incurred already in “normal times” and that the rm’s collaboration cost
just depends on its own eort \ whereas the cost reduction requires a joint
collaborative eort \( \ .
A.5.1.2 Nash-equilibrium
In a Nash-equilibrium, both actors pick their optimal strategy given their co-
player’s strategy. Formally, the Nash-equilibrium is the intersection point of
the best response proles of both players. We get the best-response functions
'(, by taking the rst derivative of the objective functions with respect to
the strategy variable of each player and considering the rst-order condition
(FOC) for a minimum (the state minimizes losses with respect to \( ) or
maximum (the rm maximizes prot with respect to \ ). Expressions (6) and













= 0⇒ \ ∗ (\( ) =
√
(2 + 2( ) Y
^ \(
0 ≤ \ ∗ , \( ≤ 1 (A.7)
The state has a higher incentive to increase \( if the transaction cost param-
eter 2( and the price for resources ? increase. The rst eect is due to the
fact that collaboration reduces transaction cost and a larger ? increases the
cost of an emergency stock, which makes conscation of items during a crisis
more attractive. However, as collaboration reduces the transaction cost of
conscation, the state has an incentive to increase \( . Inversely, larger values
of ^( , @ and \ reduce the incentive for collaboration. The eect of ^( as the
cost parameter of collaboration is straightforward. If the compensation cost
@ is high, the state is reluctant to rely upon conscation and rather builds
an emergency stock of resources for which collaboration is not necessary.
Perhaps the most interesting eect refers to \ . There is a clearly negative
eect of \ on \ ∗( : the larger the rm’s contribution to collaboration, the
larger the incentive for the state to reduce its collaborative eort. Hence, the
collaborative investments of both actors are strategic substitutes. Roughly
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speaking, games in which the players’ strategies are substitutes (as the op-
posite of complements) are called submodular games (Fudenberg and Tirole
1991).
It is mainly this feature of the game that makes the NE-outcome inecient.
Some eects of the model’s parameters are similar for the optimal collabora-
tion strategy of the rm. The rm increases collaboration if the transaction
cost parameter 2 is high and if the collaboration cost parameter ^ is low.
Furthermore, the collaboration level of the company \ ∗

also acts as a substi-
tute for the collaboration level of the state \( , i.e. the more (less) the state
collaborates, the less (more) the company invests in collaboration.
However, three dierences in the optimal strategies are striking: rst, the
rm’s collaboration level is not only increasing in its own transaction cost
parameter but also in the transaction cost parameter of the state 2( . Hence,
the rm is partially internalizing the transaction cost of the state, which
leads to a higher level of collaboration. The reason for this is that a high
value of 2( increases the need for collaboration for the state but reduces the
amount of resources G the state can acquire in times of a crisis. By increasing
\ complementary to the increase of \( , the rm can keep the number of
resources high and the state’s frictions for use of these resources low.
Second, in contrast to (6) the inuence of the transaction cost parameters
are merely probabilistic, i.e. they only inuence the optimal strategy of the
company as an expected value. However, the disaster probability Y does
not inuence the state’s collaboration level, because the entire rst-order
condition is multiplied with Y so that this parameter cancels out. Finally,
while both resource prices (@ and ?) inuence the optimal strategy of the
state, they do not appear in the best-response function of the rm. This is
because these parameters are linked to the state’s collaboration level via the
budgets whereas they are independent from the rm’s collaboration level
(collaboration reduces cost but does not alter prices).
Figure A.4 depicts the best-response functions of both actors. The chosen
parameter-values are =100, Y=10%, 2(=1, 2=1, ?=2, @=1, ^( = 10, ^ = 10.
Both response functions have a negative slope and are convex which reects
the submodular property: The less (more) one actor contributes the (higher)
lower the contribution of the other actor.
The NE (NE1) can be found at the intersection of both curves. For this example,
the collaboration levels are \ ∗
(
= 0.79 for the state and\ ∗

= 0.43 for the rm, i.e.
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Figure A.4: Best-response functions.
the state provides a larger contribution than the rm. Formally, we determine
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into the loss function of the state and
the prot function of the company gives the individually optimal outcomes








). However, there is still one
important note at order. The derived solutions (8) and (9) characterize the
equilibrium provided the existence of a NE. A NE for this game exists if (and
only if) inequality (10) is fullled. If expression (10) is violated, there is no









A.5 A Basic Game-Theoretic PPEC-Approach
This case is illustrated in Figure A.4 for the constellation where the best-
response function of the rm corresponds to the dotted line. In this case, the
company’s curve is so low that it passes under the curve of the state. Such a
failed-collaboration scenario is possible if, for example, the collaboration cost
^ of the rm is very high (numerator of the right-hand side of (10) increases),
the disaster probability Y is extremely low or the rm’s frictions due to lack
of collaboration (2 ) are not high enough (denominator of the right-hand
side of (10) decreases). We can conclude that the rst and most important
obstacle for collaboration is a parameter and incentive constellation in which
a company has no self-interest in a collaborative agreement at all.
A.5.1.3 Firm reputation
In this basic model, the rm has an incentive to invest into collaboration if
pre-crisis collaboration with the civil protection authorities reduces the cost
for an ad-hoc transfer of resources to the state in the moment of a crisis. In
other words: If one is inevitably confronted with the crisis anyway, then it is
better to approach the operations in an orderly and planned manner.
In addition to this motive, it is also possible that a company is willing to con-
tribute due to a sense of responsibility or reputational concern. As explained
in Section A.3.2, the latter is similar to the motivation of rms to establish
a positive reputation for CSR. The rm can expect a positive percussion of
its (publicly visible) activities if customers take note of the company’s eorts
and perceive these activities in a way which increases their loyalty towards
the rm or their willingness to pay (Besiou and van Wassenhove 2015). This
way, the rm’s contribution to public crisis management can be regarded as
an investment into higher future returns.
To illustrate this eect formally, we add the reputation-term ' = X Ā \( \
to the prot function of the rm where Ā represents the expected return of
reputation and 0 < X < 1 is the discount factor. For Ā > 0, an anticipated
reputation has a positive eect on the company’s willingness to collaborate.
The second Nash equilibrium NE2 in Figure A.4 illustrates this eect: The
integration of the reputation term increases the reaction curve of the company
and leads to higher collaboration rates of the rm. However, as collaboration
rates are (imperfect) substitutes, the state will slightly reduce its level of
collaboration and can use the saved resources to increase the emergency
stock G# .
101
A Public-Private Collaborations in Emergency Logistics
Just as in the case of CSR, reputation does not automatically increase, but
actions must be credible from the customer’s point of view. Since reputation
is a long-term mechanism, the company must be able to provide the externally
visible resources and competence on a long-run basis. However, if customers
have the impression that a company pretends to play a supportive role in
humanitarian operations for tactical reasons only, this critical perception can
backre and seriously damage the rm’s reputation (Stewart, Kolluru, and
M. Smith 2009; Donia, Tetrault Sirsly, and Ronen 2017). In the area of crisis
management, a particularly high level of sensitivity on the part of the public
can be expected, as human lives are at stake here.
A.5.1.4 Loss minimal solution and mechanism design
We focus on mechanism design as a last example to illustrate how the state can
lever the collaboration level in a PPEC. Mechanism design is a branch of game-
theory and deals with the question on how the incentives of institutional
rules inuence the outcome of a group (e.g. welfare on a market or in society)
and how these rules should be designed in order to improve these outcomes
(Jackson 2014; Maskin and Sjostrom 2002; Myerson 1989). Accordingly, the
question is now, whether the individually optimal NE-outcome of the PPEC-
game can be Pareto improved. In economic policy and welfare economics, an
important reference solution is the so-called social-optimal outcome, which
maximizes the players’ joint utility (Green and Laont 1979; Sen 1982).
However, the purpose of a PPEC is not to nd a balanced improvement
between rm and state but to minimize the undersupply, which is caused
by the crisis. It is straightforward to realize that the loss-minimal outcome
implies the maximal contribution level of the rm \ = 1 (an increase of
Δ\ unambiguously lowers L because the cost of Δ\ just aects the rm,





be found at point LM in Figure 4. However, a higher level of collaboration
reduces the rm’s prot (otherwise a PPEC would also be feasible in absence
of any additional incentive). To motivate the company to participate, the state





) to the rm. To achieve this, the state must compensate the company
in monetary terms, say by a monetary transfer C . One aspect that favors the
use of mechanism design in the context of a PPEC is the fact that the party
to be compensated (the company) is also primarily interested in monetary
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payments. In order to seek an agreement with the company that comes as




! B.C . # = G#? + \(^( + C, c (\( , \ ) + C = c∗ (\ ∗( , \ ∗ ) (A.11)
According to (11), the state looks for the optimal solution that minimizes the
undersupply. The company must be compensated with the transfer C for its
additional expenditures. The transfer must be chosen in such a way that the
company receives at least the prot of the individually optimal solution c∗
and that the state can nance this transfer from the regular (normal-times)
budget # . If a solution exists, the state can oer the contract
〈
\( , \ , C
〉
to
the company, which should have no reason to reject it.
Note that for the state to be able to nance the transfer C , it must either reduce
the emergency stock G# or its collaboration level \( . Both have problematic
implications. The reduction of the emergency stock increases the dependence
on the company and requires a high degree of condence in the willingness of
the company to actually implement the concluded contract in an emergency.
Since this trust – as in any collaboration – only develops over a longer period
of time, the readiness for such a measure will already require a certain depth
and duration of the collaboration (Gintis 2000; Hardin 2002). In this case, the
formal contract would be supplemented by a relational contract between the
company and the state, which is primarily stabilized by the long-term nature
of the collaborative relationship.
If, however, the state reduces its own collaboration level, this could be viewed
with suspicion by the company. Discussions between the authors and com-
pany representatives (as part of the NOLAN project on public-private col-
laboration in Germany (IIP 2020)) revealed that under certain conditions,
companies are prepared to support the state in emergencies. Nevertheless,
they also see the danger that the state could misuse such collaboration to del-
egate governmental tasks to the companies. These arguments show that the
practical implementation of derived solutions requires an intense stakeholder
dialogue.
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A.6 Conclusion
Public-Private Emergency Collaborations provide tremendous opportunities
for public and private actors in disaster relief. However, no study on logistical
or game-theoretical models exist, which explicitly deals with this specic
form of collaboration in disaster management. Therefore, we developed a
logistical modeling framework that denes the context of logistical PPEC
models.
In the framework, we discuss the dierent logistical characteristics of public
and private actors in relief logistics, regarding their strategy and motivation,
the way they interact with each other, and their capabilities and resources.
By that, we provide a base for quantitatively modeling emergency logistics
problems considering both public and private actors.
Moreover, we developed a basic game-theoretic PPEC model that gives more
precise insights into the motivation and incentives of the partners. Inspired by
game-theoretic accounts of conventional PPPs, this model sheds light on the
partners’ participation constraints (which dene the scope of collaboration),
the eects on the outcome if the partners’ contributions are strategic substi-
tutes, and on reputational eects. Finally, it was illustrated how a mechanism
design approach can be used by the state to transform the rm’s incentives
into lower levels of undersupply or deprivation.
With the present paper, we are able to dene a variety of opportunities for
future research. However, the developed framework and model could work
as an orientation for upcoming research. Especially with the help of real
world data and case studies, the modeling framework can be further tested,
extended, adapted, and optimized.
In a nutshell, it can be concluded that, with the help of well dened PPEC-
concepts, processes in relief logistics can be understood better, supply chains
can become more resilient, and public actors can ensure that the population
is supplied as good as possible. Therefore, research on PPECs promotes the
shift from ghting the symptoms of the population’s undersupply during
crises towards ghting the course of the problem, leading to an increase in
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The private sector regularly ensures the ecient supply of food for the pop-
ulation. However, public authorities have legal obligations to ensure food
supply and might have to take over responsibilities during times of emergen-
cies. Existing procedures and supply chain structures for crisis preparedness
and public emergency food supply are often antiquated and costly. In this
study, we consider Public-Private Emergency Collaborations as an innovative
approach to improve emergency food preparedness.
We delineate a novel approach and the benets of deploying private ware-
house infrastructure and collaborative warehouse sites for public emergency
food supply. The proposed approach provides an attractiveness score for ware-
house locations and, as a consequence, increases transparency. Furthermore,
the multi-objective optimization considers logistics costs, deprivation, and
regional attractiveness. Therefore, it combines relevant but diverse objectives
for warehouse location decisions and enables ecient trade-o solutions be-
tween objectives. We apply data pertaining to the state of Baden-Württemberg
in Germany to determine and demonstrate the application of our approach
and the benets for actors in the private and public sector.
1 This chapter includes the preprint of the article "Identifying Joint Warehouse Locations in
Public-Private Emergency Collaborations" by Maximilian Löel, Alexander Zienau, Markus
Lüttenberg, Marcus Wiens, Stephan M. Wagner, Frank Schultmann, and myself, which has
been submitted to a scientic journal.
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B.1 Introduction and Problem Description
Food supply is regularly organized through private actors where grocery
chains have built highly ecient supply chains. In times of crisis (e.g. due to
failed harvest, disruption of international supply chains, or lockdowns due
to pandemics), the responsibility to ensure food supply might shift to the
public sector. Therefore, the responsible public authorities regularly have
preparedness measures and infrastructure in place to ensure responsiveness.
The German Federal Government, for example, maintains a large emergency
stock of grains and legumes in emergency warehouses (BMEL 2020b).
Public and private actors follow dierent supply chain strategies with vary-
ing requirements regarding warehouse locations. The private sector aims
for high inventory turnover (Zentes, Morschett, and Schramm-Klein 2017).
Fast Moving Consumer Goods (including food) are usually shipped from
production plants and manufacturer distribution centers via warehouses and
retailer distribution centers to stores and other Points of Distribution (PoDs;
Kellner, Otto, and Busch (2013)). For example, supermarket chain Lidl has
approximately 40 regional warehouses and 3.200 retail stores in Germany
(LIDL 2020) and Tesco around 30 warehouses and 3.500 retail stores in the
UK (Zentes, Morschett, and Schramm-Klein 2017). In contrast, the large and
costly stocks in public emergency warehouses are rarely needed (if at all),
and the inventory turnover is low. This triggers the question of whether a
closer collaboration between private and public actors could maintain the
security of food supply in case of crises and increase the emergency supply’s
eciency.
Public-Private Emergency Collaborations (PPECs) are not entirely new. How-
ever, they are usually restricted to the disaster relief and humanitarian aid
context. The humanitarian operations and supply chain management litera-
ture discusses and promotes joint crisis management via a voluntary exchange
of knowledge or resources (van Wassenhove 2006; Kovács and Spens 2007;
Wiens et al. 2018). While some countries consider PPECs in their emergency
plans (e.g. Sweden; Kaneberg (2018)), this issue has not been thoroughly
addressed in the German context.
Both public and private actors signicantly benet from closer collaboration
in this area. On the one hand, the government could substantially reduce
the number of unused goods at hand for emergency supply by utilizing
private supply chains that store specic goods in well-positioned warehouses,
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thereby saving taxpayer money. Approximately e20 million are currently
spent per year for food supplies that have never been used domestically
(Rexroth 2010).
On the other hand, private actors could benet from additional sales in crises
when having essential goods (LZ 2020b) and additional storage space for
spikes in demand available (LZ 2020a), e.g. due to improved information
sharing with public authorities and supported by public compensation within
the collaboration. Moreover, rms could be perceived as an important actor
for people’s well-being through increased media coverage (Focus 2020; MDR
2020) and achieve reputational gains (Wiens et al. 2018).
Despite expected gains from closer collaboration, public and private actors
pursue dierent objectives and operate in dierent environments (Holguín-
Veras, Jaller, et al. 2012). Therefore, long-lasting collaborations are only
feasible if chosen locations are useful and attractive for both actors to fulll
their individual objectives. In particular, we determine regional attractive-
ness with specic location criteria and evaluate a logistics network from the
commercial and emergency perspectives through monetary logistics costs
and monetized deprivation.
In the context of this study, we consider a PPEC that facilitates the combined
use of warehouses for commercial and emergency food supply. To the best
of our knowledge, no approach exists that compares the attractiveness of
regions from both perspectives and derives potential candidate locations for
collaboration. We close this gap, develop a tool that supports the process to
nd such locations, and contribute to the body of literature in two ways.
First, we increase transparency regarding the attractiveness of geographical
regions for commercial and emergency strategies. Attractiveness can rstly
dier due to divergent assessments of the importance of certain location
criteria, e.g. salary levels or the quality in local IT infrastructure. Moreover,
some criteria might only be relevant for one of the two actors (e.g., local taxes).
Comparing regions from either perspective, we further identify regions which
can be suitable for both actors.
The dierences in the regions’ scores provide useful insights for both regional
planners and commercial decision makers aiming to contribute to an increased
resilience towards crises in the context of their Corporate Social Responsibility
initiatives. For example, authorities can select and support less attractive
119
B Identifying Joint Warehouse Locations in Public-Private Emergency Collaborations
and, probably, less expensive regions they want to develop into emergency
logistics hubs.
Second, we develop an optimization model that combines multiple objectives:
costs, suering of the population in crises, and attractiveness of the regions
for warehouse locations. The outcome of this model is an array of warehouse
networks from dierent perspectives. The locations that are selected in
multiple scenarios can serve as another starting point for a PPEC: If both
actors benet from a new warehouse at the location, common contingency
measures could be installed. This may include public actors’ access to critical
goods and the power to inuence their distribution at the beginning of a
crisis. On the other hand, companies could for example receive tax-benets
or subsidies for investments in the local infrastructure.
Our study is structured as follows. In Section B.2, we provide an overview
on relevant literature. Following, we present our approach in Section B.3,
before we apply the approach in the context of a case study in Section B.4.
We discuss the results of the case study in Section B.5 and conclude our study
with an outlook for future work.
B.2 Theoretical Background
Approaches to identify warehouse locations have been discussed in the litera-
ture for a long time (see for instance Akinc and Khumawala (1977), Lee, Green,
and Kim (1980), and Yoon and Hwang (1985) as examples of early work). Fur-
thermore, the attractiveness of dierent regions as a potential warehouse
location and the corresponding selection of locations are broadly studied in
the commercial and humanitarian logistics literature. A wide selection of
criteria, frameworks, and programming approaches have been developed.
Regarding the general process of warehouse location selection, van Thai
and Grewal (2005) introduce a three-stage framework. Steps include the
identication of a geographical area, a collection of potential locations, and
the nal selection of a distribution center location. We follow the structure
of this approach within our study.
Recognizing that location decisions should be based on dierent criteria,
Badri (1996) is one early example to apply multi-objective programming and
optimization. The work ranks various goals according to their importance
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and uses lexicographic optimization accordingly. Furthermore, Chuang (2002)
uses quality function deployment (QFD) to establish useful location criteria,
considering nine criteria and expert knowledge. The type of facility is not
specied to a warehouse, but several established factors broadly apply to
location decisions, such as the quality of transportation infrastructure. Simi-
larly, Dekle et al. (2005) analyze the location of disaster recovery centers in
a county in Florida from the humanitarian perspective. Although disaster
recovery centers play a dierent role in relief operations than warehouses, the
applied location criteria are generalizable and repeatedly found in comparable
publications on location decisions (e.g., Roh, Pettit, et al. (2015) below).
Roh, Jang, and Han (2013) develop specic criteria for humanitarian relief
warehouse locations, making use of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP)
and semi-structured interviews for rst- and second-level criteria. First-level
criteria include cooperation, national stability, cost, logistics, and location.
In a follow-up study, Roh, Pettit, et al. (2015) deal with important location
factors for pre-positioning, several of which are similar to the ones used
by Dekle et al. (2005). Their goal is to identify a suitable macro- and later
micro-location for a case study warehouse. Applied methods include expert
interviews and the ranking of location alternatives. Both methods are also
used in this study. Jahre et al. (2016) present an approach to specically
include so-called contextual factors for warehouse decisions, and apply it to
the UNHCR warehouses. Their work showed that, when applied properly,
further contextual factors for demand, logistics, political, and security aspects
can improve existing warehouse networks and preparedness.
In another commercial application by Rikalovic et al. (2017), location crite-
ria are evaluated with the use of a Geographic Information System (GIS).
Following the evaluation of various location criteria, the utility value of the
macro-location is determined, similar to the (broad) region identied in the
rst step by van Thai and Grewal (2005). While the specic location criteria
are less relevant for our work, the methodology to determine criteria values
using GIS and their processing showcases advancements to analyze locations’
attractiveness through the use of geographic information. Similarly, Onstein,
Tavasszy, and van Damme (2019) combine geographic sources and criteria
with typical economic factors to provide a wide range of relevant factors for
location decisions.
Various other publications stress the importance of single location criteria,
either specically for food logistics (Fredriksson and Liljestrand 2015; Koster
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2002) or for location decisions in general (Hesse 2004; Helm, Gleißner, and
Kreiter 2012). While commercial and humanitarian applications are usually
regarded separately, it is frequently mentioned that various cross-learning
and partnering opportunities exist (van Wassenhove 2006; Kovács and Spens
2007; Cozzolino 2012).
In addition to the studies identifying location criteria, Kovács and Spens (2007)
specically highlight the linkage of business and humanitarian logistics and
discuss similarities such as risk management and continuity planning. They
argue that humanitarian or emergency logistics can and should learn from
business logistics. Early (van Wassenhove 2006) and later works (Cozzolino
2012; Wiens et al. 2018) suggest dedicated public-private cooperations.
Carland, Goentzel, and Montibeller (2018) model the value for private actors
in humanitarian supply chains, aiming to address private preferences and
facilitate involvement of these actors in humanitarian operations.
Nevertheless, commercial and humanitarian operations have also widely
dierent characteristics, be it in the environment (Kovács and Spens 2007;
Holguín-Veras, Jaller, et al. 2012) or specically in objectives (Holguín-Veras,
Pérez, et al. 2013), and it is widely accepted that these must be acknowledged
for successful implementation. In this context, Gutjahr and Nolz (2016) specif-
ically stress the importance of multi-objective decisions in the humanitarian
environment in a dedicated literature review on the subject. They acknowl-
edge both the cited work that has been done in the eld and the need for
future research in the domain.
Multi-objective optimization in the humanitarian context is, for instance,
applied by Tzeng, Cheng, and Huang (2007), including three objectives: Total
cost, total travel time, and minimal satisfaction. The combination aims to
consider eciency and fairness attributes in optimization. Görmez, Köksalan,
and Salman (2011) combine dierent objectives to locate disaster response
facilities and allocate demands to these.
The transfer of established Operations Research models to the humanitarian
context is considered as critical, arguing that models should instead be tai-
lored to the specic situation (Besiou and van Wassenhove 2015). For example,
Rawls and Turnquist (2010) develop a location-inventory model to preposi-
tion emergency supplies for disaster response under uncertainty. Similarly,
Charles et al. (2016) regard uncertainties in the context of the identication of
locations based on dierent sourcing scenarios. Cotes and Cantillo (2019) and
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Paul and Xinfang Wang (2019) moreover identify optimal locations for the
pre-positioning of goods to minimize social costs, which are dened as the
sum of logistics costs and a proxy for human suering (so-called deprivation
costs).
To the best of our knowledge, no approach highlights the dierences in
the relevant location criteria of private and public actors in a PPEC in a
comparative way. Moreover, no study supports the decision making process
to identify locations for common warehouses. Lastly, the integration of both
public and private applications with the combination of specic costs and
criteria does not exist in the literature.
B.3 Methodology
Our approach is designed as follows. We rst determine a score for the
attractiveness of a region (e.g. a municipality, district, or federal state; upper
panel in Figure B.1). To this end, we identify criteria, determine weights
and metrics, and calculate the nal score. While criteria can include items
such as "Market Proximity", a related metric could be the number of potential
customers within a certain distance. Second, we develop optimization models
to select warehouse locations for both actors. These enable optimization of
single objectives and integration of actor-specic cost objectives and regional
attractiveness. Consequently, various sets of locations exist. They provide
decision makers with the chance to select starting points for PPECs from
dierent perspectives (lower panel in Figure B.1). We briey describe the
components of our approach in the following sections before we apply the
approach in a case study in Section B.4.
B.3.1 Regional Attractiveness Score
We assess the attractiveness of a region with the help of a utility analysis
(Zangemeister 2014). Within the analysis, we determine relevant criteria
in a literature review, weigh these criteria with the help of experts, and
obtain a nal score by summing up the products of criteria weights with the
performance of the region regarding the respective criteria.
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Figure B.1: Overview of the approach. Upper panel: Process for utility analysis to determine
attractiveness; Lower panel: Combination of suitable locations for collaborative warehouses.
B.3.1.1 Criteria for Attractiveness
The rst step is to identify relevant criteria for each actor. Potential sources
are literature as described above, interactive workshops with the decision
makers, or a mix of both. We want to emphasize that the selection can be
adjusted towards any context that our general approach shall be applied
to. The approach thereby provides a high degree of exibility for decision
makers.
B.3.1.2 Weighting of Criteria
Weights are a crucial component of the utility analysis. We derive them
with the help of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), which builds upon
pairwise comparison of all criteria (T. L. Saaty 1977). For each pair of criteria,
the relative importance of one criterion over the other is evaluated using a
scale from 1 (equal importance) to 9 (extreme importance of one criterion
over the other; R. W. Saaty (1987)). The weight per criterion results from
several minor calculations.
B.3.1.3 Determination of an Attractiveness Score per Region
In a next step, suitable metrics that represent the chosen criteria need to be
identied. These metrics depend profoundly on the size and local characteris-
tics of the regions as well as available data. Although this approach does not
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require any specic geographic classication of a region, the chosen unit of
analysis eventually aects the choice of the metrics. If, for instance, a com-
pany wants to compare the attractiveness of certain countries, it will select
dierent metrics than for a comparison of smaller units (e.g., states) within
a country. While some criteria can be measured purely quantitatively (e.g.,
net labor costs), others are evaluated using both quantitative and qualitative
data. Consequently, it is necessary to transform and standardize all metrics to
the same range of numeric values to obtain a single score (Drobne and Lisec
2009).
We furthermore distinguish between benet criteria and cost criteria. In this
context, benet reects a criterion where a high value is desired, while for
cost criteria a low value is preferred.
Finally, we compute regional attractiveness from the (criteria-)weighted sum
of the normalized metrics. While these results oer to draw a variety of
conclusions, they are furthermore used as one input for the following opti-
mization models. These are necessary to evaluate warehouse locations from
a network perspective, which is crucial to understand interdependencies
between multiple locations. Therefore, we extend the attractiveness anal-
ysis with the determination of warehouse locations through optimization
models.
B.3.2 Commercial and Emergency Warehouse Location
Models
Regardless of the objectives in detail, the location models aim to establish
warehouses at analyzed locations and enable deliveries to all demand points.
Thus, the solution contains (a) locations where warehouses are opened and (b)
the allocation of demand points to warehouses. So-called location-allocation
problems were introduced by Cooper (1963). Optimization aims to nd a
solution with minimal costs in most commercial applications. Apart from the
basic case with one warehouse location, optimization balances transportation
and xed costs for the solution. While more warehouses lead to shorter
average transport distances, and thus lower transportation costs, establishing
and maintaining more locations creates xed costs for each warehouse. Thus,
a third result from the model is (c) the optimal number of warehouses to be
established.
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Table B.1 presents our modeling and optimization approach. We use this
structure since it allows to understand the individual components in more
detail and points out trade-os more clearly than a pure multi-objective opti-
mization. We, therefore, developed three models for both types of actors and
their respective scenario: cost minimization, attractiveness maximization, and
multi-objective optimization. Cost minimization in the emergency scenario
and multi-objective optimization for both scenarios require various objective
values as inputs for standardization. We use adaptations of the underlying
models to optimize specically for standardization (steps 1.5, 1.6, 2.1, 2.2, and
2.6). The following sections introduce and discuss the optimization models.
Adaptations are mentioned accordingly. Table B.2 provides an overview of
all sets and variables in the models.
Optimization sequences
Scenario Commercial Emergency






































Table B.1: Optimization sequences for commercial and emergency scenario. LC: Logistics costs;
DC: Deprivation costs; SC: Social costs (sum of logistics and deprivation costs); AT: Attractiveness;




Symbol Explanation Remark/ Details
! Set of locations subsets  (| | = <) and 
(| | = =)
( Set of scenarios ( = {B2 , B4 } (c: com-
mercial, e: emer-
gency)




Population at location j being
supplied in scenario s
B ∈ ( , 9 ∈ 
8, 9 Distance from location i to j [km]; 8 ∈  , 9 ∈ 
8, 9 Deprivation costs per person de-
termined by travel time from lo-
cation i to location j
8, 9 = 32 (C8, 9 ) [e]; 8 ∈  ,
9 ∈ 
, B Daily demand in scenario s [kg per person]; B ∈ (
2CAD2: Cost per ton and kilometer in
truck
C Capacity of warehouse type t [people to be supplied],
C ∈ )
*, Warehouse utilization *, ∈ [0; 1]
 C Fixed costs for warehouse type t
by daily depreciation
[e]; C ∈ )
C?B
8, 9
Daily transport costs between i
and j in Scenario s
C?B
8, 9




[e]; B ∈ ( , 8 ∈  , 9 ∈ 
3?8, 9 Deprivation costs when location
j is supplied from location i
3?8, 9 = %
B4
9




Attractiveness of location i in
scenario s
B ∈ ( , 8 ∈ 
G8, 9 Share of j’s demand that is sup-
plied from location i
8 ∈  , 9 ∈ 
~C
8
Warehouse of type t is opened at
location i















Slack variables for average at-
tractiveness
!>?C,B , !<0G,B ,
!=03,B
Optimal/ Maximum/ Nadir logis-
tics costs in scenario s
B ∈ (
>?C , =03 Optimal/ Nadir deprivation costs
in emergency scenario
(>?C Optimal social costs in emer-
gency scenario
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Symbol Explanation Remark/ Details
)>?C,B , )<8=,B Optimal/ Minimal average attrac-
tiveness in scenario s
B ∈ (
~̂B,1 Fixed number of warehouse lo-
cations in scenario s (to iterate)
B ∈ ( , 1 ∈ )
̄B Average attractiveness for sce-
nario s
B ∈ (
Table B.2: Variables and sets used in the optimization models.
B.3.2.1 Cost Optimization
Minimization of Logistics Costs
Logistics costs (LC) usually consist of direct transportation costs, costs for
warehousing, commissioning, and related services. Furthermore, planning,
administrative, and order processing costs as well as investment costs, inter-
















G8, 9 = 1 ∀9 ∈  (B.2)
~;8 ≤ ~18 ∀8 ∈  (B.3)
=∑
9=1
G8, 9 · %B9 ≤ ~18 ·1 + ~;8 ·; ∀8 ∈  (B.4)
<∑
8=1







G8, 9 ≥ 0 ∀(8, 9), 8 ∈  , 9 ∈  (B.6)
~18 , ~
;
8 ∈ {0; 1} ∀8 ∈  (B.7)
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The rst term of the objective function (B.1) describes transportation costs
that occur depending on the allocation of demands to warehouse locations.
It assumes direct deliveries to the demand points. The second term regards
xed costs from opening small (~18 ) and large (~;8 ) warehouses.
Equations (B.2) ensure that the whole demand is fullled, and Equations (B.3)
restrict opening a large warehouse to locations where a small warehouse is
already located. For modeling reasons, their capacity technically adds up for
this location. Following, (B.4) allow allocation only until the capacity of a
warehouse is reached. In turn, if no warehouse exists at a certain location
(~18 = ~;8 = 0), allocation is not possible.
Equation (B.5) constrains the overall number of warehouses relative to the
population to be supplied in certain scenarios. The left side of the equation
describes the overall capacity of all opened warehouses. It is set to be less
or equal to the sum of the population divided by the minimum average
warehouse utilization *, . With *, being smaller or equal to 1, overall
warehouse capacity is equal or free to be slightly larger than the actual
demand. Moreover, allocation can only be positive (B.6), and warehouses of
both sizes are either opened or not, which is reected by binary variables ~18
and ~;8 in (B.7).
The optimization determines both optimal LC and the number and location
of warehouses.
Minimization of Social Costs
In the cost optimization for the emergency scenario, deprivation costs (DC)
beared by people (or beneciaries) are added to LC, resulting in so-called
Social Costs (Holguín-Veras, Jaller, et al. 2012, SC). DC occur if people are
not supplied adequately, for example with food, medical treatment, or shelter.
The application of DC has been discussed widely in literature (Holguín-Veras,
Pérez, et al. 2013; Cotes and Cantillo 2019; Xihui Wang et al. 2017).
To apply DC in real-world application, deprivation cost functions (DCFs)
must be determined specically for the present scenario and country (Shao
et al. 2020). However, since no DCF is available for Germany, we use a cost
function developed for identical products in a similar situation in Colombia
(Cotes and Cantillo 2019) to transfer the course of the function and normalize
it whenever combined with local cost units.
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We standardize components with Ideal and Nadir Points, which are widely
used in multi-objective optimization. Ideal and Nadir Points are obtained
from the set of ecient points, i.e. the set of function values from all Pareto
optimal solutions. The Ideal Point contains the optimal objective values for
each criterion. On the other hand, the Nadir Point contains the worst possible
value for each criterion. Both points are obtained through optimizations
for each single criterion (steps 2.1 and 2.2 in Table B.1). As such, the points
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s.t. Eq. (B.2), Eq. (B.3), Eq. (B.4), Eq. (B.5), Eq. (B.6), Eq. (B.7)
The standardization of LC and DC through Ideal and Nadir points is applied in
objective function (B.8). It combines LC (Eq. (B.1)) and DC objectives. Due to
the standardization, the objective value is between 0 and 2 ((>?C ∈ [0; 2]).
B.3.2.2 Attractiveness Optimization
Even though attractiveness scores are primarily considered in the multi-
objective optimizations together with costs, the determined scores allow to
optimize solely for attractiveness, too. Spatial distribution of the locations may
be far from optimal when neglecting transportation volumes and costs. Never-
theless, it provides important information and a baseline for attractiveness in
multi-objective optimization. Hence, we discuss and evaluate attractiveness













Eq. (B.2), Eq. (B.3), Eq. (B.4), Eq. (B.5), Eq. (B.6), Eq. (B.7)
While optimizing the average attractiveness of all warehouse locations, ex-
plicit cost considerations are disregarded. Consequently, the objective func-
tion (B.9) only considers locations of opened warehouses and their respective
attractiveness values for scenario B (B ∈ (). Average attractiveness is computed
afterwards.
Equations (B.2) to (B.7) are unchanged from the former models. We introduce
Equation (B.10) to keep the optimization linear. The model is iterated over all
possible numbers of warehouses as ~̂B,1 , ensuring computation of the optimal
solution.
Average attractiveness ̄B is computed from the sum of all locations divided
by the number of warehouses opened. We use its optimum value )>?C,B as
input for the multi-objective optimization.
B.3.2.3 Multi-Objective Optimization
Competing goals can be combined for optimization, leading to multi-objective
models (Kallrath 2013). Dierent objectives in humanitarian aid and logistics
make multi-objective optimization utmost important and thus widely used in
the eld (Gutjahr and Fischer 2018). Besides dierent goals between actors as
described in the introduction, we also consider multiple goals one decision
maker aims to satisfy.
Goal programming is one method to combine various optimization goals.
In contrast to pre-emptive or lexicographic goal programming, in which
goals can be clearly ordered by importance, we apply non pre-emptive goal
programming to balance cost factors and attractiveness. Costs as quantitative
and attractiveness as mainly qualitative input are not ranked in the rst
place. Both are instead considered equally important. The optimization then
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minimizes deviations between the optimal value for each objective and the
value determined within the multi-objective optimization (Kallrath 2013).
Commercial Scenario: Logistics Costs and Attractiveness
The following optimization model generates the optimal locations and alloca-
tions in the commercial scenario.
The objective function (B.11) captures deviations in LC and attractiveness com-
pared to their optimal values. Equation (B.12) sets standardized LC in relation





is 0, since: !>?C,B2 −!>?C,B2
!<0G,B2 −!>?C,B2 = 0. Equation (B.13) standardizes attractiveness
similarly. Again, the optimal reference value on the right side must be stan-
dardized. Following, the right side is: )>?C,B2 −)<8=,B2
)>?C,B2 −)<8=,B2 = 1. Slack variables
must be positive (Equations (B.14), (B.15)). Therefore, at most one in each pair
of slack variables becomes part of the base in the solution (Kallrath 2013).
In line with the attractiveness optimization, the model is iterated over all
possible numbers of warehouses.
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)>?C,B2 −)<8=,B2 + 3
+
) − 3−) = 1 (B.13)
3+! , 3
−
! ≥ 0 (B.14)
3+) , 3
−
) ≥ 0 (B.15)
Eq. (B.2), Eq. (B.3), Eq. (B.4), Eq. (B.5), Eq. (B.6), Eq. (B.7), Eq. (B.10)
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Emergency Scenario: Social costs and Attractiveness
The following optimization model generates the optimal locations and alloca-
tions in the emergency scenario.






9=1 G8, 9 · C?
B4
8, 9


























)>?C,B4 −)<8=,B4 + 3
+
) − 3−) = 1 (B.18)
3+( , 3
−
( ≥ 0 (B.19)
Eq. (B.2), Eq. (B.3), Eq. (B.4), Eq. (B.5), Eq. (B.6), Eq. (B.7), Eq. (B.10),
Eq. (B.15)
The objective function (B.16) includes the deviation of social costs and at-
tractiveness from their optimal values. Equation (B.17) connects LC and DC




to the optimal value for social costs
((>?C ). As mentioned in Section B.3.2.1, standardized SC is between 0 and
2 due to its two components. Both terms on the left and right side of the
equation are, therefore, divided by 2. Otherwise, slack variables were to be
larger than for attractiveness, giving an unintended overweight to SC in the
objective function.
Equation (B.18), similar to equation (B.13) in the commercial scenario, sets
attractiveness in relation to its optimum value. The right side simplies to 1
since )>?C,B4 −)<8=,B4
)>?C,B4 −)<8=,B4 = 1. Again, we iteratively run the model for all possible
numbers of warehouses to ensure the determination of an optimal solution.
133
B Identifying Joint Warehouse Locations in Public-Private Emergency Collaborations
In the following chapter, we apply the presented methods and models on a case
study in Germany. As described before, German authorities maintain a large
and costly number of emergency warehouses. This network could be extended
or partially substituted by commercial actors who agree to participate in a
PPEC.
B.4 Case Study
We approach our case study on a "per municipality" base, with municipalities
classied as LAU2 regions by the European Union (EU 2020). The scope is
dierent between the attractiveness analysis and the optimization models for
warehouse location: The attractiveness analysis includes all 11,087 German
municipalities (marked as "DE" in the following). Due to capacity restrictions,
however, we limit the optimization models to the federal state of Baden-
Württemberg (marked as "BW" hereafter) and identify locations for potential
warehouses of public and private (i.e., commercial) actors.
B.4.1 Attractiveness Scores in the Case Study
Based on the literature described in Section B.2, we identied 18 relevant
criteria for our analysis, which were furthermore validated by the experts
who agreed to participate in our survey (see Table B.3 for an overview).
We asked seven experts with experience from the commercial sector (supply
chain consulting, management, and logistics service provider) as well as six
experts in the eld of emergency logistics (from several public authorities
on local, regional, and federal level besides NGOs and consulting rms) to
compare the criteria within their eld.
Following, we selected metrics that represent the respective criteria. In most
cases, a criterion is evaluated using multiple metrics. If possible, the values of
these metrics were weighted under consideration of their relative importance.
For instance, criterion C.4 ("Availability of dierent transport modes") consists
of three metrics that represent the distance to a port, a train station, or an
airport. To account for their varying importance for transportation, we




Furthermore, we need to normalize criteria values. In this context, it is im-
portant to investigate minimum and maximum values as well as the mean
of the data (Fleming and Wallace 1986). Upper and lower bounds represent
minimum and maximum values within the data in most cases. Further adjust-
ments can be necessary due to outliers which are identied using standard
tools such as a boxplot (Williamson, Parker, and Kendrick 1989).
We set the boundaries for outliers based on the interquartile range (IQR), the
distance between the 25% and 75% quartiles. All values above the 75% quantile
plus 1.5 times the IQR are considered outliers and regarded with the value of
1. Values below the 25% quantile minus 1.5 times the IQR are regarded with
the value of 0. Consequently, we norm each value dependent on its position
within the outlier-adjusted interval (see for instance Voogd (1982)).
Lastly, we distinguish benet and cost criteria. Benet criteria refer to an inter-
pretation of higher values as favorable outcomes (e.g., market size measured
by customers in proximity). On the other hand, lower values are preferred
for cost criteria (e.g., tax rates; Voogd (1982)). Consequently, scores for cost
criteria are transformed by subtracting the standardized score from 1.
Table B.3 highlights the selected metrics and their respective normalization
components. Due to limited space, we provide the data sources in the Supple-
mentary Material.
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B.4.2 Optimization Models in the Case Study
Being limited to BW as one federal state in Germany, considered deliveries
for the two scenarios dier in the number and type of locations to be sup-
plied. In the commercial scenario, only supermarkets are supplied directly
through regional warehouses. On the other hand, the emergency scenario
regards numerous dierent locations to be supplied. Schools or other public
buildings are possible emergency PoDs in addition to stores. This is especially
important since commercial stores are only located in places with sucient
demand,2 leading to gaps in demand that need to be supplied more locally
in emergencies. Originally 1,102 municipalities in the federal state of BW
reduce to 502 candidate locations in the commercial scenario. The remaining
demand is allocated to larger municipalities in proximity. All municipalities
are candidate locations in the emergency scenario however.
Moreover, emergency supply must reach all 11 million potentially aected
people, while commercial actors only supply a part of the market. This is
reected in two sub-scenarios: For one, we consider a commercial actor with
a total market share of 10%. The second assumes a ctive monopolist (100%
market share) to analyze the eects of cooperation on a larger scale. Thus,
demand points and total demand dier largely between the two commercial
and the emergency scenario. In the following, we provide an overview on
selected input parameters for the optimization.
B.4.2.1 Demand
Commercial demand per person is determined using annual per capita con-
sumption of food in Germany (Henrich 2017). Ocial ministry recommenda-
tions for daily emergency food reserves are the basis for emergency demand
respectively (BMEL 2020a). Daily volumes, 3.64kg in the commercial scenario
and 3.20kg in emergency, include food and beverages.
2 Food retailers exclude municipalities that are below a certain threshold of inhabitants as
possible locations. We assume a value of 5,000 people for our case study, which is used by
several German food retailers (e.g., Rewe (2019) and LIDL (2019)).
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B.4.2.2 Transportation Costs
Transportation distances were calculated with the help of an extensive digital
topographical model of Germany, including BW (BKG 2018). We obtained
the freight cost rate of e0.0583 per ton and km for a 24t full truck load with
an utilization of 100% from a German logistics service provider.
B.4.2.3 Warehouse Costs and Utilization
Fixed warehouse costs include a variety of factors, e.g., acquisition of land,
investment in local infrastructure, building construction cost, and equipment.
We base our cost estimation on recent projects by German food retailers (e.g.,
Flemming (2017) and NWZ Online (2016)) and have it validated by logistics
experts from the eld. Similarly for capacity estimation, we use mentioned
data on warehouse projects in combination with market shares and numbers
of stores to supply (LZ 2018).
We eventually consider two types of warehouses: The standard warehouse
oers sucient capacity to satisfy the demand of 300,000 people at an invest-
ment of e40 million. A large warehouse can supply up to 1,800,000 people,
requiring an investment of e100 million.
Since food items only reect around 76% of the goods in a typical food
retailer’s assortment (EHI Retail Institute 2017), mentioned costs are adjusted
accordingly. We furthermore assume a depreciation period of 20 years and
an interest rate of 7% p.a.
Without a dened minimum utilization of the warehouses, objectives in
e.g. attractiveness optimization would lead to unrealistic solutions with
numerous warehouses in excess, thus hampering comparability of scenarios.
We therefore restrict the number of warehouses by setting a minimum average
warehouse utilization*, of 80%.
B.4.2.4 Deprivation Costs
Deprivation costs can be determined in various ways (see e.g., Shao et al.
(2020) for a recent overview). For the present work, we include the DCF of
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Cotes and Cantillo (2019), which was determined based on the waiting time
C8, 9 and the willingness-to-pay for a food pack:3
32 (C8, 9 ) [e] = 0.0063 · C38, 9 − 0.2555 · C28, 9 + 5.8403 · C8, 9
Under the assumption of uncapacitated transport equipment and person-
nel (e.g., due to seizure), waiting time is calculated before the optimization
through distance and truck speed. In addition to the distances described above
in this section, we assume an average speed of 45 km/h, which is based on an
analysis of travel times within the attractiveness score.
B.4.2.5 Attractiveness Scores in Optimization
Attractiveness is considered a distinct input for the optimization. To avoid
an overlap of certain criteria in the score with costs regarded in the models,
we slightly modify the score for the optimization. For the commercial score,
two criteria are excluded: Market in Proximity and Land Availability and
Price Level. The former is clearly considered in local demands and resulting
transportation costs, the latter is explicitly included in xed location costs
per warehouse.
Considering emergency attractiveness, we exclude only Proximity to Bene-
ciaries from the score. This factor is directly considered in DC, since it is
represented by the population reachable within a certain time.
B.5 Results and Discussion
Results for the attractiveness analysis are for all German municipalities
(marked "DE"), unless indicated otherwise. Optimization results show the
federal state of Baden-Württemberg (BW) only.
Data for the attractiveness score was processed with the help of ESRI ArcGIS
Desktop 10.8 and Microsoft Excel. The optimization models were implemented
in GAMS and solved with CPLEX.
3 Converted with an exchange rate of COP 3,706 per EUR (Finanzen.net 2020).
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B.5.1 Results of the Attractiveness Score Analysis
B.5.1.1 Criteria and Weights
Before analyzing weights for the criteria, it is necessary to assess the consis-
tency of the survey responses with the help of so-called Consistency Ratios
(CRs) (T. L. Saaty 1977).
According to T. L. Saaty and Ozdemir (2003), a large number of criteria
negatively inuences consistency. Therefore, we select a rather high threshold
for CR of 0.3, leading to the exclusion of one rating for the commercial criteria.
Consequently, six ratings are considered as valid within both perspectives.
Figure B.3 and Figure B.2 highlight the resulting criteria weights for both
scenarios and show the composition of both attractiveness scores. The most
important criteria (i.e., those with largest criteria weights; shown with grey
bars) should be considered rst by single municipalities and authorities seek-
ing to increase attractiveness. In the commercial scenario, Market in Proximity
(F = 0.19) and Availability and Skills of Labor Force (0.19) are regarded most
important. Availability of Transport Equipment (0.18) and Transport Infras-
tructure Reliability and Resilience (0.16) are rated most important for the
emergency scenario. Notably, IT and Telecommunications Infrastructure is
considered in both scenarios, but weighted more than twice as important for
emergencies (0.13) than for the commercial scenario (0.06).
Depending on the actual contribution of the criterion scores and metrics,
criteria are either overrated or underrated in the score (relative to criteria
weights). Criteria with lower average values in their metrics are underrated,
those with higher values overrated. For example, Market in Proximity is
responsible for 8.6% of the commercial score, while the weight of the criterion
is 19.1% (grey bar), leading to a (negative) deviation of 10.5% (red bar). Thus,
the criterion is relatively underrated.
B.5.1.2 Resulting Attractiveness Scores
Table B.4 shows descriptive statistics for the resulting attractiveness scores.
The original scores for Germany are shown alongside adjusted scores for the
federal state of BW, which are used as inputs for the optimization model (see
Section B.4.2.5).
142

















































































































Commercial Emergency Commercial Emergency
Minimum 0.30 0.31 0.47 0.36
25% quartile 0.45 0.46 0.54 0.50
Median 0.49 0.50 0.57 0.53
Mean 0.50 0.50 0.57 0.53
75% quartile 0.54 0.54 0.61 0.57
Maximum 0.75 0.75 0.67 0.68
Table B.4: Statistics for the attractiveness scores in Germany (DE) and Baden-Württemberg
(BW).
Commercial and emergency scores for Germany are in similar ranges, from
0.30 to 0.75 and 0.31 to 0.75, respectively. Median and mean are close for both
scenarios, showing no large inuence by outliers.
Figure B.4 presents the nal commercial (left) and emergency (middle) at-
tractiveness scores. The maps show all German municipalities with their
respective score from light blue (lowest attractiveness) to dark blue (highest).
Commercially, the city and region of Berlin and a large area in the federal
state of Northrhine-Westphalia in the western part of Germany (including e.g.
Cologne, Düsseldorf, and Dortmund) are most attractive. Other metropolitan
regions, e.g. Hamburg, Stuttgart, or Munich are also rather attractive. The
Northern part of Hesse in the middle of Germany and some border regions
are least attractive.
Considering emergency attractiveness, the city of Berlin is also most attractive,
together with the city of Bremen in the north and various municipalities in
Northrhine-Westphalia. Least attractive regions are in Northern Saxony-
Anhalt, areas of Brandenburg, and in Eastern Bavaria. Overall, large cities
are rather attractive for both scenarios. All but one of the largest 20 cities in
Germany are among the most attractive 25% in both scores.
We illustrate the transparency gains through both scores with the help of
one municipality, whose attractiveness largely diers between both scenar-
ios. While in the commercial score, a large region north and south of Berlin
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B.5 Results and Discussion
(northeast of Germany) is highly attractive (i.e., dark blue), some munici-
palities north of Berlin are among the least attractive (i.e., light blue) for
the emergency scenario. One of these municipalities is Stechlin, north of
Berlin and close to the border between the federal states of Brandenburg
and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern further north. The village is commercially
especially attractive due to low labor costs and proximity to Berlin, which
implies a large market. For emergencies, however, its overall transport and IT
infrastructure as well as the population in close reach are far below average,
resulting in a low overall score. The combination of dierent scores allows to
draw far-reaching conclusions on a very detailed level.
The score, moreover, aims to provide practical guidance in nding a macro-
location for new warehouses. To validate our results, we cross-check it with
real commercial warehouse locations of supermarket chain Lidl (Figure B.4,
right). Therefore, we highlighted Lidl’s, publicly available (LIDL 2020), 39
warehouse locations on a map that points out regions which score within
the Top 25% commercial attractiveness regions (dark green) and the Bottom
75% (light green). If the score was not relevant at all, around 25% of all
Lidl locations would have been supposedly located in the dark green areas.
However, we identied 19 out of 39 locations (approx. 49%) in attractive
regions, with several warehouses close to dark green areas.
Moreover, the network grew over a long time and factors such as the avail-
ability of a suitable property at the time of construction play a crucial role.
Combined with the fact that we regard the German borders as system bound-
aries, neglecting attractive markets in the border-regions of neighbouring
countries, the results suggest that the score and its criteria are in fact suitable
to identify more attractive locations.4
Table B.4 shows descriptive data for the adjusted scores in BW used in the
optimization models. Ranges for the scenarios in the adjusted and locally
restricted case are considerably smaller. Median and mean are nevertheless
very close, underlining that no extreme outliers exist. Both median and
mean are considerably higher for the adjusted score in BW compared to the
original score in both scenarios. More detailed analysis shows that the federal
state has slightly below-average scores for the commercial scenario before
adjustment. Consequently, the adjustment, i.e. leaving out two criteria that
4 Note that, due to public authorities’ condentiality, we cannot validate the emergency score
similarly.
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are considered in the location model, improves the score dramatically since
the state has comparatively low scores for Market in Proximity and Availability
and Price Level for Land. In contrast, BW has above-average scores for the
emergency scenario before score adjustment already. Here, adjustment has
only minimum inuence.
B.5.1.3 Identification of Suitable Regions with the Help of Attractiveness
Scores
The attractiveness scores allow to dene regions suitable from one or both
perspectives. Figure B.5 shows a map of (un-)suitable regions in Germany
(assuming that regions above the 75% quartile are considered suitable). Four
types of regions are distinguished: Unsuitable from both perspectives (not
suitable), above the threshold only in the emergency scenario (emergency
suitable), above the threshold only in the commercial scenario (commercially
suitable), and within the Top 25% in both scenarios (fully suitable).
Fully suitable regions are clearly unevenly spread over Germany. While parts
of Hesse, Northrhine-Westphalia, and Baden-Württemberg show several emer-
gency or fully suitable regions, almost all municipalities in Northern Bavaria,
Thuringia, or Mecklenburg-Vorpommern are considered unsuitable.
Regions marked as emergency suitable are candidates public actors might
want to "make more attractive" for commercial use, e.g. through commercial
incentives or subsidies. Dierences between average criteria scores for emer-
gency and fully suitable regions are shown in Figure B.5 on the right. Most
signicant dierences occur for Market in Proximity and Producer Proximity.
Transport Infrastructure Access and Quality and Local Taxes show only minor
dierences.
Combining suitability results with composition of the score (see Figure B.2),
it becomes clear that Market in Proximity is the most eective parameter to
make regions more attractive for commercial actors. It is, however, obvious
that the market itself cannot be inuenced directly. Medium- to long-term
measures may include eorts to attract more people to live in the region and
more upstream suppliers to settle locally. This would in turn grow the market,
a local supplier base, and local labor force. On the other hand, public actors
could easily provide cheap land and tax discounts for rms. Although they
dier less between the groups of regions, both measures directly aect costs.
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B Identifying Joint Warehouse Locations in Public-Private Emergency Collaborations
Moreover, authorities of individual regions can use the score to understand
their own attractiveness more thoroughly and identify individual areas for
improvement.
Since private actors cannot set incentives to directly inuence criteria scores,
we do not discuss their score manipulation possibilities separately.
It can be concluded that attractiveness scores provide insightful regional
dierences for the commercial and emergency application. In addition to
increased transparency, decomposition of the scores and analysis of dierent
types of suitable regions provide a basis for factors that public actors could
address to incentivize combined warehouse locations in PPECs.
B.5.2 Results of the Optimization Models
In this section, we present the results of the warehouse location optimization
in the federal state of BW. Table B.5 contains the results from the optimization
models for both scenarios. For each (sub-)scenario, results are shown for a
pure cost optimization (left), optimization of attractiveness (right), and the
combined multi-objective problem (center). As mentioned above, we integrate
attractiveness as one way to take more qualitative criteria into account. These
are tailored to the priorities of either decision maker. Consistently, costs are
always lowest in the dedicated optimization and attractiveness is always
highest in its specic optimization.
The multi-objective optimization provides solutions for the trade-os be-
tween both objectives. In the commercial 10% sub-scenario for example, LC
are 3.3% higher compared to the solution when only optimizing for LC. Simi-
larly, attractiveness is 1.2% lower in the multi-objective than in the dedicated
optimization. On comparison, LC are 24% higher than optimal when opti-
mizing for attractiveness and attractiveness 8.5% lower vice versa. Numbers
of locations show less gradual dierences between the optimizations which
we discuss more specically in the following. However, the results overall
clearly show the advantage of multi-objective optimization.
Considering LC, opening costs are regularly higher than transportation costs.
Based on publicly available information on LC in the food retail sector, the
costs we report are considerably lower than overall costs in practice. This is
due to our exclusion of any costs (e.g., for equipment or sta) aside specic
transportation and opening costs. However, other costs do not directly dier
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B Identifying Joint Warehouse Locations in Public-Private Emergency Collaborations
for dierent locations and therefore do not need to be considered in this
case.
The overall number of warehouses is the same for all optimizations in both
commercial sub-scenarios, four and seven respectively. Exact locations are
dierent between the dierent optimizations except for Stuttgart as the state’s
largest city and capital. Between sub-scenarios, Figure B.6 (left) shows that
three out of four locations in the 10% sub-scenario match locations from
the 100% sub-scenario. An accumulation of locations is in the center of the
federal state, around its capital city Stuttgart. This is consistent with measures
of population density, showing the highest values in the center and on the
western border of BW.
Emergency optimization leads to 26 locations spread widely across BW (see
Figure B.6, left), again especially dense in the center of the state. The number
of locations is the same for the SC and multi-objective optimizations, but
greatly diers from the attractiveness one (seven). This dierence is clearly
induced by the cubic deprivation cost function which we included for this
scenario. While we constrained its direct inuence through standardization,
the cost behavior (for larger distances) remains the same and leads to an
increased number of selected locations. Only one location overlaps with those
from the commercial scenario. Among the optimizations for the emergency
scenario, the multi-objective optimization shares four optimal locations with
the SC and attractiveness optimizations respectively.
Both types of actors (rms and authorities or public planners) have dierent
objectives. Therefore, we introduce an optimization model that is easily adapt-
able. Having determined the optimal solutions for both actors separately,
we can compare solution quality and establish solutions that could be more
practically and cooperatively implementable. Moreover, other strategies than
pre-positioning for preparedness are discussed in the literature. Kunz, Reiner,
and Gold (2014), for instance, argue that a combination of pre-positioning and
building management capabilities leads to best results for disaster response.
One practical approach for public actors is to make use of existing warehouses
and warehouse locations instead of pushing entirely new locations in either
scenario (greeneld approach). Thereby, no high investments for new loca-
tions would be needed and existing locations could instead e.g. be adjusted
or enlarged for emergency supplies and commercial actors be integrated in
exercises for immediate response to disasters.
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B Identifying Joint Warehouse Locations in Public-Private Emergency Collaborations
To this end, we designed two model extensions: Extension I takes existing
locations of the six largest food retailers, which overall account for approxi-
mately 55% market share (LZ 2018), as candidate locations in the emergency
scenario. Extension II makes use of only one retailer’s locations and compares
results when adding a single new location to the network. We discuss the
main results in the following and provide exact numbers in the Supplementary
Material.
In Extension I, 10 out of 21 candidate locations in BW are selected (see Figure
B.6, right). Candidate locations are all closely tied to the network of highways,
highlighting the importance of access to the transportation network. LC are
20% lower than in the greeneld approach (e227,492 per day) due to the
smaller number of locations. Moreover, opening costs are expected to be
signicantly lower in reality since warehouses already exist at all candidate
locations.5 Chosen locations are spread throughout the federal state and
include ve dierent retailers. Attractiveness is 6% lower and DC 54% higher
compared to the optimization with new locations. However, DC is far from
the worst values achieved in former optimizations. It is important to note
that, due to the lack of information concerning real emergency warehouse
locations, we can only compare DC to our (optimal) solutions, not to the
setup in place. Presumably, waiting times and thus deprivation costs would
currently be higher if supplies were to be delivered from existing emergency-
only warehouses that have been set up over the last decades.
In Extension II, we exclusively use food retailer Lidl’s locations, which com-
prises the largest network of warehouses in the study area. One potential
advantage of only one partner is less complex coordination with authorities
while still being able to access the retailer’s network of six locations spread
throughout the state (Figure B.4, right). However, results for the emergency
scenario are mixed: While LC is lower than in any optimization before, DC
is almost 130% higher and the attractiveness considerably lower (-12%) com-
pared to greeneld. When adding one additional location to choose freely,
all parameters improve but still remain worse for DC and attractiveness.
Signicant overall improvements nevertheless indicate promising opportu-
nities for public actors in future. As one possible approach, they could plan
5 We still regard opening costs in our model without further adjustment since the private sector
will demand a substantial payment as compensation and certain costs accrue to transform
existing locations.
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a well-optimized network of warehouses based on existing and new loca-
tions. Chosen new locations would then be proactively promoted for future
commercial warehouse locations. Such measures could lead to a signicantly
improved base of locations for emergencies without having to construct
several new warehouses solely for that purpose.
Summarizing the results of the extensions, we highlight the following conclu-
sions: Attractiveness and DC are considerably better when all municipalities
are candidate locations within the model. However, LC are much lower for
existing locations, presumably even more so in practice. Results are overall
better when several large retailers are potential partners. While this may add
more complexity for public actors in the rst place, they avoid a lock-in with
one partner and having to ’choose a winner’, which would otherwise interfere
with their neutrality towards businesses. Lastly, cooperation with several
partners to enable pre-positioning in existing locations, building partner ca-
pabilities with exercises, and joint development of emergency procedures is
clearly in line with the mixed approach for preparedness found to be optimal
by Kunz, Reiner, and Gold (2014).
Regarding attractiveness of (existing) locations, public actors could also specif-
ically check for criteria that lead to the exclusion of certain locations and
accept all others as candidates. The provided attractiveness score facilitates
such analyses.
Moreover, it should be noted that theoretically optimal solutions are not
overly sensitive towards changes in single locations. For example, a neighbor-
ing municipality might be chosen without drastically changing overall costs
if there is no space available in the initially selected municipality. We noted
similar changes during the course of optimization which did not change over-
all results. The number of locations in the emergency model is clearly driven
by deprivation costs as the comparison of single- versus multi-objective opti-
mizations shows. However, Extension I showed no such behavior, including
less locations in the nal network than theoretically available. Overall, vari-
ous optimization runs have not revealed signicant sensitivity towards any
factor. Assumptions and inputs should nevertheless be carefully chosen for
each specic application.
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B.6 Conclusion and Future Work
Including the private sector’s warehouses more extensively into authorities’
disaster preparedness plans oers multiple benets for both sides. However,
selecting candidate locations for collaborative sites is a challenging process
that requires a deepened understanding for the requirements of both actors,
as well as their objectives.
To support the selection and facilitate an increase in collaboration, we com-
bined two analytical approaches: In the rst step, we identied location
criteria for public and private actors and ranked them with expert interviews
and AHP. Following, we selected suitable metrics to assess municipalities in
terms of the location criteria and determined a score for each municipality’s
attractiveness. In addition to providing information and transparency, the
score was one key component of the dierent optimization models developed
in our approach’s second step. These models reect the actors’ individual
objectives and strategies and identify individually optimal networks of loca-
tions. While logistics and deprivation costs were also optimized individually,
attractiveness was considered within multi-objective optimization models.
We were able to show that, even though the networks diered signicantly
between actors, our approach can identify locations for collaboration.
In addition to the models described above, we took a deeper look into two
model extensions that more directly combine existing private networks and
public objectives and are thus presumably more easily realizable: While
Extension I considered the locations of the six largest food retailers in the
investigated region, Extension II analyzed the case where only the locations
of one retail chain could be used as collaborative sites. Even though it is
more complex to collaborate with multiple partners in practice, the increased
number of potential locations leads to signicantly better results. Moreover,
market interference is minimized and the long term balance not put at risk.
Nevertheless, the study comes along with some limitations that aect the
transfer of the methodology into practice. To start with, networks are usually
not built from scratch but over a long time and adaptations therefore only
follow gradually. Consequently, changes either require a high investment
(e.g., by public actors) or only follow selectively (this aspect is reected in
Extensions I and II). We moreover acknowledge that even within groups
of actors, priorities and even criteria may vary. This can be rooted in both
dierent strategic priorities and perception of certain risks. However, our
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approach is widely exible. Firstly, it allows to force a couple of locations to
be opened and secondly it is easily able to include case- or institution-specic
criteria (e.g., regarding infrastructure) or objectives (e.g., types of costs).
Our model only indirectly addresses pre-positioning, while we discuss the
locations and direct transports for emergency supplies. We argue with Kunz,
Reiner, and Gold (2014) to combine pre-positioning and building capabilites
for ecient response, but acknowledge that more direct planning for stock
items and levels is needed to implement our approach in practice. Aspects that
directly inuence pre-positioning locations, such as vulnerability to natural
risks, are included in our analysis. Stocking details are however not included
in particular, but are decisive parameters in planning and cost modeling as
discussed by Campbell and Jones (2011).
Other crisis dynamics are likely to inuence the networks. This could for
instance include damage to the infrastructure (Ahmadi, Sei, and Tootooni
2015), uncertainty regarding data (Toghi, Torabi, and Mansouri 2016), or
a shift in inventory or demand (Pan et al. 2020). While we include some
criteria geared at resilience, our approach does not cover dynamics in general.
Consequently, future studies that include these uncertainties and dynamics
in warehouse location planning are promising to deepen the understanding
of ecient collaboration.
Another limitation and opportunity for future research lies in the very re-
strictive scope of our optimization which includes only one federal state in
Germany. This clearly neglects the use of (existing) warehouses across state
borders and characteristics of other regions. Results nevertheless show that
networks reect population density and integration of attractiveness allows
to take e.g. infrastructural factors into account.
Lastly, federal and regional authorities have very distinct responsibilities,
making it more dicult to implement country-wide supply networks for
emergencies. Recent exchange with a state ministry in BW, however, has
shown signicant interest in respective warehouse locations and networks
for emergency supply, indicating public actors’ awareness for this problem
and their motivation to develop useful solutions.6
6 Personal communication of the authors with representatives of the Federal Ministry of Rural
Aairs and Consumer Protection, 28th July 2020.
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To conclude, the developed approach increases transparency and assists in
location selection. Due to its exibility, it supports manifold ways to improved
preparedness towards future crises.
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C A Novel Approach to Include
Social Costs in Humanitarian
Objective Functions
Abstract1
Social cost functions in humanitarian operations are dened as the sum of
logistics and deprivation costs. They are widely regarded as appropriate
objective functions, even though the way they were introduced requires cau-
tiously formulated deprivation cost functions for the analyzed goods and do
not allow decision makers to include their individual preferences. We develop
this approach further and introduce a normalized weighted sum approach to
increase decision makers’ understanding of the trade-os between cost and
suering and, therefore, increase transparency signicantly. Furthermore, we
apply the approach to a case study of a hypothetical water system failure in
the city of Berlin, in which we support authorities preparing for this scenario
by identifying critical distribution centers. In this context, our model is able
to process both possible supply scenarios - too low and sucient supply. We
show that the normalized weighted sum approach signicantly improves
transparency and leads to a deeper understanding of the trade-os during the
crisis. Consequently, it proved itself as a powerful tool for decision makers
preparing for or navigating through a crisis.
1 This chapter includes the preprint of the article "A Novel Approach to Include Social Costs in
Humanitarian Objective Functions" by Patrick S. Hiemsch, Marcus Wiens, Markus Lüttenberg,
Frank Schultmann, and myself (Diehlmann, Hiemsch, et al. 2020).
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C.1 Introduction and Motivation
The COVID-19 pandemic in the year 2020 distinctly highlights the vulner-
ability of supply chains to disasters. Despite the unprecedented support by
local governments and international organizations, the WHO announced a
global shortage of critical goods such as face masks or ventilators (WHO
2020). As a response, multiple companies all over the world stepped forward
and supported the population. For instance, the German company Trigema
started to produce a large number of face masks (Irishtimes 2020), and General
Motors adapted some of their plants to produce ventilators (WSJ 2020).
In case the private sector cannot guarantee sucient supply in a crisis, actors
like governments or NGOs become active and try to reduce the burden to the
population (Kovács and Spens 2007). However, setting up humanitarian sup-
ply chains is very challenging since they vary signicantly from commercial
supply chains and often need to be designed from scratch under enormous
time pressure (Holguín-Veras, Jaller, et al. 2012). Therefore, researchers devel-
oped a large variety of optimization models to analyze and improve decisions
in disaster situations.
A very critical component of these models is the objective function (Holguín-
Veras, Jaller, et al. 2012). Various dierent objectives from commercial opti-
mization models were applied, e.g. minimization of cost (Falasca and Zobel
2011), minimization of travel time (Jánošíková et al. 2019), maximization of
the covering (Balcik and Beamon 2008), or multi-objective approaches (Ah-
madi, Sei, and Tootooni 2015; Fikar, Hirsch, and Nolz 2018; Nolz, Semet,
and Doerner 2011; Rath, Gendreau, and Gutjahr 2016; Schneeberger et al.
2016). In spite of the valuable contributions of these models, the chosen
objectives do not reect the unique nature of humanitarian interventions
(Holguín-Veras, Pérez, et al. 2013). Therefore, Holguín-Veras, Jaller, et al.
(2012) and Holguín-Veras, Pérez, et al. (2013) introduce social costs as an more
adequate objective.
They dene social costs as the sum of logistics costs (LC) and a monetary
representation of the suering of the population, so-called deprivation costs
(DC) (Holguín-Veras, Jaller, et al. 2012). Therefore, the concept of DC oers
a considerable potential to holistically analyze the system and, in turn, to
derive sustainable decisions (Kunsch, Theys, and Brans 2007). Deprivation
Cost Functions (DCFs) highlight the development of deprivation over time.
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They are "monotonic, non-linear, and convex with respect to the deprivation
time" (Holguín-Veras, Pérez, et al. 2013).
Shao et al. (2020) present an overview of the state-of-the-art in DC research.
They highlight that DCFs often dier signicantly from one another because
the values depend on the respective goods, the country under consideration,
and the specic crisis situation. Thus, dierent estimation approaches and
data from dierent countries can lead to signicant dierences in DCFs. As
an example, Shao et al. (2020), present DCFs for water or food-kits. They
highlight that, in the course of a crisis, DCFs can dier by factors of 3 and
higher. Combined with the "complex" process of data collection (Shao et al.
2020), the simple transfer of DCFs determined for a good and country seems
to be not appropriate. Therefore, in theory, every study that uses social cost
needs to rst determine an appropriate DCF for the selected good and location,
e.g. with the help of willingness-to-pay surveys.
Even though it is not dicult to conduct willingness-to-pay surveys (Shao
et al. 2020), it requires a lot of time and eort, and, therefore, takes attention
and resources away from the operations management aspects of the study.
Furthermore, the practical application can be questioned since it can be
doubted that decision makers are willing or able to take the time to conduct
a survey in the aftermath of a disaster. Consequently, in spite of the powerful
implications of the social cost approach, we argue that a more practicable
approach to include social cost is favorable in situations where it is not
possible to derive an appropriate DCF.
We suggest a normalized and weighted sum approach. After presenting an
overview of the theoretical foundation in the next Section, we describe the
main ideas and advantages of this approach with the help of an illustrative
example in Section C.3. Following, we apply the approach on a case study for
a hypothetical tap water contamination in the city of Berlin. Afterwards, we
present and discuss the results and the approach in Section C.5.
C.2 Theoretical Foundation
Shao et al. (2020) identied 31 studies that consider DC. The majority of these
studies does not regard social costs in the originally dened way, but, for
instance, considers proxies for DCFs, such as the number of missing goods
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(Serrato-Garcia, Mora-Vargas, and Murillo 2016; Biswal, Jenamani, and Kumar
2018), or a priority function (Rivera-Royero, Galindo, and Yie-Pinedo 2016).
A group of studies considers DCFs without LC. For example, Yushimito, Jaller,
and Ukkusuri (2012) use a Voronoi-based approach to identify disaster relief
locations, or Keshvari Fard, Eftekhar, and Papier (2019) determine the size and
allocation of vehicles that leads to minimized deprivation. However, Gutjahr
and Fischer (2018) point out equity problems if optimization models under a
xed budget focus on minimizing DC. To increase equity, the authors suggest
an extension similar to the Gini-coecient.
On the other hand, some studies use social cost in the originally dened
way, approaching a variety of aspects of humanitarian logistics. For in-
stance, Khayal et al. (2015) develop a location-allocation model for facili-
ties and resources, Pérez-Rodríguez and Holguín-Veras (2016) introduce an
inventory-allocation-routing model to deliver critical supplies to the popu-
lation, Chakravarty (2018) analyze options to invest in levee infrastructure,
Loree and Aros-Vera (2018) select locations and inventory allocated to Points
of Distribution, Paul and Zhang (2019) develop a two-stage stochastic pro-
gram to place capacities within a supply chain for hurricane preparedness,
and Cantillo, Macea, and Jaller (2019) identify critical links in a relief network.
Moreover, Cotes and Cantillo (2019) locate inventory in anticipation of a
crisis, and Paul and Xinfang Wang (2019) propose a robust model for facility
location in the context of earthquake preparedness.
Furthermore we want to mention two "hybrid approaches" briey, in which
DC and LC are combined in dierent ways. Xihui Wang, Fan, et al. (2019)
develop an approach to optimize the ratio of reduced deprivation and logistics
cost to understand the eciency of interventions better. Even though this
approach provides a valuable basis for eciency discussions, it only provides
the chance to compare dierent options regarding their eciency rather than
identifying a globally optimal relief decision. Moreno et al. (2018) suggest a
location-transportation problem and solve the model for the two objectives
with a lexicographic approach. While it might be reasonable to argue that
DC are more important than LC, and that the approach also allows to include
preferences in a limited way (e.g. by introducing an attainment degree), the
optimization is always focused on one objective and only regards the second
objective subsequently. Even though both approaches allow decision makers
to derive valuable conclusions, they have signicant limitations.
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In addition to the challenges regarding the sensitivity of DCFs towards local
economic conditions, we want to further address another factor that, in our
view, inhibits the use of social cost approaches in humanitarian logistics:
summing up the two cost components simply assumes that both factors are
of equal importance to each actor.
We argue that this does not reect the real conditions properly since the way
social cost functions work already includes an implicit weighting: LC are the
dominating component in peace time, when the population is not deprived of
goods. In disaster relief, DC signicantly increase, leading to a substantially
reduced inuence of LC (Holguín-Veras, Pérez, et al. 2013). Consequently,
LC have only very limited eects on social costs-based decisions in relief
logistics. We see this assumption rather critical since dierent actors might
not be able or willing to (more or less) disregard the LC implications of their
decisions.
An obvious example is an international corporation that delivers dierent
beverages into a region, which is suddenly aected by a disaster. In spite of a
potential altruistic or Corporate Social Responsibility-motivated initiative to
set up a humanitarian supply chain and support the population with donations,
it is dicult to imagine that the company would not base their decision on
costs. Another example is an international NGO that is motivated to support
the aected population but also bound to their budget. Even though it would
be possible to determine a maximal budget and implement this as a constraint
in the optimization model, this simply does not reect the preference that
money directly spent as LC can aect an organization more than shadow
prices of suering.
On the other hand, the argument "costs are less important in disaster relief"
comes into play, which is based on the (normative) judgement that money
should not matter if lives are in danger. Even though such considerations
can be observed in some cases (for instance in the COVID-19 response, when
Banks like the US Federal Reserve started huge money creation campaigns to
support people and businesses (Forbes 2020)), the assumption neglects alter-
native measures that could be done with the saved money. These measures
could, for instance, be to purchase goods and other resources, or, in case of
public actors, pay for social measures like short-term labor for the employees
(as for instance happened in Germany due to the COVID-19 crisis of 2020
(DW 2020)). Since system boundaries necessarily lead to neglecting eects
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outside the system, ignoring the costs seems to be only appropriate in a very
limited number of cases.
Following, a social cost approach should allow to include decision makers’
preferences.
The normalized weighted sum approach is an approach that solves the prob-
lems of dicult transfer of DCFs and lack of included preferences. It is
especially powerful in a bi-objective case since it allows to determine normal-
ization values comparably easy. In the following section, we rst present an
example that highlights the challenges of the original social cost approach
and discuss the methodological advantages of our new approach.
C.3 Methodology and Illustrative Example
Before discussing our approach in detail, we want to briey address the
concept of deprivation level functions (DLFs), which were introduced by
Xihui Wang, Xiang Wang, et al. (2017) and are regarded as an alternative to
DCFs (Shao et al. 2020). DLFs "provide[s] information about the degree — not
the economic value — of human suering" and can, therefore, be "dened as
the degree of human suering caused by lack of access to a good or service"
(Xihui Wang, Xiang Wang, et al. 2017). While DCFs are dened in terms
of costs, DLFs range on a scale from 0 to 10. Even though this approach
also oers a variety of advantages (see for instance Shao et al. (2020)), we
will focus on DCFs in the present study since a well dened DCF, in spite
of the diculties from an ethical perspective, provides additional room for
discussion of results for decision makers. However, we want to note that our
approach can also be applied with DLFs.
We make use of the following example to highlight our concerns with the
way social costs are dened and to show the advantages of our new approach
(see Figure C.1).
We assume that after a disaster disrupted the tap water supply of cities A
and B, a humanitarian organization (HO) becomes active and plans to deliver
water to the cities. Therefore, they need to decide at which airport they should
land with their airplane full of bottled water for 800 people. They can either
land in city A, which is inhabited by 600 people, or in city B, in which 200
people live. The roads that connect the two cities allow trac in one direction
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Figure C.1: Overview of the example situation.
and limit the weight and speed of trucks that are allowed to drive on them.
The street from A to B is a backroad and only light trucks are allowed to
drive on it, while the street in the other direction is well maintained, allowing
heavier trucks to drive on it. Hence, goods transported from A to B are
transported in two lightly loaded trucks at total costs of 2.80e per km, while
a fully loaded truck can transport all goods in the other direction (at total
costs of 1.40e per km). The heavy loaded truck can drive at 100 km per hour,
while the small trucks are only allowed to operate at a speed of 50 km per
hour due to the road conditions. The cities are located 200km away from each
other, and it takes the airplane 30 minutes to both cities.
From a social cost minimizing point of view, the preferred option oers the
minimum sum of LC and DC. The LC are 200 km ∗ 2.8e = 560e if the goods
are delivered by plane to A rst and then delivered by truck to B and 200km
∗ 1.4e = 280e if the plane lands in B and the goods are delivered by truck
to A afterwards.
DC depend on the number of aected people and the time until the goods
reach their city. For example, 600 people would be without water for 0.5
hours and 200 people for 4.5 hours if the plane landed in A. Assuming that
it is possible to transfer DCFs from one area to another, we use the DCF of
Moreno et al. (2018), in which the DC result in 1,114e if the plane lands in A
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and 1,377e if it lands in B. Consequently, the HO would prefer to land in B
since the resulting social costs of 1,657e are below the 1,674e of the other
option.
However, using a dierent DCF can obviously lead to dierent results. As
mentioned in Section C.1, the range of DCFs determined for one good and
economy compared to the same good and another economical situation can
vary at factors of above 3 during a crisis. Let us, therefore, consider an
alternative DCF that is three times higher than the DCF of Moreno et al.
(2018).
Even though the relative values of the DC stay the same, the net dierence
between the DC of option A and B triples, leading to social costs that favor
landing in city A. Consequently, it can be followed that the social cost ap-
proach is only robust if DCFs are dened accurately and implicitly balanced
with their corresponding LC, and that the way social costs implemented in the
current body of literature needs some adjustments. Consequently, we suggest
to adapt the way we use DCFs and LC in social costs objective functions and
normalize them.
Multiple ways to normalize exist, which all have their benets and draw-
backs (see for instance Kim and Weck (2005) for an overview). An example
in the context of disaster logistics is the approach from Zhu et al. (2019),
who normalize logistical, deprivation, and relative DC with the help of its
maximum and minimum and use an ant colony optimization algorithm to
obtain a solution. Even though this leads to normalization in the interval of
0 and 1, the approach is regarded as "inecient and not practical" (Mausser
2006). If, for instance, option B1 leads to the minimal DC at LC of ;1, every
option that leads to LC ;2 ≤ ;1 would be dominated by B1.
Hence, a more practical way is to normalize with the so-called Nadir and Ideal
Points (see Figure C.2), since they lead to Pareto-ecient solutions (Mausser
2006). The "Ideal Point" can be dened as "the vector composed of the best
objective values over the search space," while the Nadir point represents "the
vector composed of the worst objective values over the Pareto set" (Bechikh
et al. 2015).
The normalization of an objective value I8 follows Kim and Weck (2005):
Ī8 =
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Figure C.2: Visualization of Nadir and Ideal Point (adapted from Bechikh et al. (2015)).
Moreover, the weighting factor U represents the relative value of the DC part
of the social costs to allow decision makers to prioritize the two components
in a preferred way. It follows that we choose the feasible solution G that leads
to the minimal normalized weighted social costs:
min U ∗ ! (G) − !
340;
! #038A − ! 340;
+ (1 − U) ∗  (G) − 
340;
 #038A −  340;
(C.2)
In the context of our illustrative example with the DCF from Moreno et al.
(2018), the Ideal point is (280e; 1, 114e) and the Nadir point (560e; 1, 377e).
Consequently, the normalized social costs result as 1 in case the plane lands in
A or B for U = 0.5. If the decision maker has a preference towards regarding
DC or LC as more important (U < 0.5 or U > 0.5), a solution that ts to the
preferences of the decision maker results.
As we will show in the following section, more complex scenarios lead to
more granular variations of solutions. Hence, the sensitivity of a decision
towards social costs is reected in more detail, leading to a signicant increase
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in transparency for decision makers. Our approach can, therefore, provide
critical support for decision makers in disaster relief.
C.4 Case Study
C.4.1 Scenario Description
We assume that authorities in Berlin want to prepare for a hypothetical
failure of Berlin’s tap water system, for instance due to a large-scale water
contamination. The tap water cannot be used anymore. Therefore, the
population needs to be quickly supplied with bottled water to fulll their
basic needs.
Consequently, public authorities need to become active and install a humani-
tarian supply chain to provide bottled water to the population, in our case
for a time period of 48 hours. We acknowledge the time it takes to set up the
supply chain by assuming that deliveries arrive in Berlin 24 hours after the
start of the crisis.
The structure of the humanitarian supply chain is in line with Cotes and
Cantillo (2019): The bottles enter the system at consolidation centers (CCs),
from where they are transported via distribution centers (DiCs) to the demand
points (DPs). Figure C.3 highlights the structure of the logistical network.
In the context of our case study, we assume that the set  contains three
CCs located on the outskirts of Berlin, from where the required bottles are
transported via various transport routes to the city area. The set  of potential
DiCs consists of 12 warehouse locations distributed across Berlin, which are
currently used from private companies. We assume that the 24 hours between
the start of the crisis and the arrival of deliveries is sucient to modify the
warehouses for incoming goods. Moreover, the water is delivered to 631
schools distributed all over Berlin, at which the population can pick up the
water. Figure C.4 highlights the positions of the DiCs and CCs on the map of
Berlin.
Since CCs and DPs are considered xed, authorities need to decide which
DiCs should be opened. Opening additional DiCs costs money but leads to
faster deliveries and reduced deprivation. Hence, authorities face the trade-o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Figure C.3: Structure of logistics network.
Figure C.4: Locations of CCs, DiCs, and
DPs.
between logistics cost and deprivation cost described above by identifying an
appropriate set of locations.
We consider two scenarios to cover the potential combinations of demand
and supply: In the rst scenario, the water arriving at the CCs is sucient
to match the demand of the population (Balanced Scenario).2 In the second
scenario, the demand is not sucient to match the demand (Unbalanced
Scenario).
Hence, deprivation is expected to increase signicantly. In the context of our
case study, we assume that only 90% of the demand can be fullled, even
though the calculations can be easily adjusted to fewer deliveries.
C.4.2 Development of a Humanitarian Facility Location Model
As mentioned above, our supply chain and the connected model closely build
upon the work of Cotes and Cantillo (2019) and the related literature discussed
in their article. We rst provide an overview of the nomenclature and the
Balanced Scenario. Following, we discuss the adaptions for the Unbalanced
Scenario and the necessary steps to calculate the values of parameters.
2 Note that the developed model can also be applied to a scenario of exceeding supply. Since
the results do not signicantly dier from the results of the Balanced Scenario, we only focus
on two scenarios.
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C.4.2.1 Nomenclature
Sets
 : Set of Consolidation Centers (CCs)
 : Set of potential Distribution Centers (DiCs)
 : Set of Demand Points (DPs)
Parameters
U : Weighting factor for LC (relative to DC), U ∈ [0; 1]
28 9: : Transport costs from CC 8 to DP : via DiC 9 per unit transported
3: : Demand in DP :
59 : Fixed costs for setting up facility 9
W (C8 9: ): DC as a function of transport time C
C8 9: : Transport time from CC 8 to DP : via DiC 9
@: : Population in DP :
!8340; : Value of Ideal Point of LC
!=038A : Value of Nadir Point of LC
8340; : Value of Ideal Point of DC
=038A : Value of Nadir Point of DC
B8 : Supply of CC 8
20? 9 : Capacity of DiC 9
Decision variables
G8 9: : Proportion of demand in DP : , that is provided by CC 8 via DiC 9
~ 9 : Binary variable that represents the decision to open a location
C.4.2.2 Mathematical Formulation for the Balanced Scenario
The model for the Balanced Scenario is a capacitated facility location prob-
lem with multi-allocation. It can be applied to nd an optimal location and
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∑
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G8 9: · 3: ≤ 20? 9 · ~ 9 ∀9 ∈  (C.6)
G8 9: ≤ 1 ∀8 ∈  , ∀9 ∈  , ∀: ∈  (C.7)
G8 9: ≥ 0 ∀8 ∈  , ∀9 ∈  , ∀: ∈  (C.8)
~ 9 ∈ {0, 1} ∀9 ∈  (C.9)
The objective is to minimize the weighted sum of the normalized social costs
(as described in Section C.3). As described above, the factor U implements a
weighting between the two normalized objectives.
Eq. (C.4) ensures that the total quantity delivered by CC 8 does not exceed
the supply B8 and Eq. (C.5) guarantees complete satisfaction of the demand of
each of the DPs.
Constraint (C.6) serves two functions: On the one hand, it ensures that
deliveries only ow via a DiC 9 if it is actually opened (~ 9 = 1). On the other
hand, it limits the ows that go through each DiC below the capacity limit
(20? 9 ).
Eq. (C.7) and Eq. (C.8) dene the decision variable G8 9: ∈ [0, 1] and Eq. (C.9)
the binary decision variable ~ 9 . In contrast to ~ 9 , G8 9: is not subject to an
integer condition. Therefore, multi allocation is enabled, which allows the
model to satisfy the demand of a DP by supplies of several CCs if this is
advantageous for minimizing social costs.
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C.4.2.3 Modifications for the Unbalanced Scenario
The model described above needs to be slightly adjusted for the Unbalanced
Scenario, where supply and demand are not identical (see for instance Girmay
and Sharma (2013) for an overview of balanced and unbalanced transportation
problems).
It is common practice to transform the unbalanced problem into a balanced
problem by adding a dummy supply node that articially compensates for
the lack of supply (Girmay and Sharma 2013; Vasko and Storozhyshina 2011).
Compared to the model developed above, this implies an extension of the
set  of CCs by an articial node  . This node accounts for the unsatised
demand by representing a ctitious supply, whereby a feasible solution can
now be calculated. Thus, the supply of the  is equal to the amount of the
missing quantity of goods.
The transport costs emanating from  are set to 0 because there is no ac-
tual delivery. Therefore, no additional costs for these imaginary transports
inuence the objective function. Consequently, the people receiving a cti-
tious delivery from this node are not supplied in reality. To account for their
undersupply in the assessment of DC, the transport time C is set to the time
horizon C<0G covered by the model, since these people do not receive any
delivery until the end of the planning period.








Transport costs: 2 9: = 0 ∀9 ∈  , ∀: ∈  
Articial transport time: C 9: = C<0G ∀9 ∈  , ∀: ∈  
DC: W (C 9: ) = W (C<0G ) ∀9 ∈  , ∀: ∈  
C.4.2.4 Computation of Parameters for Normalization
According to Kirlik and Sayın (2015), the nadir point in bi-criteria optimization
"is attained among solutions that minimize the rst objective function and
vice versa" (p. 82). So  =038A is the value of the DC that results during
computation of ! 8340; , and vice versa.
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Therefore, the presented models have to be solved twice to determine the val-
ues for the normalization. For the calculation of ! 8340; we use the following
function:







28 9: · G8 9: · 3: +
∑
9 ∈
59 · ~ 9 (C.10)
Simultaneously the following term replaces the original objective function to
determine 8340; :







W (C8 9: ) · G8 9: · @: (C.11)
C.4.3 Data Collection
C.4.3.1 Demand and Supply
According to the city of Berlin, 3.754 million people live in Berlin (SSW 2019).
In line with the Sphere-Handbook, we assume a water demand of 3 liters per
person per day, which represents the absolute minimum for survival (Sphere
2018). During the modeled time horizon of 48 hours, a total demand of 22.526
million liters results. This demand is allocated to the 631 public schools of
Berlin, which serve as DPs. The allocation followed the proportion of students
per school, obtained from the Berlin Senate Department for Education, Youth,
and Sport (BSDEYS 2019). As mentioned above, the supply either matches
the demand (Balanced Scenario) or is 10% below it (Unbalanced Scenario).
The corresponding amount of water is evenly distributed to the three CCs in
both scenarios.
To quantify the suering of the population in case of water shortage, we use
the DCF of Moreno et al. (2018):3
3 Converted into EUR with the 2019 average exchange rate of 0.2268 e per Brazilian Real (ECB
2020).
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W (C8 9: ) [e] = 31, 752 ·
4 (1.5031+0.1172·C8 9: ) − 41.5031
4 (1.5031+0.1172·72) − 41.5031
(C.12)
W (C8 9: ) depends on the time C8 9: that passes until the demand of a person is
satised. Hence, it consists of the time it takes for the goods to arrive at the
CCs (C08 ) and the transport time from CC 8 to DP : via DiC 9 .
We regard an average travel speed in regular road trac for Berlin to compute
the rst stage transport time (from CCs to DiCs). According to the German
"Zukunft Mobilität", the average travel speed in Berlin is about 24 km per
hour (ZukMob 2012). As a consequence of the prevailing state of emergency,
we further assume a reduction of speed on the second stage (from DiCs to
DPs) by 50%. Since this includes a lot of uncertainty, we discuss dierent
options for the potential speed reduction in Section C.5.3.
C.4.3.2 Infrastructure and Transportation
We assume xed costs of 1e per square meter of DiC (the average DiC has
a size of 17k <2). Moreover, we assume that 0.768 pallets of water can be
stored on one <2 storage space, taking into account the size of the pallet
(1.2m*0.8m), and a cushion of 20% (e.g. for hallways or common rooms). This
is in line with Gudehus (2012), who suggest a range of 0.4-1.8 pallets per<2
for block storage.4
Regarding transportation cost, we distinguish between two dierent cost
components - the transport from CC to DiC (rst stage), and the transport
from DiC to DP (second stage). All distances are based on linear distances
calculated with ArcGIS Desktop 10.6, multiplyied with a tortuosity factor of√
2 (Diehlmann et al. 2019). We assume that the transport on the rst stage
is conducted on a sizeable 40t truck with a payload of 24t and space for 33
4 Note that, even though the DiCs oer these capacities, in reality, not all necessary space would
be used since the pallets will not be in the DiCs for a long time. However, it will probably also
not be possible to empty the warehouse completely, leaving a part of the area blocked. Within
our model, we assume that these two eects even each other out.
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pallets. In discussions with a German logistics service provider (LSP), we
select a cost rate of 0.058e per ton and kilometer.5
The cost estimation for the second transportation stage is more challenging
since the LSP calculates the prices for these kinds of trips on a per-case-base
(otherwise, a 5km trip would cost 7e). Therefore, we cannot use a directly
veried kilometer-based rate for short-distance freight transportation.
Consequently, we developed a cost estimation for a truck with a payload of 10
tons, similar to Wietschel et al. (2019), including investment costs, insurance,
taxes, maintenance, diesel, tolls, and driver wages. In contrast to the rst
transportation step, we need to regard the way back as well, resulting in costs
of 0.568e per ton and kilometer. Furthermore, labor costs for the time it
takes to load and unload the truck is a large cost driver. A factor of in total
1.33e per euro pallet is assumed.
These estimations have been validated with the LSP, comparing the costs
with the rates they would charge for a selection of comparable trips. Even
though our estimations are slightly above the rates of the LSP, we regard
them as validated since some "disaster premium" can be expected.
C.5 Results
The models were implemented in GAMS and solved with the CPLEX-solver
on an AMD-Ryzen 7 (3.8 GHz, 64 GB RAM). We consider the whole U-interval
[0; 1] in steps of 0.1.
C.5.1 Results of the Balanced Scenario
Figure C.5 highlights the optimal number of DiCs dependent on dierent
values for U . The numbers in brackets represent the set of opened DiC
locations related to the respective solution. At U = 0, when only DC are
considered in the objective function, all DiCs are opened. With increasing
5 Note that this cost rate is based on the one-way distance. Therefore, we do not regard the
return journey within this transportation stage.
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value of U , the number of DiC locations is gradually decreasing until it reaches
its minimum of 4 at U = 1, which represents a decision only based on LC.
Taking a closer look at the solutions, some sites are more present than others.
Especially the three DiCs 1,5 and 6 should be highlighted in this context since
they are included in every solution independent of U . They can be identied
as robust locations and should, therefore, be opened, regardless of the decision
makers preferences.
Figure C.5: Opened DiCs for dierent values of U in the Balanced Scenario.
Figure C.6 illustrates the absolute costs of the solutions. The LC lie within the
interval of [368 e; 1, 095 e] and decrease as U increases. Hence, they reach
their minimum at U = 1. The DC fall within the interval of [455" e; 475" e]
and in contrast to the LC, they increase as U increases. Consequently, the
minimal DC are located at U = 0. Furthermore, the gure highlights the need
to normalize if decision makers plan to include both aspects of social costs
since the DC completely outweigh the LC.
Figure C.7 highlights the value of LC and DC with respect to the related value
of U . Hence, the relationship between the two conicting objectives becomes
apparent, since one type of cost decreases if the other one increases and vice
versa.
The results in the Balanced Scenario can be summarized the following way:
DiCs 1, 5, and 6 are robust locations and should, therefore, be opened in
any case. Beyond that, no general recommendation can be made since all of
the presented solutions are Pareto-ecient. The decision for one of these
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Figure C.6: Logistic and deprivation costs for dierent values of U in the Balanced Scenario.
Figure C.7: Pareto-front with an indication of dierent values for U in the Balanced Scenario.
Pareto-ecient solutions depends on the decision maker and, therefore, the
preferred value of U . The preference can be inuenced by factors such as the
general risk perception of the decision maker, the available budget, or the
underlying situation in general.
For example, if a large budget is available, a solution in the U-range between
0.1 and 0.2 could be reasonable since both types of costs remain unchanged
in this area. Until U = 0.1, the LC rapidly decrease while the DC only slightly
increase. On the other hand, with a lower budget, a value between 0.7 and 0.8
could be appropriate as the LC are quite close to their minimal cost while DC
are still moderate. In contrast, with U-values greater than 0.8, the DC increase
at a disproportionate rate in relation to the small savings regarding the LC.
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C.5.2 Results of the Unbalanced Scenario
Figure C.8 highlights the dierent optimal location decisions with respect
to the value of the weighting factor U . The general course of the solutions
looks similar to the course of the graph for the rst scenario: all 12 DiCs are
opened if U = 0, and the number of DiCs decreases as U increases. At U = 1,
only 4 open DiCs are left.
Figure C.8: Opened DiCs for dierent values of U in the Unbalanced Scenario.
However, a comparison of the solutions reveals dierences, not only regard-
ing the number of locations but also the composition of optimal DiC-sets,
especially in the higher U range. As in the balanced case, DiCs 1 and 6 are
included in every solution and can, therefore, be identied as robust locations.
In contrast to the rst scenario, DiC 5 is no robust location in the unbalanced
case. Compared to the results described above, DiC 5 is not opened in the
case of U = 0.9, but DiC is 11 opened instead. DiC 11 oers less space at less
cost than DiC 5. Since fewer goods ow within the system, the size of DiC
11 combined with the other three open DiCs is sucient now, allowing to
reduce costs.
The costs are illustrated in Figure C.9. They show a similar pattern as in
the Balanced Scenario. However, it is noticeable that, compared to the rst
scenario, DC are much higher. They range from 1,100Me to 1,124Me. This
high number results from the undersupply underlying this scenario. Even
though only 10% of supplies are missing, total deprivation more than doubles,
highlighting the exponential structure of DCFs.
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Figure C.9: Logistic and deprivation costs for dierent values of U in the Unbalanced Scenario.
Figure C.10: Pareto-front with an indication of dierent values forU in the Unbalanced Scenario.
Figure C.10 highlights the Pareto-front and, therefore, the trade-o between
LC and DC. Even though the absolute numbers dier in magnitude, the course
is very similar to Figure C.7 and, thus, underlines the competitive nature of
the two objectives as well.
The results in the Unbalanced Scenario can be summarized in the following
way: DiCs 1 and 6 are robust locations and should be opened in any case. As
stated before, the nal decision depends on the preferences of the decision
maker. Similar to the rst scenario, U-values between 0.1 and 0.2 could be
reasonable for high budgets. On the other hand, U could be set to a value
between 0.7-0.8 for low budgets.
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C.5.3 Analysis of the Sensitivity Towards Travel Speed and
DiC Capacities
As mentioned above, we furthermore want to discuss the sensitivity of the
results towards two key assumptions: the travel speed and the number of
pallets per<2 of DiC area.
Table C.1 highlights this analysis for the Balanced Scenario. In addition to
the combination discussed in detail above (12 km/h and 0.768 pallets per
<2), the table shows the LC, DC, and number of opened DiCs for dierent
combinations of travel speed and capacity. Note that an equal number of
open DiCs does not automatically lead to equal DC or LC. Since the number
of pallets that t in one DiC strongly depends on the capacity of pallets
per square-meter, travel distances change within the selected combinations.
Moreover, we calculate DCs based on travel time. Consequently, they increase
if travel speed slows down.
An increase in travel speed leads to a reduction in both types of costs - LC
and DC. However, the signicance of the eect diers. The mean drop in LC
is on average 0.033% for each percent increase in travel speed in case of 0.768
pallets per<2 (and 0.036% in case of 2 pallets per<2). Moreover, the mean
DC drop by an average of 0.028% (and 0.032%).
However, an increase in the number of pallets per <2 comes along with
more complex eects. On the one hand, the mean LC decrease by 0.048%
for each percent increase in pallet capacity in case of a second stage travel
speed of 6 km per hour (0.044% for 12 km per hour and 0.052% for 18 km per
hour). On the other hand, mean DC slightly increase in all cases - 0.001%
in case of 6 km per hour and even smaller increases for dierent travel
distances. This is unexpected since the increased capacity of DiCs allows for
additional options to deliver goods through them. Consequently, it can be
followed that the positive eects of the LC signicantly outweigh the changes
in DC. This, furthermore, underlines the importance of considering both
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C.6 Discussion
The results of both scenarios underline the wide range of applications and the
great versatility of the developed approach. The weighting factor U allows
the decision maker to integrate individual preferences into the calculation of
an optimal location decision based on the available budget and the particular
situation.
In the case of U = 0, only the DC are included in the objective function.
Accordingly, if U is set to 1, only the LC are considered. Every other value for
the weighting factor in between these two extremes represents a weighted
mixture of both cost objectives. This allows the decision maker not only
to implement a prioritization for one of the cost factors according to the
disaster situation but also to identify potentially suitable options for action
by examining the entire interval U ∈ [0; 1].
Moreover, dierent phases of the disaster can lead to dierent preferences
and, consequently, dierent values for U . For example, it is possible to use a
lower value for U in disaster relief than in preparedness.
Additionally, by examining the entire U-interval, some DiCs can often be
excluded entirely from the set of potential DiC locations because they do not
occur in any of the calculated solutions. Furthermore, robust DiC locations
may be found that appear in each of the solutions and should, therefore, be
in the focus of authorities preparing for a disaster.
In contrast to the original denition of social costs in the objective function
by Holguín-Veras, Pérez, et al. (2013), this leads to a signicant increase in
transparency and, therefore, provides valuable support for decision makers.
Figures C.11 and C.12 highlight this by presenting the number of opened DiCs
and the cost structure for the Balanced Scenario without normalization.
It follows that before we introduced our approach, decision makers would
open all DiCs since they would only regard the outcome of U = 0.5. Further-
more, the implicit prioritization of DC leads to a comparably rigid function
behavior and a sudden drop for U between 0.9 and 1. This drop highlights the
benets of normalization since it allows decision makers to understand the
sensitivities of the SCF more thoroughly.
In addition, as shown in our solution analyses of the two scenarios, the model
can provide a good overview of the possible trade-os between dierent
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Figure C.11: Opened DiCs for dierent values of U without normalization in the Balanced
Scenario.
Figure C.12: Logistic and deprivation costs for dierent values of U without normalization in
the Balanced Scenario.
options by analyzing the Pareto-front in respect to U ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, it
supports the whole decision making process and, thus, facilitates to tailor
decisions to the specic disaster context.
C.7 Conclusion
The use of social cost functions in humanitarian logistics depends on well-
dened deprivation cost functions. However, only very few of these functions
have been scientically developed. Combined with the lack of transferability
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due to a strong sensitivity towards local economic conditions, the application
of social cost functions is dicult. Moreover, the original denition of social
cost functions in humanitarian logistics comes along with two potential
weaknesses. First, it does not allow to include preferences of decision makers
towards one of the two cost components. Second, it contains an implicit
weighting since deprivation costs can completely outweigh logistic costs in
disaster relief.
Therefore, we further developed the concept of social costs in humanitar-
ian logistics and introduced a normalized weighted sum approach. After
presenting the methodological foundations of the approach, we applied it
to a case study for a hypothetical water system failure in the city of Berlin.
Assuming that authorities want to prepare for such a scenario, we developed
a model that identies an appropriate distribution network. Since it is not
clear if the supply is sucient, the model needed to be exible enough to
consider both cases (Balanced and Unbalanced), which we investigated in
two scenarios. Furthermore, we compared the results with the results of the
original denition, highlighting the increase in transparency, in particular
with respect to the sensitivity of the decision.
Future studies can complement our approach in many ways. For example, it
would be possible to derive "rule-of-thumb factors" for U in a survey of deci-
sion makers from dierent institutions (e.g. private sector, NGOs, authorities).
While the approach supports decision makers to understand their decisions
better, they still need to decide for an appropriate U by themselves. Therefore,
standard values could work as a starting point for discussions with decision
makers.
Moreover, the application of the approach in the context of collaboration
seems promising. If, for instance, public and private actors work together
in a Public-Private Emergency Collaboration (PPEC, Wiens et al. (2018)),
dierent combinations of individual preferences would aect the outcome of
the PPEC signicantly. Hence, our approach could support them aligning their
objectives and nding compromises for long term collaboration. Moreover, it
is possible to derive Pareto-fronts for dierent collaboration scenarios and,
therefore, allocate budget to a portfolio that ts the individual preferences
best. Consequently, this could enable a better coordination of resources and,




Despite the potential elds of further investigation, we can conclude that our
approach signicantly increases transparency for decision makers and allows
them to include their preferences into the objective function. Thus, it leads
to more substantiated decisions and, consequently, to a more ecient relief
logistic.
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D On the Combination of Water
Emergency Wells and Mobile
Treatment Systems: A Case
Study of the City of Berlin
Abstract1
A shortage of water leads to severe consequences for populations. Recent
examples like the ongoing water shortage in Kapstadt or in Gloucestershire in
2007 highlight both the challenges authorities face to restore the water supply
and the importance of installing ecient preparedness measures and plans.
This study develops a proactive planning approach of emergency measures
for possible impairments of water supply systems and validates this with
a case study on water contamination in the city of Berlin. We formulate
a capacitated maximal covering problem as a mixed-integer optimization
model where we combine existing emergency infrastructure with the de-
ployment of mobile water treatment systems. The model selects locations
for mobile water treatment systems to maximize the public water supply
within dened constraints. With the extension to a multi-objective decision
making model, possible trade-os between the water supply coverage and
costs, and between the coverage of dierently prioritized demand points
are investigated. Therefore, decision makers benet from a signicantly in-
creased transparency regarding potential outcomes of their decisions, leading
to improved decisions before and during a crisis.
1 This chapter includes the nal version of the article "On the combination of water emergency
wells and mobile treatment systems: a case study of the city of Berlin" by Christoph Stallkamp,
Markus Lüttenberg, Marcus Wiens, Rebekka Volk, Frank Schultmann, and myself (Stallkamp
et al. 2020). The supplementary material can be found on the journal website.
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D.1 Introduction
D.1.1 Motivation
Critical infrastructures are organizations and facilities with great importance
to the public. Failure can lead to supply shortages of essential services as
well as possible disruption of public safety (BMI 2009; UNISDR 2009). In case
of an emergency, it is necessary to limit damages to critical infrastructures
and to prevent possible corresponding disruptions of services (Wannous and
Velasquez 2017). This objective is particularly relevant due to new security
policy risks like international terrorism and signicant natural risks that have
an enhanced potential to damage critical infrastructures (Bross et al. 2019).
Therefore, authorities need to update their continuity plans regularly and
make sure that each part of the critical infrastructure is protected.
The water supply system and the sewage system are one of the critical in-
frastructures of a city (BMI 2009). Potential damage to the system can lead
to the unavailability of drinking water. For example, a contamination led
to disruptions in Toledo (Redfern et al. 2018) and Flint (Ruckart et al. 2019).
Moreover, the system can be aected by natural disasters. For example, an
earthquake caused signicant disturbance of the water system in Los Angeles
in 1994 (Davis 2014), a long-lasting drought put the supply in Kapstadt under
heavy pressure (Enqvist and Ziervogel 2019). Moreover, severe ooding led
to a collapse of the water distribution of Gloucestershire (Rundblad, Knapton,
and Hunter 2010) and Simbach am Inn in Germany (Bross et al. 2019). While
a lot of measures and contingencies are in place to repair and reestablish
water supply, it is important to develop plans to mitigate the consequences
of a disruption.
Drinking water is critical for the survival of the population. Therefore, op-
erators of critical infrastructure are obliged to develop contingency plans.
For example, German water supply companies need to implement preventive
measures for strengthening the safety of public water supply. If companies
lack capacities to re-establish normal operations, German authorities need to
ensure alternative supply measures (BBK 2016a).
Dependent on the level of the disruption, authorities can activate a variety
of specialized disaster management agencies or divisions. Besides safety
and security actors like reghters, police, or the military, authorities can
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activate the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW), which provides
technical support in the context of civil protection and disaster assistance
(Deutscher Bundestag 1990). The agency consists of volunteers that form dif-
ferent specialist groups, including drinking water specialist groups equipped
with resources to establish an emergency water supply. These resources
include mobile water treatment systems, water transportation containers,
and vehicles (BBK 2016a). Other specialist groups provide emergency repair,
supply, or rescue (BBK 2016b).
While the Federal Oce for Civil Protection and Disaster relief (BBK) coordi-
nates crisis interventions on a national level (BBK 2016b), each federal state
in Germany is in charge of their own disaster measures. In case of water
supply disruptions, they can, for example, install mobile pipes from regions
with functioning water systems or use transportation trucks (BBK 2016b). In
severe cases, when a huge number of people cannot be supplied otherwise,
German authorities can activate more than 5,200 independent emergency
water wells throughout the country that enable quick access to groundwater
(Fischer and Wienand 2013).
However, even though measures to maintain and check the wells are in place,
it is not certain that each well works properly (Boehme, Geißler, and Schweer
2012). Moreover, the well system was designed and installed during the cold
war (Fischer and Wienand 2013). Even though authorities occasionally install
new fountains, it can be debated if the locations reect the current distribution
of the population properly. Therefore, the focus of our study is to analyze the
eectiveness of wells in a hypothetical disaster and to investigate, how these
wells can be supported by a more exible technology.
D.1.2 Problem Description and Contribution
Mobile water treatment systems represent a exible option to complement the
emergency supply by wells. However, the decision making on the placement
of these mobile systems is highly complex and depends on multiple factors,
such as suitable locations, distance to the beneciaries, or available budget.
This is especially complex in disaster relief since parts of the population in
dierent and sometimes critical physical constitution need dierent types
of help (see for instance IFRC (2011), who state that they "prioritize to help
the most vulnerable and ensure that immediate emergency needs are being
met)." Decision making is especially challenging for authorities responsible
207
D On the Combination of Water Emergency Wells and Mobile Treatment Systems
for the whole population. While they are focused on maximizing the supply
for the vulnerable part of the population, they still need to make sure that the
non-vulnerable parts of the population receives sucient amounts of water
or help as well.
Therefore, we developed a multi-criteria decision model to support decision
makers in implementing an emergency water supply chain in case of the
disruption of the public water supply. This model allows to consider dierent
objectives within the optimization and, therefore, to analyze possible trade-
os (e.g. cost vs. coverage, focus on vulnerable vs. less vulnerable parts of
the population).
The model consists of three parts: determination of the spatial demand and the
supply of the existing emergency water supply infrastructure, identication
of potential locations for mobile water treatment systems, as well as the
selection of locations for them.
Consequently, the article contributes to the body of literature in three sig-
nicant ways. First, we provide a guideline to transparently assess available
capacities for the rst time to enable decision makers to assess their own
systems’ conditions and capacities. Second, we develop a novel maximum cov-
ering model to support decision makers designing emergency water supply
chains. The developed model combines various extensions for the maximum
covering location problem. In contrast to previous models, our approach
allows to jointly consider existent service infrastructure with additional facil-
ities, while integrating the inventory allocation of facilities to demand points.
Third, the importance of considering trade-os is obvious since authorities
need to regard multiple stakeholders and their needs within their decision
making. Furthermore, it is necessary to understand the consequences of
prioritizing parts of the population. With our methodology, various trade-os
can be identied in a clear-cut way.
The paper is structured as follows. After the review of related literature in
the following section, we provide an overview of the model in Section D.3.
Following, we apply the model in the context of a case study for a hypothetical
terror attack (water contamination) on the public water supply of the city of
Berlin, Germany in Section D.4. The results of that case study are highlighted





Jain (2012) highlights the challenge of possible contamination of drinking
water sources after an emergency, especially if there is a lack of infrastruc-
ture to purify water. He classies four groups of possible contaminants: (1)
microbiological contaminants, (2) chemical contaminants, (3) radiological
contaminants, and (4) physical contaminants. Loo et al. (2012) provide a
comprehensive overview of water treatment systems that purify water from
dierent contaminants. They also developed a framework to support author-
ities and relief organizations selecting from the multiple water treatment
options in emergencies. Water treatment systems are classied according
to their operating principle (Loo et al. 2012) or their capacity, ranging from
point-of-use systems for the intervention on a household level to small-scale-
systems on community level (Peter-Varbanets et al. 2009).
Several papers analyze the eectiveness of specic water treatment technolo-
gies reducing the concentration of water contaminants in dierent emergency
settings. Clasen and Boisson (2006) note that household-based ceramic lters
helped to improve the drinking water quality among the population aected
by ooding in the Dominican Republic in 2003. Clasen, Smith, et al. (2006)
provide an overview of several water purication technologies deployed after
the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. They highlight that a timely, comprehen-
sive, and eective response to restore drinking water is essential to save lives
and outline conditions under which household water treatment technologies
are useful to provide relief to an aected population. Dorea et al. (2009)
describe the intervention with a clarier on a community level and provide
performance data from the Indian Ocean tsunami. Garsadi et al. (2009) extend
the investigated treatment systems in this aftermath by the discussion of the
practical experiences of the deployment of mobile water treatment systems.
Mahmood et al. (2011) evaluate household sand lters in the aftermath of
an earthquake that damaged over 4,000 water and sanitation schemes in
northern Pakistan in 2005. Lantagne and Clasen (2013) document the impact
of a household intervention with chlorine and lter products distributed after
the 2010 earthquake in Haiti.
Since the number of natural and man-made disasters is expected to rise, e.g.
due to climate change, migration, diseases or terror attacks, it is necessary to
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develop holistic concepts to encounter the consequences of the disasters as
eectively as possible (Wu et al. 2019). This also includes integrated concepts
for drinking water supply and water treatment technologies.
D.2.2 Covering Approaches
According to Church and Murray (2019), public actors’ location decisions are
often formulated as covering problems to represent the principle of equity
while placing public facilities and services. There are two types of location
covering models, Location Set Covering Problems (LSCP) and Maximal Covering
Location Problems (MCLP). While LSCPs seek to cover total demand while
minimizing the number of facilities needed, MCLPs maximize the covered
demand based on a given number of facilities (Church and Murray 2019).
According to Toregas (1970), an application of the LSCP is placing emergency
response services with a maximal accepted service time. Other applications
are ensuring the access of services for people with disabilities (Kwan et al.
2003), the siting of bus stops (Murray 2001), or the placing of warning sirens
(Current and O’Kelly 1992).
On the other hand, possible applications for the MCLP are the placing of
health clinics (Bennett, Eaton, and Church 1982) or re stations (Murray
2013) in case only a limited number can be set up. Church and ReVelle (1974)
suggest that MCLPs for given planning applications can be solved by varying
the number of facilities. This allows to create a trade-o between the coverage
provided and the investment in facilities (Church and Murray 2019). This
additional information allows the decision maker to weigh between service
level and cost.
Li et al. (2011) provide an overview of various extensions of the MCLP and
LSCP like implementing quality levels of service, multiple types of service, or
ensuring back up coverage. Moreover, Church and Murray (2019) mention
extensions regarding integrating existing service systems and hierarchical
services.
Loree and Aros-Vera (2018) highlight that allocating inventory from facilities
to demand points is another important aspect while designing post disaster
humanitarian supply chains. Integrating the inventory allocation decision
into the facility location decision links the optimization of facility locations
with the consequences for the supplied population (Lin et al. 2012). Loree
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and Aros-Vera (2018) discuss three models with the objective to maximize
the covered demand (Jia, Ordóñez, and Dessouky 2007; Murali, Ordóñez, and
Dessouky 2012; Hong, Xie, and Jeong 2012). Only Jia, Ordóñez, and Dessouky
(2007) and Hong, Xie, and Jeong (2012) base their models on possible facility
locations and specify the numbers of facilities that are to be placed. However,
none of the models considers multiple facility types to meet the demand and
none considers trade-os.
Consequently, our MCLP diers from available humanitarian location-
allocation models by including the following model components: it determines
facility locations, while simultaneously considering multiple facility types
that combine eorts to provide relief and maximize coverage. In addition,
capacity constraints, the allocation of inventory to the demand points, and
multiple sourcing are included. Furthermore, we extended the MCLP model
to include a multi-criteria perspective, allowing for trade-o analysis.
D.2.3 Multi-objective Approaches
Real-world problems include multiple objectives that decision makers have
to consider. The resulting multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) problems
combine decisions regarding cost, environmental risk, service level, or other
aspects (Clasen, Smith, et al. 2006).
Various studies used MCDM methods to nd optimal solutions for dierent
emergency settings. Barbarosoğlu, Özdamar, and Çevik (2002) develop a
mathematical model for helicopter mission planning during disaster relief
operations. The model has two sub-problems with conicting objectives
leading to the additional development of a multi-criteria analysis. Evaluating
another use case, Bastian et al. (2016) create a multi-criteria decision analysis
framework to optimize the military humanitarian assistance aerial delivery
network.
Emergencies in the context of water are also investigated, including hazards
and public water supply. Gigović et al. (2017) evaluate possible ooding areas
in urban areas by dening factors that are relevant to the hazard of ooding
combining the application of geographical information systems (GIS) and
MCDM. Doerner, Gutjahr, and Nolz (2009) investigate the placement of public
locations near coasts taking risks of inundation by tsunamis and costs into
account. Singh, Jha, and Chowdary (2018) evaluate groundwater potential
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while Al-Weshah and Yihdego (2018) investigate dierent approaches to
remediate water supply after groundwater pollution. Tscheikner-Gratl et al.
(2017) investigate a multi-objective approach for the maintenance of water
supply systems, while Zimmermann, Felmeden, and Michel (2018) assess
dierent water infrastructures. Nolz, Doerner, and Hartl (2010) introduce a
decision support system for planning water distribution tours with trucks in
emergencies. The transportation problem includes a cost criterion based on
travel time and a coverage objective.
Boonmee, Arimura, and Asada (2017) provide a comprehensive overview of
location-based decision making problems that are related to humanitarian
logistics in emergencies. The survey is based on data modeling types and
the classication of facility location problems. Furthermore, it examines
pre- and post-disaster situations (Boonmee, Arimura, and Asada 2017) and
includes multi-criteria problems. None of the mentioned approaches regard
the trade-o between dierently vulnerable groups of the population.
Furthermore, Holguín-Veras et al. (2013) provide an overview of humanitarian
logistics problems with multiple objectives. They discuss incorporating a
measure into optimization problems, which represents the suering of the
population experienced from a lack of access to goods or services, and name
this external eect deprivation cost. Therefore, deprivation cost functions
present an opportunity to prioritize parts of the population (Rivera-Royero,
Galindo, and Yie-Pinedo 2016). Shao et al. (2020) provide an overview of the
recent literature on the concept of deprivation cost and highlight challenges
associated with this approach. They conclude that deprivation cost functions
are highly sensitive towards the product and the local economic characteristics
(Shao et al. 2020).
To the best of our knowledge, no estimation for water deprivation cost func-
tions in Germany is known. Hence, the application of a deprivation cost
approach does not seem to be mature enough in our context.
D.2.4 Research Gap
The literature review shows that there are no covering models that provide
an integrated concept of combining existing infrastructure with additional
mobile water treatment systems. The developed model allows decision makers
to consider already existing infrastructure when deciding where to place
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additional mobile water treatment resources in an emergency or undersupply
case.
With the extension of the MCLP model to a MCDM model, comprehensive
trade-o analysis with dierent priorities are enabled. To the best of our
knowledge, there is no such model combination allowing for a comprehensive
analysis of trade-os between coverage and length of supply routes, number
of deployed water treatment systems or costs. Our approach also provides
valuable insights into the prioritization of certain demand points over others,
especially if deprivation cost functions cannot be applied.”
D.3 Methodology
The model consists of three modules that are described in the following
subsections. The modules (A) and (B) feed the module (C) that consists of the
optimization model and enables trade-o analysis.
D.3.1 Model Requirements
The introduced model aims to support the establishment of a humanitar-
ian supply chain in the context of an urban water emergency. Modeling an
emergency supply chain for a major city involves the denition of model
boundaries, the collection of required data, and the formulation of assump-
tions due to prevailing unknowns and uncertainty.
The main objective is the maximization of the coverage of the public water
demand. In covering models, demand is covered and supplied within a prede-
ned service standard. The demand coverage is maximized by placing mobile
water treatment systems throughout the city while taking already existing
and functioning emergency infrastructure (wells) into account.
The main challenges are estimating demand, identifying and locating water
supply capacities, and determining preferences of the decision maker. The
model is supposed to fulll the following requirements:
1. Estimating demand and identify demand centers within the study
area. This includes dierent categories of demand such as the demand
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of residents and patients of high vulnerable facilities such as hospitals
and nursing homes.
2. A second requirement is establishing the available drinking water
within the study area. Possible drinking water sources are already
existing emergency infrastructure and location candidates for mobile
water treatment systems.
3. Besides optimizing the total water demand covered, the consecutively
optimization of secondary objectives should be possible to allow
analyzing trade-os between the attainment of multiple objectives.
This enables the decision maker’s preferences to be represented.
Possible trade-os could be the maximum coverage at a given budget
or at least to gain knowledge on how much a higher coverage would
cost.
Figure D.1: Overview of model requirements and modules with the chosen modeling approaches
(modules A, B, C). The requirements are discussed above and are based on the challenges identied
while designing a water emergency supply chain. Three model modules are formulated and
described to meet the requirements.
D.3.2 Model Components
Figure D.1 displays an overview of the model requirements and contrasts
them with the chosen modelling approaches to meet these requirements. The
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water demand module (A) and the water supply module (B) are two modules
to determine the required data for the optimization module (C). Module (A)
locates the water demand by constructing demand points based on collected
data while taking two dierent categories of demand into account. Module
(B) evaluates water supply capacities with respect to their locations and
costs. Furthermore, existing emergency infrastructure is investigated and
possible locations for mobile water treatment systems are dened as solution
space. Module (A) and (B) represent the data basis for module (C). The
core of module (C) is a lexicographical optimization model comprising two
objectives, enabling a consecutive optimization of coverage and associated
costs. It allows the mapping of trade-os between objectives and the impact of
the decision maker’s preferences. Figure D.2 displays the interdependencies
of the dierent modules that are described in more detail below.
Module (A) determines the demand in case of an emergency. Based on data
for population density per building blocks and the water demand per capita,
demand centers can be localized and their water demand can be calculated
resulting in the water demand of regular residents. Vulnerable patients of
hospitals and nursing homes are located at these high care facilities. Their
demand is characterized by the number of beds per institution and the per
bed demand. Additional demand ows can extend the approach.
The available water supply by existing emergency wells is established by
module (B). Data must be identied that locate the existing emergency in-
frastructure and its capacities. Possible locations for mobile water treatment
systems are dened by identifying open areas and by restricting potential
candidates based on location criteria such as access to the road network
or a water source. The opportunity to supply locations by tank trucks is
evaluated.
The decision making process is described, summarized and solved in module
(C). The established data from modules (A) and (B) is input for a capacitated
maximal covering location problem (CMCLP). A CMCLP was chosen since
covering models are typically used to design emergency services (Daskin
2008). Church and Murray (2019) justify this with the goals of the public sector,
including the provision of good services and fairness that are implemented
through a service level. Moreover, a MCLP is formulated since the number of
available mobile water treatment systems is limited in case of an emergency.
Demand is regarded as covered if the nearest supply is within a predened
distance and provides a predened minimum of water.
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Figure D.2: Overview of the model and the decision making process. Water demand module (A)
and Water supply module (B) provide data for the optimization module (C). The decision making
process is based on a multi-objective optimization problem and trade-o analysis.
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If emergency infrastructure exists, the model extends this by placing mobile
water treatment systems. These two dierent facility types have both specic
supply capacities. Multiple facilities can provide service for one demand
point.
Chung, Schilling, and Carbone (1983) describe a basic formulation of CMCLP.
Their basic formulation was extended by additional constraints leading to
the following optimization model (see Table D.1 for a description of the
components).
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I8 9 ≤ 1, ∀8 ∈  , (2)
I8 9 ≥ ~8 9 ∗ 5 3, ∀8 ∈  ,∀9 ∈ #8 , (3)∑
8∈ 9
08 ∗ I8 9 ≤ 2 9 ∗ G 9 , ∀9 ∈  , (4)∑
9 ∈
B 9F ≤ 2F, ∀F ∈,(, (5)∑
F∈,
B 9F ≤ 1, ∀9 ∈  , (6)
B 9F ≤ 0; 9F, ∀9 ∈  ,∀F ∈,(, , (7)∑
F∈,(
B 9F ≥ G 9 , ∀9 ∈  , (8)∑
9 ∈
G 9 ≤ ?, ∀9 ∈  , (9)∑
9 ∈,)
G 9 ≤ @, ∀9 ∈  , (10)
I8 9 ≤ G 9 , ∀8 ∈  ,∀9 ∈ #8 , (11)
~8 9 ≥ I8 9 , ∀8 ∈  ,∀9 ∈  , (12)
~8 9 ≤ I8 9 ∗", ∀8 ∈  ,∀9 ∈  , (13)
G 9 ∈ {0, 1}, ∀9 ∈  , (14)
~8 9 ∈ {0, 1}, ∀8 ∈  ,∀9 ∈  , (15)
I8 9 ≥ 0, ∀9 ∈  . (16)
The objective function of the CMCLP is to maximize the total demand covered
(1). It is subject to the constraint that a demand point is satised by a water
source that is located within a certain distance and receives an amount of
water that is lower or equal to its total demand (2). Therefore, an oversupply
is not possible. Moreover, constraint (3) establishes that the water allocated to
a demand point is higher than a percentage that can be predened dependent




8 Index of demand points (8 ∈  )
9 Index of water supplying facilities (9 ∈  )
F Index of water source (F ∈,()
#8 Set of water sources within service standard of demand point i { 9 |38 9 < ( }
 9 Set of demand points within service standard of water supplying facility j
{8 |38 9 < ( }
) Set of existing emergency supply locations {j | supplying facility j is part of the
existing infrastructure}
,) Set of available water treatment systems {j | supplying facility j is a water
treatment system}
,) Set of available water treatment systems that must be supplied by trucks
{ 9 | 9 ∈WT and distance to water > 3, }
Parameters
3, maximal distance allowed for pump supply of water treatment system
38 9 shortest distance between demand i and supply j
0; 9F binary allocation of supplying facility j to water source w
08 amount of demand at demand point i
2 9 capacity of water supply facility j
2F maximum number of water treatment systems that can be supplied by water
source w
( desired maximum distance between supply and demand
? maximum number of water treatment systems to be placed in total
@ maximum number of water treatment systems that can be supplied by available
trucks
5 minimum percentage of demand that must be supplied by an allocated facility
within the service standard




1, if water treatment system is located at j
0, otherwise
9 ∈,)
G 9 1 9 ∈ )
~8 9
{




1, if location j is allocated to water source w
0, otherwise
I8 9 percentage of demand i assigned to facility j
Table D.1: Notation of sets, parameters and variables used in the optimization model.
thereby eliminated. Therefore, people are sure that if they take a trip to a
water supply facility, they will get an adequate amount of water. Due to this
combination of constraints, the demand can be covered or partially covered
by one or multiple sources within an acceptable distance.
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Water supplying facilities have a predened capacity that must not be ex-
ceeded (4). In addition, constraint (5) ensures that the capacities of water
sources are not exceeded by the number of water treatment systems placed
next to it. Each location is allocated to one water source (6) while the alloca-
tion is only possible if it is feasible with respect to other emergency systems
placed at the same water source (7). Constraint (8) establishes that if a water
treatment system is placed at a location, this location must be allocated to a
water source.
A maximal number of ? water treatment systems can be sited (9), of which @
can be placed further away from water than a specied distance (10). Con-
straint (11) restricts the allocation of demand to available emergency infras-
tructure and locations where a water treatment system has been placed.
Constraint (12) denes a lower bound and constraint (13), an upper bound
for the decision variable ~8 9 . Constraints (14) to 16 dene the range of values
of the decision values.
Due to the constraints described above, it is possible that the available re-
sources are not sucient to supply a desired proportion of the population.
In Section D.6.2, we discuss this issue and suggest a model to analyze this
further if decision makers want to extend their analysis in this direction.
Furthermore, the problem is extended to a multi-objective problem that is
solved using a lexicographic approach, optimizing the objectives coverage
and costs in a dened sequence. This enables the investigation of possible
trade-os between dierent objectives (Farahani, SteadieSei, and Asgari
2010). Table D.2 introduces additional parameters to enable the trade-o
analysis.
In general, a lexicographic solution approach optimizes multi-objective prob-
lems sequentially in a predened order and, therefore, it is based on the
preferences of the decision maker. The present model assumes that the deci-
sion maker prioritizes coverage higher than cost in the case of a terror attack
or emergency. The coverage is optimized while the cost objective is not con-
sidered. If multiple solutions result in an optimal coverage, the cost objective
is optimized within the determined solution space (Nickel, Stein, and Wald-
mann 2011). An objective attainment degree can extend this approach. Table
D.2 introduces the parameter ?4A>E that represents an objective attainment
degree and allow deviation from the optimal solution of the demand covered





perCov attainment degree of optimal coverage solution (percentage)
Costs
costEW daily cost of operating existing emergency water supply infrastruc-
ture () )
costLW daily cost of operating a water treatment system not supplied by
trucks (,) \ ,) )
costLC daily cost of operating a water treatment system supplied by trucks
(,) )
Number of Water Treatment Systems
perTotalCov percentage of the total demand that must be covered
Table D.2: Extended notation to enable trade-o analysis: Multi-objective optimization approach,
inclusion of costs and analysis of water treatment systems needed to achieve a dened coverage.
The following equations (17) to (18) display the additions to establish the
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I8 9 ∗ 08 = ?4A>E ∗ Optimal Coverage (18)
The rst step of the lexicographic solution approach maximizes the demand
covered as dened in equations (1) to (16) and the optimization approach
described above. The coverage of its optimal solution is then set to the
objective attainment degree in equation (18). The second step of the approach
is minimizing the associated cost for the given coverage. Therefore, objective
function (17) is introduced. Constraint (18) enforces that the set coverage
is achieved. The full optimization model for minimizing the total costs also
includes constraints (2) to (16).
D.4 Case Study
In the following, the consequences of a hypothetical terrorist attack on the
water supply infrastructure of Berlin, Germany, is investigated. The city of
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Berlin is assumed to be a prestigious target for a terrorist attack, as it is the
capital of Germany, with over 3 million registered residents (Amt für Statistik
Berlin-Brandenburg 2019) in the center of Europe. Therefore, the city is a
suitable case study for the application of the introduced optimization model
and for planning an emergency water supply chain.
D.4.1 Berlin and its Emergency Management Processes
According to the Berliner Wasserbetriebe (2019), the average water consump-
tion of a Berlin resident is a total of 110 liters per day. Drinking water and
water used to prepare food are 5.5 liters, whereas most of the water is used
for personal hygiene or sanitary facilities. Water supply is ensured by nine
waterworks that gain water from bank ltrate, which is extracted indirectly
from surface water. Its quality depends on the condition of lakes and rivers
next to the waterworks (Hiscock and Grischek 2002). Thus, if the surface
water is contaminated, there is a possibility of a disruption of the public water
supply (Möller and Burgschweiger 2008).
The responsibility of water supplying companies includes preventive mea-
sures for strengthening the safety of the public water supply (BBK 2016a). If a
disruption or failure of the public water supply can no longer be controlled by
the water supply company, the municipality, district, or state may assist with
alternative supply measures (BBK 2016a). In that case, federal agencies like
the THW are deployed, and existing emergency infrastructure is activated
(BBK 2016b).
The THW can provide mobile water treatment systems to establish an emer-
gency supply. The deployment of these systems results in the need for al-
ternative water sources providing water to gain drinking water. In the city
of Berlin, surface water is a valuable water source for purication systems,
since it is easily accessible due to signicant water surfaces (58.48 :<2) in
and around the city (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2018). Surface
water is usually the most polluted water, leading to stricter requirements for
purication technologies (Dorea et al. 2009). If there is no time to identify
possible contaminants within the water, a purication system that puries a
broad spectrum of contaminants should be preferred. Riley, Gerba, and Elim-
elech (2011) recommend the use of multi-barrier techniques. This technique
is, for instance, included in the UF-15 system of the THW (Al Naqib 2019).
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Consequently, dierent levels of contamination can be puried simultane-
ously, allowing supply to the UF-15s from various sources of water around
Berlin. Depending on the severity of the emergency, using multiple sources
such as lakes, rivers, or even ground water can increase the available capacity
while simultaneously not depleting single local water resources.2
Groundwater is usually the preferred source due to less exposure to contam-
ination than surface water (Doerner, Gutjahr, and Nolz 2009). Emergency
water wells ensure the availability of groundwater in Berlin during disrup-
tions of public life and water supply shortages (Fischer and Wienand 2013).
According to Fischer and Wienand (2013), there are more than 900 emergency
wells in the city of Berlin.
D.4.2 Emergency Scenario
The investigated emergency scenario comprises the failure of the public water
supply of the city of Berlin after a terrorist attack on the waterworks of the
city. As time is needed to run dierent detection methods to identify the
contaminants, the water supply is shut down and an emergency water supply
network has to be established in the meantime.
We assumed that the groundwater is not contaminated. Therefore, the emer-
gency water wells can be operated. The large water surfaces of the city of
Berlin are additional water sources, but treatment systems are needed to
ensure drinking water quality. The UF-15 treatment systems of the THW are
used to extend the existing infrastructure of emergency wells. The water is
distributed at the wells and treatment systems. The locations of the wells are
xed, whereas the UF-15 systems can only be placed at locations that fulll
specic requirements (see Section D.4.3.3).
We assumed that besides the public water supply, no other public infrastruc-
ture like roads or power supply was attacked. Roads are accessible and power
is available everywhere. The accessible roads imply that neighboring commu-
nities or other federal states could provide help by supplying bottled water,
water tanks, or other resources. The supply of bottled water is not evaluated
since it is not under control of the local authorities. However, knowledge
2 Note that cities with only one source of water (e.g. Las Vegas with Lake Mead) cannot take
advantage of this increased exibility.
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and equipment stationed in other federal states are deployed and increase
the available capacities of the authorities. The running power supply implies
that wastewater treatment systems can be used for the disposal of sewage.
Therefore, the water sources will not get contaminated with wastewater.
During the crisis, all businesses in the need of drinking water stay closed
as their constant water supply cannot be guaranteed (e.g. hairdresser, ...).
However, food supply, pharmacies, hospitals (critical infrastructure) and
businesses in the service sector remain opened. Residents are informed
in time so that there is no increase in diseases or other suerings due to
consumption of contaminated water. Since the attack was not expected, we
assume that private households did not store additional water to complement
the emergency water supply.
D.4.3 Data Collection
The data collected consists of the demand structure, the available emergency
wells, location candidates for available water treatment systems and distances
between supply and demand. The following subsections provide an overview
of the data while details of the collection and processing can be found in the
supplementary material.
D.4.3.1 Demand Structure
In Germany, the First German Water Securing Regulation (1. WasSV) deter-
mines the amount of water that must be provided to the public in case of an
emergency. It distinguishes between regular persons and persons in highly
vulnerable facilities. In our context, we regard hospitals or nursing homes as
vulnerable facilities, as suggested by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee
(IASC 2010) and the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Per-
formance in Humanitarian Action (Sanderson, Knox-Clarke, and Campbell
2012). Regular persons are supplied 15 liters per day while persons in highly
vulnerable facilities are supplied 75 liters per day. Residents of vulnerable
facilities are provided with 150 liters of water per day if it is an intensive care
facility.
Within the attached supplementary material, the collection and processing of
the data to establish discrete demand points for the dierent demand types is
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described in detail. The emergency water demand of the regular residents is
56.23 million liters per day, whereas the demand of high and intensive care
facilities is 6 million liters per day. It has to be mentioned that people also
store water at home that, in theory, reduces the required amount of water
that authorities need to deliver to ensure the well-being of their population.
However, we still regard the full demand of water due to observations made
during the rst wave of the COVID19-pandemic. Since people panicked and
started to purchase goods that the they did not directly need (e.g. toilet paper),
we assume that people would still try to receive water if they need it and the
state oered it to them for free.
To avoid unnecessary trips, a predened percentage ensures that, if demand
is allocated to a water supplying facility, an adequate amount of water is
supplied per person. We assume that a threshold of 20% of the German
standard for water quantity is suitable, resulting in 3 liters per person and day.
This is in line with Sphere Project (2018), that denes 3 liters as the absolute
minimum in the aftermath of a disaster.
The analysis of demand is limited to the stated types of facilities. Water
supply for schools, food suppliers, or industry is not investigated due to the
assumption that these facilities are closed during the response phase.
D.4.3.2 Emergency Wells
The emergency water supply chain combines existing infrastructure with
mobile water treatment systems. The existing infrastructure for water emer-
gencies includes 1,028 emergency wells that are placed throughout the city
of Berlin. Their average drinking water output is 90,000 liters per day and
well (Langenbach and Fischer 2008).
The supplied water will be disinfected with chlorine if needed (Langenbach
and Fischer 2008). It is assumed that the legal maintenance procedures have
been followed and that, therefore, all emergency water wells considered in
the optimization model can be accessed and operated. If this would not be the
case, the model parameters can be easily updated and the optimum locations
of water treatment systems for maximum coverage can be recalculated.
The daily costs associated with the operation of an emergency water well
are separated into personal costs and costs associated with equipment and
consumables. Table D.3 summarizes the estimated expenses that amount to a
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rounded 10,700 e per day per operated well. Based on the assumption that all
1,028 emergency wells are operated during the maximum of 12 hours per day,
xed supply costs of 11,308,000 e per day arise that can not be inuenced by
the model. The details of the calculation are outlined in the supplementary
material.
Cost Driver Expenses Quantity Sum Source
Personal Costs





18.20 e per day 1 18.20 e THW
(2012b)
Consumables Costs
Disinfectant 0.075 e per 1 liter 90,000 6,750.00 e Träger
(2019)
Sum 10,728.20 e
Table D.3: Daily costs of operating one emergency water well.
D.4.3.3 Mobile Water Treatment Systems
The THW has 14 drinking water specialist groups, each of which has a UF-
15 drinking water treatment system.3 Since the THW is under the control
of the German Ministry of Interior, authorities can control the availability
and maintenance of UF-15. Therefore, there is no competition with private
stakeholders who want to support their processes by purifying water them-
selves. And, if a water treatment system would be unavailable, e.g. due to an
unexpected breakdown, the model parameters can be easily updated and the
optimum locations of water treatment systems for maximum coverage can
be recalculated.
The UF-15 treats well or surface water using ultraltration with a capacity
of 15<3 per hour (Al Naqib 2019). The operating time of the system is 20
hours per day, which yields 300,000 liters of water per system and day (THW
2012a). The treated water meets the drinking water quality standards of the
drinking water ordinance (BRD 2018).
Furthermore, we dene the following location criteria (Table D.4):
3 According to email exchange with THW.
226
D.4 Case Study
Criterion Description Value Source
Access to water Ability to feed water treatment systems
with water must be ensured. Therefore,
it must be possible to bridge the distance
between water source and system with
a pump. Alternatively, delivery by truck











Transportation of water to the water
treatment system must be possible if
it can not be supplied water by pump.
Therefore, the maximal distance to next
road must not exceeded the maximal dis-










Location candidates must be within the
maximal allowed supply routes to at











Table D.4: Location criteria for location of water treatment systems.
According to EPA (2011), an emergency response site should have an area
of more than 60 x 60 meters in size, which is also used as criterion for the
needed water system operating area. The locations must be accessible by
road to enable deployment and transportation to and from the site. Since the
water treatment system is also used as a distribution station, locations should
be close to demand points (EPA 2011).
The location should also have access to a raw water source (Corsten and
Gössinger 2016), which can provide a water feed of 15<3 per hour. The
usage of a maximum of one pump per water treatment system is assumed. It
can generate the required ow rate up to the distance of 1,200 meters. The
available number of pumps and their pump capacities separates locations
into locations that can be supplied by pump only and locations that must be
supplied with additional measures. These measures include supplying raw
water by tank truck to site. In the supplementary material, we determined
that we need two trucks to supply one treatment system. The THW has 14
trucks with the needed capacities, limiting the operable number of water
source distant treatment systems to seven.
The criteria described above were used to process data provided by Berlin‘s
Geoportal (Berlin 2019c). The identied location candidates are separated into
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two sets: the rst set is within a distance of 1,200 meters to a water source
and can be supplied by one water pump, while locations in the second set
need additional measures to be feasible candidates. The set of locations that
can be supplied with a pump contains 2,403 locations. The set that contains
the locations that need alternative supply measures contain of 157 additional
locations.
Cost Driver Expenses Quantity Sum Source
Personal Costs
Volunteer THW 22.00 e per hour 18 7,920,00 e THW (2012b)
Equipment Costs
Pumps 35.00 e per day 4 140.00 e THW (2012b)
Power Generator 4.77 e per hour 1 95.40 e THW (2012b)
Water Tanks 7.70 e per day 12 92.40 e THW (2012b)
Drinking Water
Laboratory
18.20 e per day 1 18.20 e THW (2012b)
UF-15 884.00 e per day 1 884.00 e THW (2012b)
Sum 9,150.00 e
Table D.5: Daily costs for operating one mobile water treatment system.
Table D.5 highlights the estimated expenses per day for the operation of an
UF-15 system. The estimation includes personal and equipment costs. The
total daily operating costs are around 9,200 e per system if it is placed next
to a water source. If tank trucks have to be deployed, the costs increase to
10,300 e due to additional personal costs as well as costs for the trucks and
fuel. For a detailed overview of the data collection and processing see the
supplementary material.
D.4.3.4 Supply Route
We dene the distance between supply and demand points as BD??;~ A>DC4 .
This supply route represents the service standard and is used to select locations
for water treatment systems. Within the case study, supply routes between
interacting points are calculated using the Euclidean distance. However,
the assumption of direct links is not applicable when considering overland
routes. Therefore, a tortuosity factor of
√
2 is introduced to embrace real road
conditions (Delivand 2011; Diehlmann et al. 2019).
According to Langenbach and Fischer (2008), reasonable supply routes in
the context of emergency water wells are between 500 and 2,000 meters.
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We assume this also applies for the supply with water treatment systems.
Therefore, the maximum service standard is examined for a supply route of
1,250 meters, evaluating an intermediate scenario. A sensitivity analysis for
dierent supply routes lengths follows in the Section D.6.
D.4.3.5 Data summary
Table D.6 provides an overview of the collected data for the case study. It
includes the parameter settings for the optimization runs. As already men-
tioned, the collection and processing of the used data can be found in the
supplementary material.
D.5 Results
This chapter summarizes the results of the optimization. The optimization
model is implemented in GAMS and solved with the CPLEX-solver.1
D.5.1 Computation of Model Input Parameters
Figure D.3 provides an overview of the water demand per planning area of
the city of Berlin. The darker the shade of the planning areas or the larger
the circles, the higher the demand in the area. The gure highlights that
special care facilities are often placed within the city center, while the general
demand is distributed rather equally within the city.
Moreover, we identied 2,560 potential locations to place mobile water treat-
ment systems. Of these possible locations, 2,403 are near (<2 km) a water
source, so that a water treatment system can directly be supplied. In Figure
D.4, these areas are highlighted (green). In addition, there are 157 potential
locations that require supplies by tank trucks (red).
1 With a tolerated MIP-gap of 0.5%.
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Parameter Value Source
Optimization Parameters
Distance to water (3, ) 1,200 meters Feuerwehrschulen Bayern (2018)
Desired maximum distance between
supply and demand (()
1,250 meters Fischer and Wienand (2013)
Number of available water treatment
systems (UF-15 units) (?)
14 Email exchange with THW
Maximum number of water treat-
ment systems that can be supplied by
trucks (@)
7 Wisetjindawat et al. (2014),
Email exchange with re brigade
Berlin and THW
Minimum percent of demand sup-
plied per trip (5 )
20% Sphere Project (2018)
BRD (1970)




THW (2012b), Träger (2019)
Operating Costs Water Treatment
Systems (2>BC!, )
9,200 e per day THW (2012b)
Operating Costs Water Treatment




THW (2012b), Statistisches Bun-
desamt (2019)
Spatial Demand Structure
Number of regular demand points 14,755 Berlin (2019a)
Number of special demand points
(hospitals, nursing homes, sheltered
housing)
529 Berliner Krankenhausge-
sellschaft e.V. (2019), Privatin-
stitut für Transparenz im
Gesundheitswesen GmbH (2019)
Emergency Wells
Number of operated emergency water
wells () )
1,028 Geofabrik GmbH (2019)
Daily drinking water supply (2 9 ) 90,000 liters per
well
Fischer and Wienand (2013)
Mobile Water Treatment Systems
Location candidates next to surface
water (,) )
2,403 EPA (2011), Corsten and
Gössinger (2016), Fischer
and Wienand (2013), Feuer-
wehrschulen Bayern (2018),
Berlin (2019b)
Location candidates that must be sup-
plied by trucks (,) )
157 Wisetjindawat et al. (2014), email
exchange re brigade Berlin,
email exchange THW




Distance Calculation Euclidean Dis-
tance
Mwemezi and Huang (2011)
Tortuosity factor B@AC (2) Diehlmann et al. (2019)
Table D.6: Overview of relevant input data for the optimization model.
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Figure D.3: Map of water demand of regular residents and high care facilities in the city of
Berlin. The demand of the residents is aggregated to planning areas of the city. The dierent
colors represent the total water demand in liters [l].
Figure D.4: Map of location candidates for placing water treatment systems in the city of Berlin.
The locations are distinguished according to their distance to the closest water source.
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D.5.2 Location Analysis
D.5.2.1 Optimal Locations that Maximize Covering
Figure D.5 displays the results of the single objective model with the parame-
ters and input data stated above. The regular demand points as well as special
demand points in central areas with a high population density are mostly
covered. This is a result of the high number of emergency water wells in this
area. Without additional water treatment systems they cover a total demand
of 77%.
The treatment systems are placed in the outer districts of Spandau, Pankow,
Reinickendorf, and Marzahn-Hellersdorf, where the number of emergency
wells is lower. All 14 available water treatment systems are placed within
close distance to an adequate water source. The systems increase the demand
covered by seven percentage points leading to a coverage of 84% of the total
demand.
The total costs associated with the emergency response are 11,128,400 e
per day resulting from operating the 1,028 emergency water wells and 14
water treatment systems.These high costs indicate the need of a multi-criteria
optimization approach including a cost criterion.
D.5.2.2 Optimal Locations for Cost-eicient Maximum Covering
A cost-ecient emergency supply enables the investment of saved resources
in other areas of the emergency response.
The results of the proposed lexicographic two-step approach are comparable
to the results of the single objective model with a coverage of 84%. Because
other locations in the outer districts of Spandau, Pankow, Reinickendorf, and
Marzahn-Hellersdorf have been chosen, the solution space for the optimal
coverage does not seem to be bijective. However, within the solution space,
no solution is more cost-ecient than the one found with the single objective
model. Therefore, the total costs associated with the lexicographic optimiza-
tion are also 11,128,400 e per day. The high operation costs are caused by
the emergency water wells and the assumption that all are operated. These
x costs amount to a rounded 11,000,000 e and cannot be inuenced by the
model design and decision variables.
232
D.5 Results
Figure D.5: Map of regular and special demand points left uncovered, considering a maximum
supply route of 1,250 meters.
D.5.2.3 Prioritization of Special Demand over Regular Demand
As mentioned above, decision makers try to prioritize the highly vulnerable
demand points in disaster relief. To investigate the eects of such a prior-
itization of demand types, the lexicographic CMLCP is slightly modied:
the gradual optimization of coverage and costs is replaced by the gradual
optimization of special and regular demand covered. Therefore, the objective
function of the CMCLP is split into covering high care facilities and covering
regular demand points. The model assumes that the decision maker prioritizes
the demand of high care facilities. Therefore, the objectives are optimized in
this order.
The result of the modied lexicographic approach is a total coverage of 81%
covering 91% of the demand of high care facilities and 80% of the regular
demand. The costs are 11,129,500 e resulting from operating 1,028 emergency
water wells, 13 water treatment systems close to a water source and one
water treatment system that has to be supplied by truck. The map shows that
some of the mobile systems are placed in more central districts like Mitte,
Friedrichshain, Charlottenburg, Tempelhof, and Steglitz (see Figure D.6). This
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Figure D.6: Map of locations of mobile water treatment systems placed when prioritizing high
care facilities.
emphasizes the prioritization of the special demand in this area, as high care
facilities that were only partially supplied are now being fully supplied.
D.6 Discussion
This section discusses the generated results and highlights trade-os be-
tween dierent objectives. The design and assumptions of the model are also
critically reviewed.
D.6.1 Length of the Supply Route
The maximum length of the supply route impacts the total demand coverage
(Figure D.7). In the diagram, the length of the supply route ranges between
500 meters and 2,000 meters (as suggested by Langenbach and Fischer (2008)).
While shorter supply routes decrease the travel distance of a supplied person,
longer maximal supply routes increase the total coverage.
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The results show that a short maximum supply route leads to a considerably
low coverage of 63%. The coverage increases by 12 percentage points when
the maximal length allowed is set to 750 meters. Within the dened value
range, the maximal total coverage is 88%.
As coverage is strongly inuenced by the supply route, a short supply route
reduces the chance that demand can be allocated to a facility within the
dened maximum length of the supply route. However, we can also see
that prolonging the supply route from 1,250 to 2,000 meters only gains 4%
additional coverage. Thus, the decision maker has to determine a reasonable
length for the supply routes.
Figure D.7: Achievable coverage dependent on the maximum length of the supply route.
Within this paper, the distance is determined by the linear distance between
two points and a tortuosity factor. Thus, the distance between supply and
demand is only an approximation. Determining the distance based on a
network length could increase the accuracy of the results.
D.6.2 Number of Water Treatment Systems to Ensure a
Specific Coverage
To increase the supply, it is possible to purchase additional purication sys-
tems at additional cost. Therefore, we analyzed the number of necessary
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systems to provide predened coverage with the help of a capacitated lo-
cation set covering problem (CLSCP). The optimal and capacitated version
of the prototypical LSCP is described by Church and Murray (2019). The
introduced notation is extended by the parameter ?4A)>C0;>E introduced in
Table D.2, which determines the percentage of the total water demand that
must be covered.
The CLSCP is locating the minimum number of facilities needed so that
the dened coverage can be reached (Church and Murray 2019). Thus, the
objective function 19 minimizes the number of placed facilities. Compared
to the prototypical formulation by Church and Murray (2019), total demand
must not be fully covered in our case since total coverage only has to be
higher than a predened percentage described by constraint 20. Therefore,
not every demand point must be covered within the service standard (21).
The other constraints are equal to the constraints formulated for the CMCLP.

















I8 9 ≤ 1, ∀8 ∈  , (21)
I8 9 ≥ ~8 9 ∗ 5 , ∀8 ∈  ,∀9 ∈ #8 , (22)∑
8∈ 9
08 ∗ I8 9 ≤ 2 9 ∗ G 9 , ∀9 ∈  , (23)∑
9 ∈
B 9F ≤ 2F, ∀F ∈,(, (24)∑
F∈,
B 9F ≤ 1, ∀9 ∈  , (25)
B 9F ≤ 0; 9F, ∀9 ∈  ,∀F ∈,(, (26)∑
F∈,(
B 9F ≥ G 9 , ∀9 ∈  , (27)
I8 9 ≤ G 9 , ∀8 ∈  ,∀9 ∈ #8 , (28)
~8 9 ≥ I8 9 , ∀8 ∈  ,∀9 ∈  , (29)
~8 9 ≤ I8 9 ∗",∀8 ∈  ,∀9 ∈  , (30)
G 9 ∈ {0, 1}, ∀9 ∈  , (31)
~8 9 ∈ {0, 1}, ∀8 ∈  ,∀9 ∈  , (32)
I8 9 ≥ 0, ∀9 ∈  . (33)
Since the introduced CLSCP determines the required number of water treat-
ment systems to reach a predened percentage of total coverage, the relation-
ship between both is analyzed. The nonlinear trade-o curve shows that there
is no feasible solution for full coverage while considering only the identied
locations to place the mobile treatment systems (Figure D.8).
The maximal possible coverage is 99% with 116 required water treatment
systems. The existing infrastructure of emergency water wells is covering
77% of the total demand. A high number of water treatment systems is needed
to yield a signicant increase in coverage.
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Figure D.8: Number of water treatment systems required to reach a targeted coverage.
In the case study, only 14 systems are available increasing the coverage to
84%. The purchase and deployment of additional water treatment systems for
the THW is therefore an option to increase the demand coverage. However,
a small number of additional systems would only lead to a small increase
of coverage. Moreover, the decision makers have to decide if an increase in
coverage is worth the associated costs or if the money could be spend more
ecient in other ways.
Reasons why full coverage cannot be achieved may result from data quality
and data preparation. Moreover, it is possible that individual persons cannot
be reached within the approved lengths for the supply route. This could
include, for example, the inhabitants of the islands in Lake Tegel, as they are
isolated.
Figure D.8 also indicates the importance of the existing emergency wells,
which can be accessed easily. Eliminating the capacities of the wells results
in a coverage of 7% deploying the currently available 14 water treatment
systems. The highest possible coverage without wells is 99%. 1,596 mobile
treatment systems with an average utilization rate of 7% are required.
This demonstrates the importance of the existing emergency water wells. Mo-
bile water treatment systems are not suitable to reach full coverage by them-
selves and the existing network of emergency wells should be extended.
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D.6.3 Relaxation of Constraints for the Prioritization of
Special Demand
The objective attainment degree allows a deviation from the optimal solution
to investigate the possible trade-o between coverage of special and regular
demand. This degree denes the minimum value of the optimal solution that
must be reached. The attainment degree of 100% yields an optimal coverage
for the special demand of 91%. For this solution, the regular demand covered
is 80% resulting in a total coverage of 81%. By lowering the attainment degree,
it is possible to cover more regular demand points (Figure D.9).
We see that the total coverage varies little within the analysis. The optimal
total coverage of 84% is reached with an attainment degree of 95%. With
this attainment degree, 87% of the special demand and 83% of the regular
demand is covered. The coverage of the regular demand is close to its possible
maximum of 86%.
The results show that the impact of the special demand on the total coverage
is smaller than the impact of the regular demand. This results from the
lower total demand at high care facilities, which account for 10% of the total
demand. The optimum coverage of the total demand decreases only slightly
when high care facilities are prioritized. The decision maker has to decide if
the prioritization is worth this dierence.
Figure D.9: Trade-o between coverage of high care facilities and coverage of regular residents.
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D.6.4 Trade-o Between Coverage and Costs
In the following Subsection, we analyze the trade-o between coverage and
costs. However, we want to point out that this does not hint that authorities
would not try to supply as many people as possible. A reduction of cost could
also mean that authorities make resources available for other measures that
support the population as well. For example, authorities could increase the
total supply to the population if a comparably small loss in coverage by the
treatment systems saves enough money to purchase a truck full of bottled
water. Even though it can be discussed that Berlin’s authorities could count on
more or less unlimited nancial support of the state in such a severe disaster,
this probably does not apply to some authorities in developing countries or
Non-Governmental-Organizations (NGOs) working on a budget.
The trade-o curve between optimum coverage and exible daily costs shows
that a deviation from the optimal coverage enables potential cost savings
(Figure D.10). The exible daily costs associated with the optimal coverage
are 128,800 e (14 mobile purication systems * 9,200 e per day).
The reduction of the attainment degree to 99% leads to cost savings of 9,200 e
while 83% of the total demand is covered. Further reduction of the attainment
degree leads to a linear decrease of the daily costs. This trend is interrupted
between the attainment degree of 95% and 94% before continuing linearly
after 94%. With the reduction of the attainment degree below 93% no water
treatment systems are placed, and water is only provided with the existing
emergency infrastructure.
In the linear parts of the trade-o curve, the decision maker has to decide
whether cost savings of 18,400 e are worth it to lose 522,414 liters of water,
which could supply more than 34,000 residents. The trade-o curve, there-
fore, provides the decision maker with a higher transparency regarding the
consequences of his or her decision. Consequently, he or she can derive more
ecient and well-informed decisions on the deployment of water treatment
systems, and use the available budget as ecient as possible.
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Figure D.10: Trade-o between cost and coverage displayed based on the attainment degree of
the solution for optimal coverage.
D.7 Conclusion and Research Outlook
The design of an emergency water distribution system represents a dicult
challenge for authorities. A variety of trade-os has to be regarded for an
ecient solution. To support public decision makers in this process, we
developed a capacitated maximal covering location model based on georef-
erenced data that maximizes the water demand covered, followed by a cost
minimization step.
We applied the approach to a case study in the city of Berlin, Germany.
Therefore, we extended the model with a multi-objective approach to regard
various trade-os. For example, we showed that a prioritization of special
demand suggests completely dierent locations for the mobile treatment
systems. Moreover, we increased cost transparency by the investigation of
the trade-o between cost and coverage. This enables the decision maker to
know the eective price (or opportunity cost respectively) of additional water
supply facilities in an emergency.
It can be concluded that the deployment of mobile water treatment systems
extending existing infrastructure increases the covered water demand and
the supply of suering people signicantly. Thereby, a high spatial density
of existing emergency infrastructure is the basis for a high coverage within
reasonable supply routes. In Berlin, this is demonstrated by a close network
of wells within the city center, already covering 77% of the total demand. The
deployment of additional 14 mobile water treatment systems increased the
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total demand covered by only seven percentage points to 84% of the total
demand. Furthermore, a supply based on mobile water treatment systems
alone resulted in a total coverage of 7%. Mobile systems are associated with
additional costs, leading to the key trade-o between coverage and costs.
However, the case study did not regard uncertainties like the functionality
of a well or the availability of treatment systems. Even though legal mainte-
nance procedures both on water treatment systems and emergency wells are
implemented, there is still a risk of water treatment system or well failure.
Therefore, the eects of possible malfunction could be analyzed a priori with
the help of a Monte Carlo Simulation or two-stage stochastic programming in
a follow-up study or could be covered posteriori by another model run with
respectively updated data. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect a signicant
time delay between the start of the crisis and the availability of all treatment
systems. Therefore, a stochastic or dynamic extension of the model could
provide valuable information.
Another extension could be to take the geographic distribution of stockpiled
water into consideration and locate the adjusted demand. One example could
be that people with larger apartments are more likely to store water at home
than people with small apartments (Bell and Hilber 2006). Integrating the
adjusted demand into the developed model consisting of wells and mobile
water treatment systems might further increase the applicability to the real
world. Furthermore, the adjusted demand might lead to higher coverage
rates.
In addition, most of the used data is publicly available. Therefore, the data
(and cost data in particular) could be further validated by experts and adjusted
to the way costs are invoiced or distributed in disaster management practice.
Requests to validate the cost estimations led to the surprising situation that
dierent organizations and authorities could not provide us with real data,
but instead, reciprocally referred to each other. This hints towards a general
cost-transparency problem, which could be addressed in future studies.
In spite of the aforementioned challenges, the approach has the potential to
signicantly increase the transparency of decisions for decision makers and
therefore improve the eciency of disaster relief management.
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In cases where the private sector struggles to cope with the impact of a disas-
ter, authorities try to reduce the burden on the population and set up supply
chains to distribute essential goods. Therefore, they estimate demand and
location of the aected people and open points of distribution to supply goods
from, e.g. public buildings or sports facilities. However, the location of these
points of distribution depends heavily on accurate demand estimations. Com-
bined with a high time pressure that prevents the collection of detailed data,
inecient decisions result. However, these decisions improve signicantly if
private actors share their market knowledge. Since this information is strictly
condential for companies and at the same time requires a lot of coordination
eort from public actors to acquire, the quantication of the benets of the
collaboration is important for both sides. Moreover, the time at which the
information is received and the way the information is utilized regarding
dierent intervention intensities is supposed to be crucial. Therefore, we
develop a framework to quantify the consequences of shared information for
both actors and apply it to a case study for a tap water contamination in the
city of Berlin. We highlight that both actors benet from the collaboration
1 This chapter includes the preprint of the article "On the Value of Accurate Demand Informa-
tion in Public-Private Emergency Collaborations" by Miriam Klein, Marcus Wiens, Markus
Lüttenberg, Frank Schultmann, and myself (Diehlmann, Klein, et al. 2020).
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and that the time the information is received has a comparably low eect
on the total supply. Moreover, we show that private actors can reduce the
impact of market interventions on their processes signicantly by actively
collaborating with authorities.
E.1 Introduction and Motivation
While private actors manage the distribution of goods in peacetime, public
authorities are responsible for guaranteeing sucient supply to the population
in times of crisis. Therefore, they need to establish new supply chains in
a complex and uncertain environment (Holguín-Veras, Jaller, et al. 2012).
However, critical decisions taken in disastrous situations are urgent, and
information can therefore not be acquired in the level of detail that is required
to understand the situation thoroughly (Gralla, Goentzel, and Fine 2016). The
required information comprises both the supply side (production capacity,
market quantities) as well as the demand side (location and demographic
characteristics of people in need).
In contrast to private actors who manage to build a deeper understanding of
the market every day, public actors usually only possess general market data
about the rms’ capacities or production quantities. For instance, German
authorities conduct a survey that tracks the produced amounts of "fats, cereal,
starch, feedstus, milk, and sugar industries" on a regular basis (Federal
Oce for Agriculture and Food Germany 2019). However, it remains unclear
if and how this static and production focused data can prove itself valuable
in disaster relief. Furthermore, the German government installed an interface
where pharmacies can report bottlenecks in critical supplies (BfArM 2020).
Even though this approach seems promising to reduce the response time to
crises in the medical sector, a holistic approach to information acquisition
seems more powerful.
To tackle this issue, the US Federal Emergency Management Agency is run-
ning a pilot study to test the value of near-real-time data in disaster relief,
proactively by purchasing access to market data for 3.6 million USD for one
year (Federaltimes 2019).
A less costly approach to receive information in crises could be by collabora-
tion. The importance of collaboration in disaster logistics has been widely
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acknowledged and dierent aspects of collaboration have been discussed
(see for instance Rodríguez-Espíndola, Albores, and Brewster (2018a) and
Waugh Jr. and Streib (2006)). However, market information represents a piv-
otal asset to companies and have therefore been highlighted as one of the key
challenges for eective collaboration (Nurmala, Leeuw, and Dullaert 2017).
Therefore, it remains questionable if private actors are willing to share their
knowledge. Consequently, public actors need to both understand the value
of the information and the implications of their decision under the dierent
levels of information accuracy. However, to the best of our knowledge, no
approach exists that quanties the value of possessing more accurate infor-
mation in Public-Private Emergency Collaborations (PPECs). Therefore, we
propose a framework to quantify this value of information and analyze how
this value is aected by the point of time and the intensity of the state’s
intervention.
Our paper is structured as follows. First, we provide an overview of related
literature in the next Chapter. Afterward, we present the framework and
discuss the dierent components in Chapter E.3. Following, we highlight the
power of the framework by applying it to a case study, in which German
authorities need to open up Points of Distribution in the aftermath of a tap
water system contamination. We conclude with a discussion of the strengths
and weaknesses of our approach and highlight potential directions for further
research.
E.2 Literature Review
This Section embeds our approach within the current body of literature. We
focus on the following three aspects of disaster management: collaboration,
facility location models, and information management.
E.2.1 Collaboration in Disasters
Various actors become active in the aftermath of a disaster. For example,
Kovács and Spens (2007) name Government, Military, Logistics providers,
Donors, Aid agencies, and other NGOs as key actors and highlight the im-
portance of eective collaboration. Various factors might aect the coordina-
tion of these actors signicantly (Balcik, Beamon, et al. 2010): the number
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and diversity of actors, donor expectations and funding structure, compe-
tition for funding and the eects of the media, unpredictability, resource
scarcity/oversupply, and cost of coordination. Consequently, a variety of
articles suggest approaches to mitigate some of these obstacles (Davis et
al. 2013; Dubey et al. 2019; Heaslip, Sharif, and Althonayan 2012; Nagur-
ney, Salarpour, and Daniele 2019; Rodon, Maria Serrano, and Giménez 2012;
Rodríguez-Espíndola, Albores, and Brewster 2018b; Toyasaki et al. 2017).
Most of the studies discussed above involve some sort of collaboration that
includes humanitarian organizations. On the other hand, the collaboration
between public and private actors is especially critical for ecient disaster
management (Cozzolino 2012). While private organizations are responsible
for the distribution of goods in peacetime, public actors become responsible
in times of crisis. Hence, ecient collaboration between these two actors can
have a signicant impact on ecient relief management.
A growing body of literature is actively discussing various aspects of these
so-called Public-Private Emergency Collaborations ("PPECs"; Wiens et al.
(2018)). For instance, Holguín-Veras, Pérez, et al. (2013) discuss dierent
objectives of both actors and argue for extending cost-based objectives with
a cost-proxy for human suering. Since commercial actors are prot-driven,
eective mechanisms are required to oer the chance to collaborate success-
fully (Carland, Goentzel, and Montibeller 2018). Furthermore, Gabler, Richey,
and Stewart (2017) mention two additional barriers for PPECs: internalization
and unidirectional communication. In the context of our study, unidirectional
communication is especially important since it is supposed to inhibit the
willingness to share information (Gabler, Richey, and Stewart 2017).
However, to the best of our knowledge, no study exists that quantitatively
measures the eects of collaboration for both actors under combined opera-
tional and informational strategies.
E.2.2 Allocation and Facility Location Problems in Disasters
Researchers developed a variety of approaches to locate facilities in disasters
or to allocate inventory or parts of the population to these facilities. For a
recent and sophisticated review, see Sabbaghtorkan, Batta, and He (2020)
who analyzed location, allocation, and location-allocation papers with a focus
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on the prepositioning of facilities and the allocation of inventory to these
facilities in anticipation of a disaster.
Additional approaches focus on the disaster relief phase, which starts right
after the impact of the disaster (Kovács and Spens 2007). Baharmand, Comes,
and Lauras (2019) developed a bi-objective and multi-commodity location-
allocation model that minimizes logistics cost and response time. Zhao et
al. (2017) developed a model that minimizes opening cost and walking dis-
tance for beneciaries dependent on the forecasted shelter demand. Görmez,
Köksalan, and Salman (2011) identied shelter locations in response to an
earthquake in Istanbul. None of these contributions explicitly consider strate-
gies of information acquisition and information sharing.
Furthermore, it has to be mentioned that some covering models consider
uncertainties in input values. For instance, Arana-Jiménez, Blanco, and Fer-
nández (2020) dealt with knowledge uncertainties through fuzzy techniques,
and Li, Ramshani, and Huang (2018) developed a stochastic cooperative maxi-
mum covering approach that analyzes the situation of NGOs utilizing free
capacities of other NGOs’ warehouses. Even though they regard dierent de-
mand levels, they generalize the demand and do not regard dierent demand
intensities for dierent regions simultaneously.
However, to the best of our knowledge, no study exists in which dierent in-
formation levels and the implications of alternative decisions are compared.
E.2.3 Uncertain Information in Disaster
Disasters are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. Therefore, a
variety of studies exist that deal with dierent aspects of uncertainty, such as
for example infrastructure status (Yagci Sokat, Dolinskaya, et al. 2018), travel
time (Balcik and Yanıkoğlu 2020), sta availability and customer behavior
(Schätter et al. 2019), or demand and supply (Bozorgi-Amiri, Jabalameli, and
Mirzapour Al-e-Hashem 2013).
Our study builds upon literature regarding demand information and the
exchange of information.
Even though humanitarian organizations are experts in disaster management
and adapt their whole supply chain towards these uncertainties (see for
instance van der Laan et al. (2016), who discuss the forecasting methods
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at Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)), their supply chains are designed to
be exible towards a variety of potential disasters on a global level. Even
though this increasingly leads to decentralized and more regional supply chain
structures (Charles et al. 2016), the determination of concrete demand of the
population after an unexpected disaster occurred still requires a signicant
amount of time. Therefore, humanitarian organizations use standardized
guidelines like the Sphere-Handbook to dene critical goods and their related
demand per person in disaster settings (Sphere 2018) and determine the
required amount of goods directly after the disaster stroke (for instance via a
rapid needs assessments, which is supposed to take up to seven days (IFRC
2020)).
To speed up the time it takes to determine demand, some researchers tried to
dene criteria to quickly identify areas in which potentially vulnerable parts
of the population live (Kapucu 2008; Kawashima, Morita, and Higuchi 2012;
Sandholz 2019). For instance, Sandholz (2019) surveyed the population of
the German city of Cologne and identied that the likelihood of a person to
possess specic emergency goods like ashlight, matches, radio, and others
increases with the duration a person lives in this apartment. In spite of the
power of this information, a high dependency on the availability of such data
results.
In contrast to public actors or relief organizations, commercial business-to-
customer (B2C) business units are interacting directly with their customers
on an everyday basis. Therefore, they are used to dealing with demand uc-
tuations in response to unexpected incidents in the context of their Business-
Continuity-Management (BCM) and have therefore a good understanding of
the population’s potential reaction to the disaster (Schätter et al. 2019). Con-
sequently, other actors in disaster relief would benet from this information
signicantly.
Even though information exchange in disasters is widely understood as a
crucial aspect of disaster management (Celik and Corbacioglu 2010), many
impeding factors exist. Day, Junglas, and Silva (2009) conducted interviews
with relief logisticians active during Hurricane Katrina and identied eight
impediments on information ows: inaccessibility, incompatible formats,
inadequate ow of information, low information priority, source information,
storage, medium-activity misalignment, and unwillingness. Moreover, Al-
tay and Labonte (2014) analyzed challenges for information ows (extracted
from "27 evaluations, lessons learnt reports, and mission reports") from the
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Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitar-
ian Action. They highlighted that factors such as information quality and
willingness to share information are especially important and argue that this
could be improved by installing the Global Logistics Cluster as coordinator of
the exchange of information. This could be combined with an approach from
Sheu (2010) who developed an entropy-based fusion approach that generates
information estimations based on multiple sources and their related belief
strengths.
In spite of the possibilities to verify the quality of the information and to
ensure that the information reaches the right decision maker faster, it remains
questionable if private actors are willing to share their information with the
whole cluster rather than in an exclusive and bilateral public-private setting.
Moreover, sharing information is not necessarily every actor’s objective. For
instance, after the Haiti earthquake 2010, "some organisations simply did not
feel the need to coordinate or share information, especially those with their
own unrestricted funding." (Altay and Labonte 2014).
Furthermore, the consequences of information exchange can be crucial for
both actors - especially for private actors that are, in the long run, dependent
on monetizing their knowledge. Before private actors agree on exchanging
information, they therefore need to understand the consequences. At the
same time, public actors need to understand the value of the information in
case they consider purchasing or seizing critical information. However, to
the best of our knowledge, no approach exists that quanties the value of the
information and puts it in perspective with the consequences of sharing the
information for both actors. In the next Section, we describe the framework
we developed to ll this gap.
E.3 Model Framework
E.3.1 Problem Statement
We take the perspective of public authorities, which aim to supply the popu-
lation of a city or an urban district with essential goods (e.g. water) during
a crisis. Therefore, they need to decide which Points of Distribution (PoDs)
they should open to supply goods to the population. However, they do not
possess detailed information about the distribution of the total demand within
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the area. This demand depends on the goods people stockpiled at home. On
the other hand, private actors possess this knowledge since they interact
with their customers every day, e.g. by analysing Point of Sales data, and can
therefore extract information regarding the purchasing behavior and goods
people store at home. An example could be a district in which many diabetic
people live, resulting in an increased number of diabetic-friendly products in
stores.
Before authorities start to contact private actors and ask them to share the
information, they need to determine the value of the information to decide for
measures to take (extreme measures such as seizure can only be considered in
case obtaining the information makes an extremely signicant dierence).
E.3.2 Framework to Quantify the Value of Information
The following framework describes the problem mentioned above and an
approach to quantify the value of the information (see Figure E.1). Three
steps are required to determine the value of information.
First, we analyze the Scenario, in which the decision-maker possesses no
accurate demand information. Therefore, the demand of the population is
assumed to be equally distributed ("ED"-Scenario; grey boxes in Figure E.1 and
aggregated to Demand Points (DPs)). In the next step, we allocate these DPs
to supermarkets, so that the utilization of the capacities of the supermarket
is as high as possible. Moreover, a maximum walking distance is regarded.
If the crisis is severe, the state - or in extreme cases NGOs - becomes active
and open up PoDs to support the population that is not supplied by the
supermarkets (Wiens et al. 2018). These PoDs can, for instance, be public
buildings, churches, or stadiums (DHS 2006; PAHO 2009; U.S. Department of
Agriculture 2017).
Second, we analyze the outcome, if the authorities had more accurate infor-
mation with the same procedure as mentioned above. The chosen PoDs dier
signicantly from the opened PoDs selected with more accurate information
(see "I"-Scenario; green boxes in Figure E.1).
Third, the quantication of the value of information follows. This requires
an additional Scenario, the "Combined Outcome" or CO-Scenario (see "CO"-
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PoDs chosen with theoretical, inaccurate demand information and the "real-
world" DPs. It therefore represents the outcome of the plan in reality. Hence,
the dierence between CO and ED quanties the planning error, while the
dierence between I and CO represents the value of the information.
In the following Subsections, we provide a brief overview of the main com-
ponents of the framework, while the case study discussed in Chapter E.4
highlights the power of the approach in practice. Moreover, potential ex-
tensions of the framework, e.g. regarding dierent time of interventions or
dierent intervention intensities are discussed in Chapter E.5.
E.3.3 Definition of Demand Points
DPs consist of two components - the location and the demand of a required
good (or a combination of goods) at time C .
• The location of the DPs depends on the level of aggregation. While
the highest level of detail results from a per capita analysis,
aggregations on a house, block, or district level might be more feasible
in terms of computation power and available data.
• The demand for a good depends on various factors such as the
disaster context, individual preferences, or the physical constitution of
the population. While certain minimum standards in disaster
situations exist (see for instance Sphere (2018)), an assessment of the
needs of the population is central.
E.3.4 Allocation of DPs to Supermarkets
The concrete formulation of the allocation model depends on the context
of the disaster and many realizations are possible. An example of objective
functions could be the minimization of PoDs required to oer a target service
level (Charles et al. 2016), the minimization of total cost (Lin et al. 2012), or a
multi-objective approach (Baharmand, Comes, and Lauras 2019). Dependent
on the quality of the available data and the specic context of the model,
specications such as customers’ supermarket chain preferences could also
be included.
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E.3.5 Facility Location Model
Similar to the allocation model mentioned above, the Facility Location Model
(FLM) needs to be tailored to the disaster context. Since public actors are
not prot-driven, the objective functions could for instance entail the mini-
mization of the total walking distance between DPs and a number of PoDs
(Görmez, Köksalan, and Salman 2011), the maximization of supply to the
population (Balcik and Beamon 2008), or the minimization of social costs
(Loree and Aros-Vera 2018). Furthermore, aspects such as dierences in the
suitability of a building to become a PoD, or specic types of buildings could
be considered (PAHO 2009).
E.4 Case Study: Tap Water Contamination in Berlin
The case study was inspired by the water contamination from the city of Hei-
delberg, Germany, where the drinking water was contaminated on February
7th, 2019, for a couple of hours (Heidelberg24 2019).
We assume that the tap water system in the city of Berlin is contaminated.
Even though it is still usable to ush, wash clothes, or to shower, it is not
drinkable anymore. Moreover, it is known that the tap water will be drinkable
again after one day, reducing the level of panic within the population. Due to
the crisis, the demand for bottled waters increases signicantly and companies
try to cope with the sudden increase. To reduce complexity, we only focus
on drinking water. Indirectly induced demands for products such as food or
soap will not be regarded.
Public authorities realize that the supermarkets are not able to supply enough
water to the population. Therefore, they decide to open PoDs. Due to a
contract with a logistics service provider, transportation of water to these fa-
cilities is secured and does not need to be regarded in the model. Furthermore,
we assume that only public schools are considered as locations for PoDs and
that these schools are all equally suitable as a PoD.
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E.4.1 Definition of Demand Points
As mentioned above, two key characteristics dene DPs: the location and the
demand.
E.4.1.1 Location of DPs
An aggregation level of an "on a house basis" oers a high resolution. Data
acquired from the city of Berlin (Berlin 2019a)2 is the basis for the location
of the 387, 083 buildings. However, not all of these buildings are inhabited.
Since the city of Berlin provides information on the population density on a
"per block" base (Berlin 2019b), we only select the buildings that lie within
one of those dened blocks, reducing the numbers of buildings in the scope
of our analysis to 372, 629 (see also Figure E.2). Following, the inhabitants per
block are evenly distributed over the buildings that are located within this
block. The number of people per house results. The way the demand for each
house is determined will be described in Subsection E.4.1.2 below. However,
due to the extremely high computational eort that comes with the allocation
of 372, 629 buildings, the sum of the demand of the houses within one block
is aggregated back on a block base to reduce computational complexity. A
total of 14, 759 DPs results.
E.4.1.2 Demand Estimation
According to the Sphere handbook, 15 liters of water per person and day are
sucient for short periods of time (Sphere 2018). Moreover, the authors of
the handbook consider 2.5 − 3 liters of water per day as an adequate amount
for "drinking and food" (Sphere 2018). Therefore, we regard demand of 3 liters
per day and person.
We dene the two dierent scenarios for the demand based on the respective
actor: While private actors can predict the demand due to their experience
with demand uctuations (accurate information), public actors cannot estimate
the demand as accurately, especially under high time pressure. Therefore, they
can only relate on immediately available data (e.g. census data; inaccurate
2 Data licence Germany – attribution – Version 2.0
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information) or wait until the situation becomes more clear (for example,
Comes, van de Walle, and van Wassenhove (2020) states that the Philippine
army was unaware of the concrete impact of Typhoon Haiyan until it was
covered by international media).
Since private actors’ success depends heavily on their market knowledge,
this information is not publicly available, and we need to determine an ap-
proximation for our case study with the help of proxy data. Even though this
data is free to access, the data analysis and manipulation process is extremely
time consuming and cannot be done eciently by authorities right after the
disaster occurred.
We base our estimation on the assumption that, due to the short time of the
crisis, only the part of the population, which did not store bottled water at
home, requires water. Following, the demand per person we regard in the
case study results from the required amount of water (3 liters) reduced by the
stockpiled amount.3
According to a recent study by Sandholz (2019), where the authors conducted
a representative survey of the stockpiling of 1,109 households in a major
German city, 66.8% of the population stockpiles water for more than ve days.
Therefore, the stockpiling amount of 33.2 % of the population is 0.
In the case of inaccurate information, we assume that authorities only know
the number of people living at each DP and the average amount of water
stockpiled per person. Consequently, the demand for each person is reduced
by 66.8% for the ED-Scenario, while the demand in the I-Scenario is 0 liters
for 66.8% and 3 liters for 33.2% of the population.
Regarding the approximation for the accurate demand information, we regard
three indicators for the number of goods stockpiled at home: the available
space in the apartment (Bell and Hilber 2006), the nancial or social status of
the person (Havranek, Irsova, and Vlach 2017), or the distance to the closest
supermarkets (Jiao, Vernez Moudon, and Drewnowski 2016). Even though
we acknowledge that multiple additional indicators inuence the stockpiling,
we only regard these three characteristics for each house for the sake of
simplicity. After all, the objective of this study is not to provide an improved
3 Even though a person that stockpiles a limited amount of water could still try to buy additional
water, we do not regard this "exceeding" demand further.
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estimation of stockpiling behavior but to show how information sharing can
improve decisions.
To determine the stockpiling, we rank the DPs in terms of these indicators and
sum up the individual ranks to attain a merged rank.4 Finally, the best ranked
66.8% of the population is regarded with a demand of 0 liters. Furthermore,
the demand for each DP (each block) results from the aggregation of each
building within this block.
Size of the apartment
We use the population density per block as a proxy for the size of the apart-
ment (see also Figure E.2). Each building receives the density value of the
block it is located in.
Figure E.2: Extract from map of Berlin
with the population density highlighted on
a per block basis [in ppl per hectar] (Berlin
2019b)
Figure E.3: Map of Berlin with 447 PRs and
their social status index (Berlin 2019c).
Financial situation
We estimate the nancial situation with the help of the local "Status Index"
(SI), which is based on the current and long term unemployment rates, the
child poverty rate, and the "proportion of not-unemployed recipients of trans-
fer payments" (SSW 2019a). The SI is dened on the level of the so-called
4 In case of equal values, each of the related buildings receives the highest value.
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"Planungsräume" (PRs, see also Figure E.3) - 447 geographically dened areas
dividing Berlin into segments of similar social and demographic characteris-
tics (SSW 2019b).5 Consequently, we allocate the SI of the related PR to each
building.
Distance to supermarkets
The average distance between each building and the ve closest supermarkets
was calculated with ArcGIS Desktop 10.6.1. and represents the distance to
the supermarkets. Afterward, the buildings were ranked accordingly.
Determination of stockpiled amount
As mentioned above, the individual ranks for each building were summed
up to determine an overall ranking. We combine these overall ranks with
stockpiling data obtained from Sandholz (2019) to determine the demand per
DP. The allocation of DPs to supermarkets follows.
E.4.2 Supermarket Allocation
The model for allocating the DPs to supermarkets is a maximum covering
model (Farahani et al. 2012). With the binary decision variable G8 9 (indicating
if % 8 is allocated to supermarket 9 ), a demand of 18 per DP, a supply of
0 9 per supermarket, a distance 38 9 between %8 and supermarket 9 , and a
maximum walking distance of A , we dene the model as follows:
5 Since January 1st, 2019, the city of Berlin slightly changed the structure and now denes 448
PRs. As the statistical data available refers to 447 PRs, we will keep using the "old" classication
of the PRs without the minor adaptions.
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G8 9 ∗ 18 ≤ 0 9 ∀9 ∈  (E.2)
G8 9 ∗ 38 9 ≤ A ∀8 ∈  , ∀9 ∈  (E.3)∑
9 ∈
G8 9 ≤ 1 ∀8 ∈  (E.4)
G8 9 ∈ {0; 1} ∀8 ∈  , ∀9 ∈  (E.5)
While Eq.(E.1) denes the objective to maximize the allocated amount of
water from all supermarkets 9 to all DPs i, Eq.(E.2) ensures that the capacity
limit of each supermarket is not exceeded. To compute our calculations, we
use supermarket data obtained from the Berlin Senate Department for Urban
Development and Housing (BSDUP 2016). Since this data only contained
GIS coded data about 1062 supermarket locations and the corresponding size
of the sales area, we needed to determine the capacity per supermarket by
approximation: we broke down the amount of bottled water sold in Germany
per year (VDM 2019) on a per-day and capita base and multiplied it with
Berlin’s population to calculate the daily sales of bottled water in Berlin (in
our case: 1.77 million liters per day). Following, we divided this number by
the total sales area to determine the water capacity per<2 of sales area (in
our case: 1.63 liters per<2). The capacity per supermarket follows by the
multiplication with the size of the corresponding sales area.
Eq.(E.3) ensures that a DP is only assigned to a supermarket (G8 9 = 1) if the
geodesic distance between DP and supermarket is within walking distance
of the DP. In the context of our case study, we follow the German Federal
Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety and
dene the maximum walking distance as 1,000 meters (BMUB 2014). Moreover,
Eq.(E.4) ensures that no DP is allocated to more than one supermarket to
reduce the complexity to collect the goods for the population. Finally, Eq.(E.5)
denes G8 9 as a binary variable.
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E.4.3 Location Selection for PoDs
The remaining demand after the allocation to the supermarkets is considered
as the input-demand for the PoD location selection. We assume that the
authorities are only able to open a limited amount of schools as PoDs and that
each of these PoDs has a capacity of 60,000 liters per day (roughly ve trucks
with a load of 12 tons). This capacity would furthermore be in line with the
recommendations of the World Food Programme, who recommend limiting
the number of people per distribution site to 20,000 (WFP 2002). Regarding
potential schools to open, we use data received from the Berlin Senate De-
partment for Education, Youth and Sport (BSDEYS 2019) that included GIS
data for all public schools in Berlin. After data editing and preparation, the
pool of potential PoD locations included 631 schools.
The following model decides, which of the schools : should be opened as
PoD (~: = 1), and which DP is allocated to which school (G8: = 1) if a total










G8: ∗ 18 ≤ 0: ∀: ∈  (E.7)
G8: ∗ 38: ≤ A ∀8 ∈  , ∀: ∈  (E.8)∑
:∈ 
G8: ≤ 1 ∀8 ∈  (E.9)
G8: ≤ ~: ∀8 ∈  , ∀: ∈  (E.10)∑
:∈ 
~: ≤ ! (E.11)
G8: , ~: ∈ {0; 1} ∀8 ∈  , ∀: ∈  (E.12)
Note that, even though  refers to the same set of DPs, the demand of the DPs
of the second model diers (whenever a DP G was allocated to a supermarket
within the supermarket allocation model, the demand of this DP G in the
school allocation model is 0). Eq.(E.6-E.9) are equivalent to the supermarket
allocation model mentioned above, with the objective of maximizing the
allocation to the population. Eq.(E.10) ensures that an allocation is only
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possible, if a school : is open. Eq.(E.11) accounts for the maximum number of
schools to open (!), while Eq.(E.12) denes ~: and G8: as a binary variable.
E.5 Results
E.5.1 Demand Points
The calculation of ranks and the allocation of demand to the DPs was con-
ducted using Microsoft Excel (16.0.4849.100 64-bit) and ESRI ArcGIS Desktop
10.6.1. A total demand for 3,720,554 liters results. Since the information about
potentially vulnerable blocks is very sensitive, we avoid highlighting the
assessment on a per-block base and aggregate the demand for each DP on
the level of the PR (see Figure E.4 and E.5).
Figure E.4: Visualization of the demand
per PR assuming evenly distributed stock-
piling estimation [in l per PR].
Figure E.5: Visualization of the demand
per PR highlighting the accurate demand
stockpiling estimation [in l per PR].
Therefore, accurate information helps to identify potentially critical regions
since the demand in dierent regions of Berlin varies stronger than in the
case of equal distribution. Following, it is possible to prioritize regions more
eciently.
E.5.2 Allocation to Supermarkets
The model to allocate DPs to supermarkets was implemented in GAMS and
solved using the CPLEX Solver (on an Intel Xeon CPU E7-4850, 2.00 GHz,
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256 GB RAM). It took approximately 45 minutes to solve the problem with a
relative MIP-gap of 0.5%, resulting in a total supply from the supermarkets of
1,734,812 liters and capacity utilization of 98%. Consequently, the exceeding
demand results in 1,985,742 liters.
E.5.3 Location Selection for PoDs
Regarding the number of PoDs to open, we distinguish between two cases - 10
schools and 33 schools. Thirty-three schools were chosen since this number
ensures that the capacity of supermarkets and schools matches the demand.
On the other hand, the signicant operational eort required to open 33 PoDs
cannot be neglected. Therefore, we also regard 10 PoDs as a more feasible
number of schools to open. This number is further supported by the blackout
in Berlin Koepenick in February 2019, in which ve schools were opened
(RBB 2019). Since Koepenick only represents a small part of Berlin, a safety
cushion of 100% was chosen.
The PoD location model was implemented in GAMS and solved using the
CPLEX Solver (on an Intel Xeon CPU E7-4850, 2.00 GHz, 256 GB RAM). It took
on average 9 minutes to solve the problem with a relative MIP-gap of 0.5%,
resulting in a total supply of 416,321 liters from 10 schools and 947,518 from
33 schools. Therefore, public authorities are able to estimate that opening ten
schools lead to a total supply of 2,151,133 liters of water (equivalent to 58% of
the total demand of the population), while 2,682,330 liters could be distributed
with 33 schools (equivalent to 72% of the total demand). Therefore, it can be
followed that 28% of the capacities are unused due to the distance restriction
if 33 schools are considered.
E.5.4 Quantification of the Planning Error
As discussed in Chapter E.3, the planning error results from the dierence of
the CO- and the ED-Scenario. Furthermore, the CO is determined by an addi-
tional run of the location selection model with the additional restriction:
~ 9 = 1 ∀ 9 ∈ {Locations selected in ED-Scenario} (E.13)
It follows that the results planned do not reect potential outcomes since the
chosen locations only lead to a supply of 120,586 liters from 10 schools and
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396,843 liters from 33 schools. Consequently, authorities would overestimate
the outcome of their intervention by up to 71%. This can have severe conse-
quences. If, for instance, a mayor of a city planned to supply goods for 10,000
people, aid would, in fact, only reach less than 3,000 people. This eect is
furthermore underlined by the fact that only 23 of 33 open schools actually
distribute goods, while 10 are left with all of their goods and nobody around
to pick them up.
E.5.5 Quantification of the Value of Information
The value of information results from the comparison of the I-Scenario and
the CO-Scenario described in Section E.5.4 above. If the state possessed
all information before making its decision, the supply to the population
would result in 496,608 liters from 10 schools and 1,092,457 liters from 33
schools. Therefore, public actors benet signicantly from the exchange of
information, leading to an increase in supplies of up to 412%.
Figures E.6 - E.8 furthermore highlight the results, presenting the 33 locations
chosen for the ED-, the CO-, and the I-Scenario. It follows that authorities
would rather open schools in the center of Berlin, even though schools more
towards the outskirts of the city are better if the real demand is considered.
Figure E.6: 33
schools opened in the
ED-Scenario.
Figure E.7: 33
schools opened in the
CO-Scenario.
Figure E.8: 33
schools opened in the
I-Scenario.
E.6 Discussion and Further Analysis
The presented framework allows for a precise determination of the planning
error and the value of information. Therefore, it provides crucial insights
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for decision-makers in disaster management. They can, for example, use the
planning error from this study as an outcome estimation indicator in cases
of high uncertainty. Furthermore, it highlights the impact of an increase in
information accuracy and provides an understanding of how much the quality
of disaster relief can be improved by higher information quality. However, it
remains questionable if private actors are willing to share information.
Moreover, the exchange of information is challenging, even if a company
is willing to collaborate. For example, agreeing on appropriate data-types,
interfaces for the data-exchange, or update-cycles can - together with the time
it takes to nd a partner to collaborate - take a long time. Therefore, relief
can signicantly speed up if public and private actors agree on the specic
collaboration parameters before the crisis. Moreover, PoDs chosen in the
model can be regarded as designated disaster sites in disasters, reducing the
communicational and planning eort in the direct aftermath of the disaster
drastically (similar to Dekle et al. (2005) who identied designated relief sites
in the US).
To gain a better understanding of the importance of time, we compare the
decision in the case study above with an alternative, accelerated decision
where schools open up at the same time as the supermarkets. Therefore,
beneciaries have more opportunities to receive goods while supermarkets
might sell less.
E.6.1 A Comparison of Dierent Times to Start the
Intervention
While market interference was implicitly excluded due to the dime lag be-
tween the start of the crisis and the start of public actors’ intervention, it
is also possible to analyze the consequences of an earlier intervention of
public actors. Earlier intervention in this context refers to opening the PoDs
at the same time as the supermarkets open (see Table E.1). Hence, parts of
the population that were expected to go to supermarkets in the Scenario
above could go to schools. Therefore, earlier intervention leads to market
interference.
This Subscenario "B" is calculated similarly to the CO-Scenario described in
Section E.5.4: after the selection of PoDs to open, an additional run of the
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supermarket allocation model follows, in which the opened PoDs are included
as additional distribution points.
Subscenario B leads to an increase in total supply (see Table E.2). While total
deliveries increase in each Scenario analyzed, the overall eects are rather
small, ranging from a 2% increase in the I-Scenario for 10 schools up to an
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Public actors wait until
supermarkets run out
of capacity before they
receive the information




the demand that will be
left when the
supermarkets run out of
goods and choose the
best locations to fulll
this demand. Each
person can either go to
one of the supermarkets
or one of the PoDs that
are open.
Public actors choose
PoDs so that the total
demand can be supplied
best. There, PoDs are in
direct competition to
supermarkets for the
demand that could have
been met without public
intervention.
Table E.1: Overview of the dierent Subscenarios.
The implications of public interventions on private supply chains cannot be ne-
glected and should be considered carefully before intervening. In Subscenario
B, public actors implicitly tried to reduce the impact of their interventions
by only focusing on the demand that cannot be supplied for by the market.
However, public actors could also try a more holistic approach and consider
the total demand. Hence, the impact on supermarkets is expected to be more
signicant. In the following Subsection, we analyze this Subscenario C.
E.6.2 A Comparison of Dierent Intervention Intensities
In the context of this case study, we dene the dierence in intervention
intensity by the demand regarded in the public actors’ optimization model
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(see also Table E.1). In the case of a less severe intervention (Subscenario
B), authorities only consider the demand that would not be fullled by the
supermarkets if the supermarkets were to distribute goods by themselves. In
the case of a stronger market intervention (Subscenario C), public authorities
consider the total demand of the population. Consequently, Subscenario C
can be interpreted as the population’s favorite Subscenario since the best
possible supply results, in which the allocation to supermarkets and the
facility decision for schools occurs at the same time.
From a mathematical perspective, we implemented this Subscenario as an
extended location selection model with " = I ∪ J. Furthermore, we set
~< = 1∀< ∈ I. Consequently, the constraint that controls the number of
opened PoD (Eq. (E.11)) is adapted to include the 1,062 additionally opened
PoDs: ∑
<∈"
~< ≤ ! + 1, 062 (E.14)
Subscenario C leads to a better supply to the population than the baseline (A)
and the less severe intervention (B, see Table E.2).6
However, the proportion of the supply that is taken care of by the private
sector remarkably deviates from the intuitively expected outcome since su-
permarkets lose, on average, a higher share of sales in the case of weak
intervention than in the case of strong intervention. A reason for this is the
increased exibility of public actors regarding potential beneciaries and
the implicit division of the population between the two actors that results
from the holistic optimization approach. Consequently, supermarkets have
an incentive to collaborate closely with public actors in case they expect any
kind of intervention. However, it is not possible to eliminate crowding-out
eects if public and private actors are active at the same time.
6 It has to be mentioned that due to the increased complexity of the problem, we had to increase
the allowed relative MIP-gap to 3%.
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E.6.3 Eects of Dierent Subscenarios on Supermarket
Chains
Since it is not possible to eliminate crowding-out eects, we further analyze
the consequences of the dierent intervention strategies on supermarket
chains. Therefore, we aggregate the supply from the individual supermarkets
on a "per-corporate-group" level. In line with Kaufda (2019), we consider the
following groups: Aldi, Edeka, Metro, Norma, Rewe, Schwarz, and "others".
Figure E.9 highlights the distribution per chain in the dierent Subscenar-
ios.7 For example, group 7 is highly aected by Subscenario B_CO_33, while
the sales of group 3 change signicantly less due to the intervention. Con-
sequently, crowding-out aects dierent chains with dierent intensities.
Therefore, public actors need to be very careful to make sure that they do not
"pick winners" and have signicant long term consequences on the competi-
tion in the market.
Figure E.9: Overview of the lost sales per group compared to no intervention (A).
7 Due to reasons of condentiality, we do not link the names of the groups to the data and
generalize them as group 1-7.
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E.7 Conclusion
Public actors strategies strongly depend on accurate demand information
during crisis intervention. Within the realm of our case study, inaccurate
information can result in planning errors of up to 71%. At the same time, the
impact of the intervention can increase by up to 412%, if decision-makers
receive accurate information. Moreover, the earlier public actors become
active also has a positive eect, even though this eect is comparably small.
Furthermore, we were able to show that severe market intervention results
in better exploitation of supermarkets than a less severe market intervention.
Consequently, private actors should seek for collaboration in cases they are
afraid that public actors would become active individually otherwise.
However, additional research is necessary to gain a deeper understanding of
the crisis mechanisms. First, we did not consider the legal implications of the
dierent Scenarios. We were able to show that the eects of the interventions
on supermarket groups dier signicantly. Since authorities are not allowed to
pick "winners", it remains critical if addition in total supply justies dierent
decisions.
Moreover, we did not consider crisis dynamics. The objective of this article
was to quantify the value of a current level of information in contrast to
an alternative set of information. Therefore, we did not consider dynamic
eects, even though additional information might change the assessment
(for an overview of humanitarian logistics models that include real-time data,
see, for example, Yagci Sokat, Zhou, et al. (2016)). Therefore, the approach
could, for instance, be combined with dynamic optimization approaches
such as the work from Paterson et al. (2019), who developed a work-in-
progress approach for updating stochastic models of human-centric processes
in disaster management through unstructured data streams and encoded
information.
Furthermore, we treated every DP equally. Even though this is reasonable
within an analysis of system capacities, a prioritization of vulnerable parts of
the population could help to make the results more applicable for practice.
Closely connected is the denition of the next steps if authorities were to
implement ways to receive information in crises. This could include dening
DPs together, to agree on the format of the data sent (e.g. as an Excel, or as
GEO-Coded les), or to discuss the way authorities can process the data.
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E.7 Conclusion
Despite the challenges discussed above, the framework proved to quantify
the value of information in disasters eciently. Therefore, it can establish
itself as a powerful tool to improve disaster resilience.
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